

*The Language of
Communism*

DOUBLE
TALK

Harry Hodgkinson

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN

What Orwell predicted for 1984 has already come to pass in the sense that the Communist use of language can no longer be rightly interpreted without a dictionary. The events of the past few years have convinced even political innocents that words like Peace and Democracy have very different meanings when used by Communists. 'Peaceful Co-Existence' is a current example of a phrase which it would be dangerous to take at its face value—both East and West have their own interpretation.

To the Communists, words are weapons; this brief encyclopædia is a guide to their armoury. It gives authoritative interpretations of the Communist idiom, with historical background and with some humour. As such, it should be a useful work of reference for libraries, speakers, writers, broadcasters, and the newspaper reader. To those involved in any way in the verbal cold war it brings welcome aid.

Doubletalk



ROTOZEYSTVO. While the manager of a state establishment puts up a notice calling for vigilance, an 'enemy of the people' steals a secret document from his jacket pocket (Krokodil, 10 February 1953)

Doubletalk

THE LANGUAGE OF COMMUNISM

HARRY HODGKINSON

George Allen & Unwin Ltd

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PREFACE

AFTER his death, Stalin was praised by a member of the 'collective leadership' that succeeded him as the man who 'revealed the role played by language as an instrument for the development of society'. The quotation was incomplete. It tactfully omitted his reference, in the same sentence, to language as 'an instrument of struggle'. Words, said Stalin in effect, are weapons. Weapons, implied the new regime, are to be used with discretion, and not brandished indiscriminately.

To the Communist, as to everyone else, language is also a means of communication—'the most important means of human intercourse' was Lenin's description; but it has a special significance for him. Language was to Marx the 'direct reality' of thought; 'ideas do not exist divorced from' it. And for Stalin 'the reality of thought manifests itself in language'. Words are tools as well as weapons, each fashioned for a precise function. They must not be employed for the wrong purpose, or they will lose their sharp cutting edge and so their usefulness.

Words are not thus mere symbols but, to change the metaphor again, they store meaning rather as a battery stores electricity. When a Communist speaks, for example, of the 'Contradictions' in society, he is not merely referring in general to any tensions and conflicts of interest within it, but thinks he is being as specific and scientific as an engineer who talks of the strains in metals or an aircraft designer who studies an alloy's proneness to fatigue. Society and the human being within it are scientific problems; even the writer, according to Stalin, is an 'engineer of human souls'.

The language of Communism, therefore, is not so much a means of explaining to an unbeliever what Communism means, but an armoury of weapons and tools intended to produce support or dissolve opposition to Communist policies on the part of people either hostile or indifferent to them. The meaning of a Communist word is not what you think it says, but what effect it is intended to produce.

Some examples are so well known that they have long ceased to produce the expected response. The days have passed when well-intentioned but simple-minded people could be induced to sign

'Peace' petitions, for example, without first looking at the credentials of the sponsors, whose belligerent hearts often belie their pacific pretensions, as in the case of the Czech Communist who declared that he would 'batter the warmongers to death with peace'.

When this noble word became suspect, a more complicated phrase began to come to the fore; and it has become fashionable for the statesmen of the world to express their support for 'Co-existence', or 'Peaceful Co-existence' between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Whereas in their minds it can be translated as meaning that each bloc will adopt a policy of live and let live towards the other, it is for the Communists, on the contrary, a policy of live and let die. They believe that rival systems to their own are doomed; but they do not wish to be brought down themselves in a common disaster, and this phrase was formulated about thirty years ago to explain and justify a suitably prudent line of action.

At the worst, the use of such phrases is a surrender of moral and political initiative to the Communists; instead of fitting words to the realities of life, the words come to have an independent existence of their own and the realities tend to be distorted to fit them. At best, it is a source of endless misunderstanding. Agreement may appear to have been reached when the two parties mean quite different things by the words they use. Each continues to act in terms of his own understanding of them, and there follow inevitable accusations of betrayal from either side. It is wise, therefore, to find what the Communist states mean by such words as 'freedom', 'democracy', and 'peace' before making agreements with them, rather than suffer disillusion afterwards.

There are three main obstacles to such an understanding. First, Communist writings and speeches abound in technical jargon that means either nothing at all or something quite different to the rest of the world. Out of its context, the description of the Chinese Communist regime as 'a people's democratic dictatorship' is literally nonsense; but in fact it defines precisely the place of China in the Communist hierarchy. So, too, the 'workers', the 'working class', the 'class conscious workers', and the 'proletariat' represent four distinct concepts. This type of phraseology, which often reveals the intentions of the person using it, is the easiest to master. It merely calls for patience and familiarity, though it carries the occupational risk of supposing that all the categories to be found in the mind of a Communist must have a real existence in society.

Second, there are difficulties of translation. Much of the significance and effect of Communist writing in Russian depends on the vivid use of traditional words and expressions that lose their effect, even their point, in translation. *Kulak*, to us, is a foreign word and an alien idea. In Russian it means a fist, hence tight-fisted, hence a tight-fisted peasant; hence, long before the Revolution, a tight-fisted wealthy farmer exploiting the labour of poor landless peasants. And so, without ever needing to define precisely who is and who is not a *kulak*, the good citizen is expected to boil with indignation when the word is uttered, just as Pavlov's dogs salivated with pleasure at the sound of the dinner bell, even when it had ceased to mean that dinner was on the way. A *kulak* is in practice no more and no less than a peasant against whom the government intends to discriminate. In Russia in 1930 a peasant who wanted to keep any private land outside the collective farms could be branded as a *kulak*; in Czechoslovakia in 1954 a man farming over fifty acres of his own land was not so described so long as he produced all the food he could for the towns. In these matters of definition, the question as Humpty Dumpty said is 'who is to be master—that's all'.

The problem of translation applies, of course, in reverse. President Eisenhower, for example, appealed to the Soviet leaders for help in turning back 'the black tide of events'. *Pravda* translated 'the black tide' as 'the grave march' and in that simple transposition pointed the difference of mood between peoples of the ocean and those of a vast mainland washed by seas, tideless and often locked in ice; between individualists for whom history is a flux of events and men for whom it is an inexorable process, not to be tampered with or set back to an earlier stage. History can be a wheel or a highroad, but nothing so unmapped and unpredictable as the sea.

And third, there is the problem of misunderstanding, involuntary or deliberately cultivated. 'The genial Stalin', for example, was not a bluff, Falstaffian, happy-go-lucky figure but simply 'Stalin, the man of genius'. Yet, despite such experiences, we do tend on the whole to take words at their face value. Peace still means for us the absence of war; democracy still means a form of government in which the rulers are responsible to the ruled and to accepted laws and customs. Communists, for whom the spoken and written word is 'an instrument of struggle' towards power, can hardly be blamed for using the words most likely to induce us to hand over our destinies to them.

We ought to be blamed, however, if we do not halt these familiar-looking words and ask to look at their credentials. We should inquire not what they mean to us, nor even what they meant to Karl Marx and Lenin, but what on the ample evidence of Communist broadcasts, newspapers, speeches and books they mean here and now to Stalin's successors. That is what this glossary of modern Communist usage tries to do; it is intended as a contribution to what Wittgenstein has called the 'battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language'.

H. H.

July 1954

A NOTE ON SOURCES

AMONG the more valuable books for a study of modern Communism are, of course, the classic texts of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, especially Stalin's last pamphlets, *Marxism in Linguistics* (1950) and *Economic Problems of Socialism* (1952). A comparison between the entries in different editions of the *Soviet Encyclopaedia* is often illuminating. (Sometimes reprinting does not keep pace with policy changes; e.g. during 1954 subscribers to the latest edition were sent new pages to be inserted in place of those devoted to the achievements of L. P. Beria, whose fall inconveniently took place after the relevant volume had gone to press.) Comparable changes of emphasis and definition are to be found in a comparison of various editions of the *Standard Dictionary of the Russian Language*.

The other main written sources found useful in compiling this glossary have been :

SOVIET NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Izvestia (News), the Government daily.

Pravda (Truth), the Communist Party daily.

Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), the Armed Forces daily. (*Krasniy Flot* (Red Fleet), the separate Navy daily, ceased publication in 1953; replaced in 1954 by *Sovietsky Flot* (Soviet Fleet)).

Komsomolskaya Pravda, the Young Communist League daily.

Kommunist, the ideological organ of the Communist Party.

Ogonyok (Light), illustrated weekly.

Krokodil (Crocodile), humorous and satirical paper.

Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette), literary newspaper with a strong interest in international politics.

Zvezda (Star), Leningrad literary and critical monthly.

Bloknot Agitatora (Agitator's Notebook).

TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) agency messages.

PROPAGANDA JOURNALS IN ENGLISH

Cominform Journal (the name given throughout this book to the Cominform's weekly, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*) is a guide to Communist Party policy developments, especially in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe.

Soviet Union, an illustrated monthly.

New Times, weekly magazine dealing with international affairs.

Soviet Literature, monthly journal, containing long extracts from new novels, poetry, reviews, etc.

Soviet Woman, bi-monthly journal.

(The above are duplicated in French, German, Spanish and other languages.)

Soviet News (London), a weekly news-sheet.

News, a fortnightly journal intended primarily for English-speaking readers.

Satellite Newspapers mainly quoted are *Rude Pravo* and *Lidove Noviny* (Czechoslovakia); *Zycie Warszawy* (Poland); *Tägliche Rundschau* and *Neues Deutschland* (Eastern Germany).

Much valuable material not easily available otherwise is given by Moscow Radio and satellite broadcasting stations on their extensive system of home and foreign-language services.

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ABBREVIATIONS. The great length of Russian words, combined with the great wordiness of communist language, has produced a proliferation of synthetic words formed from the initial letters or syllables of phrases and titles. The pre-military Voluntary Society for Co-operation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy (*Dobrovolnoye Obshchestvo Dlya Sodeystva Armii, Aviatsiy i Flota*) becomes more manageable in both print and mouth as DOSAAF. Such new words take on a life of their own and have grammatical variations played on them. A member of the Komsomol (Young Communist League) is a *komsomolets*; its newspaper is the *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. Before the war a member of the NKVD (security police) was an *enkavedist*. Earlier still the *Kadets* whom the Bolsheviks fought in 1917 had nothing to do with the Army; they were members of the Constitutional Democratic Party, whose title had been telescoped. Still to be met with are KIM (the former Youth International); NEP (Lenin's New Economic Policy, or retreat to qualified capitalistic enterprise in 1921); and SMERSH (*smert shpionam*: death to spies), the wartime name for the Soviet Army counter-espionage organisation. vokhs, which looks after visitors, is the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The habit is not confined to politics. The Moscow Arts Theatre, for example, is popularly spoken of as *Mkhat*, which is rather as if everyone in London spoke of Sadler's Wells as Swelt, or the Polytechnic Institute as the Pin instead of the Polly. (See also COMINFORM, COMINTERN, KOMSOMOL, MVD, POLITBURO, VPK.)

ABSOLUTISM. 'Absolutism in Russia fell as a result of the bourgeois democratic revolution of 1917. The leader of that revolution was the proletariat, directed by the party of Lenin-Stalin.' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1949 ed.) These three doubtful propositions, while affording a compact example of modern communist methods of writing history, also show why the communists cannot accept

any criticism of their own regime as absolutist. Theirs is 'soviet democracy' or 'popular democracy', as distinct from 'parliamentary democracy'; and they are prepared to argue, if at all, only over the relative merits of the adjectives.

ABUSE, though prolific, is not indiscriminate. It is of three kinds:

(1) Epithets, used with varying degrees of sincerity, which spring from the view of the non-communist world as ruled by millionaires who sacrifice people to profits—such are 'man-hating cannibals' and 'capitalist hyenas'.

(2) Phrases deliberately used, tongue in cheek, to raise prejudice against opponents—such verbal caricatures are 'chewing-gum spivs', 'boogie-woogie tramps' (Americans), 'paralytic sycophants', and 'playboy soldiers' (British).

(3) Words used within the communist movement to attack backsliders or those who have fallen out of favour, such as 'Trotskyite scum', 'Bukharinite diversionist', 'opportunist'. These are a form of political shorthand, telling the initiated the type of offence alleged to have been committed and producing by reiteration a reflex emotion of hatred against the offender.

AGGRESSION 'presumes a conflict between states, and the aggressor is he who first attacks.' (Mr. Vishinsky, 2 October 1950). This definition expressly excludes civil wars: 'No aggression exists in the case of internal conflict. There is aggression in the case of interference with the internal affairs of a state.' This means that the legitimate government of any country defending itself in civil war is unable to receive help from other states without making them guilty of 'aggression'. The presence of North Korean forces in South Korea in 1950 was legitimate civil war according to this definition, and North Korea was therefore excluded from censure by the Warsaw Peace Congress definition of an aggressor as the country which 'first reverted to armed forces, regardless of circumstances'. China, by sending only so-called 'volunteers', was equally immune, and so the United Nations automatically became the 'aggressors' because they sought no legal subterfuge for the presence of their forces in South Korea. If, however, they had remained technically guiltless by adopting the idea of 'volunteers' they could still have been branded as aggressors by definition, for Aggression is (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1949 ed.) 'the basic method of the foreign policy of

imperialist states in the epoch of imperialism, when contradictions in the capitalist world are sharpened to the extreme; the method of forcibly dividing the world'. It is also 'characteristic of the class society in the pre-imperialist period, reflecting the aspirations of the ruling classes to widen their sphere of exploitation of the workers by conquering and subjecting foreign peoples and lands'. It is thus axiomatic that 'imperialist' and 'pre-imperialist' capitalist states (that is, non-communist ones) must behave in an aggressive fashion, and so no necessity devolves upon their critics to produce specific evidence of aggressive acts.

The USSR has for many years attempted to have aggression precisely defined internationally, and its own proposals have remained essentially unchanged from the League of Nations Temporary Mixed Commission of February 1932 to the Legal Committee of the United Nations Assembly in January 1952. The Russians have always sought to ban 'interference' in the affairs of other countries as well as blockades while excluding civil wars and 'infringement of treaties'. Most other countries have felt that no system of definitions can be foolproof; and that, as a British Lord Chancellor once said on the subject: 'No one can define a pretty girl but, thank heaven, we know one when we see one.' The tendency to bind others and preserve freedom of action for oneself, never wholly absent in attempts to define aggression, may have prompted Clemenceau's remark, *L'agresseur, c'est l'autre*.

AGITATOR. The word preserves much of its original Latin meaning of one who moves or drives another, and has not the pejorative sense it possesses outside the Communist orbit. *Pravda* referred in December 1951 to 'the honourable role' of the agitator in leading the people towards Communism.

The *agitatori*, of whom there are several million (China alone has 1½ million, some of them non-Communists, and Bulgaria has 220,000), are mostly volunteers who influence the group among whom they work, but a minority are professionals. All are concerned with popularising Soviet foreign policy and encouraging increased production at home, often by recommending and supervising the introduction of new techniques. The agitator is the man or woman who understands the Party's reasons for particular lines of policy and has the ability to explain them and make them acceptable to the general public, both communist and non-communist.

He is thus a combination of salesman, preacher, and public relations officer who can, in the business phrase, 'sell' official policy in the factory and on the farm, in talks with individuals or small groups of people.

In order 'to bring broad masses of the working class into action', Stalin said it was necessary for the agitator 'to explain patiently and attentively, so that people should understand what the Party wants and whither it is leading the country. They did not understand today, then make sure to explain it tomorrow. They did not understand the next day, make sure to explain it the day after. Without this there is not nor can there be any leadership at present.' (*Cominform Journal*, 25 January 1952.)

The political function of the agitators is thus to increase the area of consent among the governed. To this end, they explain 'the great goals of the struggle' for peace and socialism; they 'organise the masses to work for fulfilment and over-fulfilment of state plans'; they 'popularise the Stalin peace policy'. Thus a general election is not so much an occasion for a formal vote of confidence in the Soviet Government (which is accorded by more than 99 per cent. of those voting) as for giving the Government an opportunity of carrying its propaganda into the homes and workshops of all its citizens. A correspondent in *Izvestia* (9 February 1951) said of the current election that he and other workers at 'the back of beyond', the Sinai station on the Pechora railway, had not been able to 'participate' in this great event because they had no newspapers or wireless and 'during the whole election campaign neither I nor my neighbours have seen a single agitator'.

Communist regimes set great store by their agitators, and where important changes are planned—especially when hostility or incomprehension is to be expected—the Government can be caused considerable embarrassment by any inadequacy or excess of zeal on the part of the agitators. This occurred in Bulgaria during the programme of farm collectivisation early in 1951. The Prime Minister personally addressed agitators of the Sofia region on 7 April, accusing them or their colleagues of over-persuading the peasants to join collectives by promising them everything they wanted—food, more fodder, houses, clothes, vineyards, and their own livestock. Members who had joined, bringing livestock and implements with them, were now leaving again in disillusion, and taking their possessions with them. Chervenkov commented:

'It is impossible to rule the population simply by commanding them.'

Agitators' appointments are approved at local Communist Party meetings, to which they also report back on their work. The branch secretary is personally responsible for supervising their work. The Party organisations are expected to see that the agitation for which they are responsible is continuous and not confined to special campaigns, and that some local significance is always discovered and dwelt on when general political questions are being discussed (*Cominform Journal*, 25 January 1952). In the USSR there are 120 local editions of *Bloknot Agitatora* (*The Agitator's Notebook*), a pocket size publication of the type of a political party's 'notes for canvassers' or 'campaign handbook'. It is issued three times a month, and the Moscow edition has a circulation of 170,000 copies. In Italy a weekly paper is published for agitators, and *France Nouvelle*, the French communist weekly, contains 'Pages for Agitators'.

Agitation is being constantly extended to 'new forms and methods of mass political agitation'. In Czechoslovakia, during one of the communist peace campaigns, a Pilsen schoolboy called F. Fux 'thought of a good way to agitate for peace' (*Rude Pravo*, 16 February 1951). He wrote to his father: 'I would like you to decide to increase your working output to prove that you have joined the defenders of peace.' The father did not react in what may perhaps be defined as a bourgeois fashion, but answered simply: 'Dear Son, As a driver in the Pilsen building works, I intend to pledge myself to increase my efficiency by 15 per cent. If necessary, I will also work on Sundays.' This exchange of letters took place at a time when workers were being invited to work Sunday shifts without pay.

(There is some risk in quoting Czechoslovak examples, of course. One can never be wholly sure that the spirit of the Good Soldier Schwejk is absent. Thus the Education Minister, Nejedlý, broadcasting on the Slovak poet Kollar's vision of Slav unity, said (27 January 1952): 'How ridiculous for Beneš, the Westerner without a shadow of Slav sentiment, to ask in 1945 whether Stalin, a Georgian, could understand the Slav idea and policy!' This phrase, while ostensibly a glowing tribute to Stalin, is open to the reflection that Beneš, whatever his 'sentiments', was a Slav by birth, which no Georgian could ever be. To unfriendly ears Nejedlý must have conveyed an opposite effect to the one presumably intended.)

AGROGOROD ('Agro-town') is a town built in the countryside to house the members of a 'superkolkhoz'—a collective farming unit of from 500 to a few thousand families, formed by the amalgamation of smaller collective farms, each of from ten to thirty families. (See KOLKHOZ.) 'The agrogorods are a new and admirable phenomenon of rural construction such as history never knew until our day. The creation of these towns is an important step towards destruction of the contrast between town and country.' (*Bloknot Agitatora*, December 1950.) In January 1951, N. S. Khrushchev noted with approval that collectivised peasants were becoming more like industrial workers. The new rural towns had become an important problem, and the large *kolkhozes* must now assume responsibility for housing, helping to make the farmer's life similar to that of the town dweller's. The Party must guide the work, which should start with 'public and production buildings'. Houses for the farmers could be individual or contain several apartments, and the greater part of the individual allotments of land (a collective farmer has about an acre of privately-owned land) should be situated outside the village. The new house, outbuildings, small kitchen garden, and orchard should not contain more than a quarter to a third of an acre of land. This would prevent the villages from spreading enormously, and involving more water pipes, more electric cables, more roads, and so on. Superkolkhozes must set up their own building brigades and provide building materials, using material from old houses extensively. Khrushchev said that the word *agrogorod*, which had been used in the Ukraine, was too ambitious and implied too much. He preferred the term *kolkhoznyi poselok*, collective farm settlement.

Khrushchev's speech, made in Moscow on 18 January, was not published until 4 March, and a *Pravda* editorial of 10 March said it was 'only intended as a basis for discussion'. It was followed by frank criticism from various parts of the USSR, particularly from Armenia. The tempo of amalgamations slackened. *Kolkhozes* declined in numbers from 254,000 to 123,000 in the single year 1950, but by October 1952 they still numbered just on 100,000. Malenkov told the 19th Party Congress on 5 October 1952 that officials, 'especially in the amalgamation of the small collective farms, have adopted a wrong, narrow, utilitarian approach. . . . They proposed to carry out a post-haste mass resettlement of the villages and their reconstitution as large collective farm settlements, demolish the

old collective farm installations and houses of the collective farmers and create in the new places large collective farm settlements, collective farm towns "agro-towns". This they regarded as the most important task in the organisational-economic consolidation of the collective farms.

'The mistake of these comrades lies in the fact that they have forgotten the main production tasks of the collective farms, and put the primary emphasis upon their derivative-utilitarian tasks—those concerning amenities on the collective farms. Amenities are doubtless important; but they are, however, secondary rather than primary tasks and can be successfully solved only on the basis of well-developed communal production. The tendency to forget or minimise the main production tasks might have led our practical work in the countryside astray, hampered the further upsurge of the collective farms and inflicted great harm upon the welfare arrangements, as well as upon the whole cause of socialist development. The Party took timely measures to overcome these wrong tendencies in the sphere of collective farm construction.' The tasks in the *kolkhozes*, said Malenkov, were to ensure the growth of farm production and an increase in the material standard and welfare of the farmer.

The apparent conflict of view between Khrushchev and Malenkov may have represented a change in tactics rather than a basic difference of view on policy. The *agrorod* policy, which would involve eventually rehousing the 18½ million families working on collective farms, makes great demands on the country's resources, not to mention the possible reactions of the farmers themselves. But *agrorods* appear to be favoured in principle and Stalin prophesied in October 1952 (*Economic Problems*, pp. 30-1) that great new towns would appear 'as centres not only of large-scale industry, but also of the processing of agricultural produce and of powerful development of all branches of the food industry'. The actual word may prove, however, to be too compromised for revival. An Estonian paper (*Rahva Hääl*, 27 February 1953) criticised a local Komsomol magazine for 'the boring repetition of the word *agrotown*'.

Mr. Khrushchev's campaign, from Autumn 1953, for the development of virgin and marginal lands in Kazakhstan and elsewhere eschewed the word *Agrorod*; but there were signs that something similar might emerge from it. Activity was made to centre

on the Machine Tractor Stations; the new settlements were described with pictures and a plan in *Sovietsky Soyuz*, February 1954, and given the name of *Zernograd* (Grain Town) in *Ogonyok*, 23 May 1954.

ALASKA. There have been several indications since the war that the Soviet regime regrets its predecessor sold Alaska to the United States in 1867 for \$7,200,000. It is felt to have been a bad bargain. 'An absurd sum: 5 cents a hectare', said the Soviet geographical magazine *Vokrug Svyeta* in February 1951, reflecting on the country's mineral riches. It is also felt to have been an unnecessary restriction of Russian influence. Russians explored the Pacific coast of America from the seventeenth century and went as far as Hawaii. The Russian flag flew near San Francisco before the American and Russian settlements were made in Alaska around the end of the eighteenth century. But these outlying outposts were subsequently withdrawn. 'The power and glory of the Motherland grew dim on the distant coasts, which fell into worthless hands.' (*Vokrug Svyeta*.) Finally Alaska was sold. Mr. V. V. Kuznetsov, appointed a Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1953, is quoted by the Yugoslav Communist Sretan Zujevic as having seen a map of Alaska in Fairbanks when the two of them were returning from the United Nations meetings in San Francisco in 1945. 'Kuznetsov began to curse the Americans, and I remember he said: "That is ours, it's Russian: they took it from us, we'll take it from them." ' (*Dedijer, Tito Speaks*, 1952.)

ALCOHOLISM. The Eastern European Industrial Revolution, like the Western of a century ago, has found itself confronted with the threat to production represented by heavy drinking, whether as a survival from more rustic and bucolic habits or as an escape from the drabness and dislocation of industrialisation, or even to help in making good deficiencies of diet. 'The struggle against alcoholism' was therefore ordered, first in Czechoslovakia and from the beginning of 1951 in Poland. Trade Unions and works committees were employed in tactics that savoured both of old style temperance revivalism and the more sophisticated Alcoholics Anonymous. Some works councils sent addicts for medical treatment. Warsaw Radio on 12 January 1951 offered its microphone to an employee at the agricultural technical services workshop, Lublin,

who said that since giving up vodka (after therapy) he was achieving great production results. 'I have broken with my old life, and I feel much better.' He added that he was working more efficiently, and so 'my wages have gone up considerably'. Polish factories drew up tables of absenteeism or late arrival caused by drinking. These did not solve the problem, and a law was introduced forbidding the sale of alcohol not only on pay days but also 'during popular meal hours in restaurants and public houses'. The Polish newspaper *Zycie Warszawy* said (3 February 1951) that this was producing 'positive results'.

In Hungary the more negative method of control is replaced by the offer of tempting substitutes. *Kis Ujsag*, the Smallholders' Party organ, announced (23 October 1951) that a new drink had been prepared for miners and building workers. It consists of 'planta' (a tea-substitute), honey, citric acid, hawthorn berries, and sugar, and 'the addition of hot water produces a tasty and nourishing beverage'. It was to be obtained at mobile buffets which 'serve dishes rich in vitamins and welcome workers with merry tunes played on gramophone records'.

A campaign against drunkenness in the USSR was heralded with the publication of a nineteenth-century temperance painting of a wife barring the entrance to the tavern to her sot of a husband (*Ogonyok*, 20 September 1953); and it increased in intensity during the early months of 1954. Photographs of drunkards were published in *Verchernyaya Moskva* (3 April 1954); and Koktail Khall, a leading Moscow bar since before the war, where teen-agers had begun to congregate until long after midnight, was closed in June 1954 and turned into an ice cream parlour. Street corner booths sprang up for the sale of liquor and became popularly known as 'green sentry boxes'. In Rostov-on-Don, the concentration round the gates of the agricultural machinery factory grew so great that the Young Communist League protested to the police. Some moved away; others, while carrying on with their old business, put out signs suggesting they were selling ice cream, fruit juice drinks, and *shashlik* (skewered roast meat). A local policeman and Communist Party member complained that the factory workers 'run into beer halls at every step. The young people are being ruined by these drink shops. "Quick-drink" bars are hothouses breeding hooligans. Every fight and quarrel starts there.' (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 7 May 1954.) Writers, as well as workers, are 'often found

carousing' in '“lunchrooms” and shops bearing the sign “beer and waters” (meaning vodka) which are called “quick-drink” shops by their addicts’. ‘We think it is high time public opinion should be roused against these violations of Socialist ethics . . . effective measures to combat drunkenness should be worked out.’ (*Literary Gazette*, 6 April 1954.)

AMERICA has a strange fascination for Soviet Communism, hardly dissimilar from the compound of respect and hatred to be found in Mitya Karamazoff's outburst in the penultimate chapter of Dostoevsky's novel: 'I hate that America already! And though they may be wonderful at machinery, every one of them, damn them, they are not of my soul.' They are 'that rabble out there, though they may be better than I, every one of them'. The feeling is something like that of the brother of the Prodigal Son experienced on discovering—as he thought—that rewards are not distributed according to merits.

Although so much of the outer form of life in the USSR—for example, the Moscow skyscrapers, modern aircraft, new industrial techniques—appear to follow American models, any obligation is bitterly repudiated; partly, perhaps, because accusations of plagiarism would touch the Soviet leaders on a very sore spot at a time when they are determined to prove their economic freedom from cultural independence of and military superiority to the United States. America is resented, not merely for her 'imperialists' or her standing as a Great Power, but for the humbler details of daily habits which go to build a 'Way of Life' apparently acceptable to millions of people in the USA and, with modifications, elsewhere in the world.

The official Soviet defence of its own more austere Way of Life against what it regards as the meretricious surface glitter of Americanism—glossy magazines, plentiful semi-luxuries like cars and household gadgets, Hollywood film stars and so forth—is somewhat the equivalent of the old Puritan's denunciations of Vanity Fair and his variations on the theme that strait is the gate and narrow is the way.

The assault on all things American begins with the transatlantic claim to be a bastion of freedom. The USA is on the contrary 'the prime example of the police State backed by arbitrary use of power and fascist force' (*Moscow Radio*, 11 February 1951). 'The

USA today is one huge prison. No American citizen can feel safe from being seized in the street and being cast into jail.' (*Moscow Radio*, 9 February 1951.) The importance of such phrases as a counterblast to the frequent similar allegations against the USSR need no stressing. They are also intended to break down any remaining sympathy among the masses of Eastern Europe, for whom America has always been more than a geographical location, and has become a sort of earthly paradise affording both refuge from oppressive governments and a high living standard.

To break down this sympathy, hardly anything of the American tradition, so far as it is known to the masses, is allowed to survive. Only Lincoln abides the Soviet question, although Washington and F. D. Roosevelt, each in his different context, are spoken of with respect. Even American leaders not normally associated with the extreme Right are singled out for abuse. Woodrow Wilson was 'a past master at political skulduddery' [*sic*] (*New Times*, No. 27, 1951), and the idea of awarding a Nobel Peace Prize to Harry S. Truman was 'like applying hot poultices to a corpse' (*Lidove Noviny*, Prague, 20 January 1951). Leading business men are credited with literal descent from seventeenth-century pirates and private incomes of up to \$50 million a year. 'Not knowing what to do with their money, wealthy Americans are surpassing Caligula and giving banquets in honour of their dogs and erecting monuments to them.' (*Bucharest Radio*, 27 February 1951.) There is perhaps a certain charm in this glimpse into the depths of Caligula's wickedness; but worse is to follow. The allegations of germ warfare in North Korea in 1952 were the climax of a campaign accusing the USA of trying to ruin East Europe's crops in 1950 by dropping the Colorado beetle ('the American beetle') and reaching out even to that humble amenity of life in the United States, Coca-Cola. A new Coca-Cola bottling plant being built at Lambach, Upper Austria, was in effect an 'ammunition factory': 'the small brown bottle is but the forerunner of the bomb; the poison it contains prepares the way for poison gas' (*Vienna Radio's Russian Hour*, 23 March 1951). As with American drinks, so with American clothes. In December 1951, a dance attended by young workers of the Dunapentele (Hungary) steel works was interrupted by a microphone saying: 'We, people of Sztalinvaros (Stalin's town, the new name for Dunapentele), do not tolerate the presence here of people imitating American fashions. Therefore we request the

young man wearing a grey flannel suit and a yellow shirt to leave the building with his partner immediately.' The young people referred to were soon surrounded by 'a group of laughing and mocking youths' (*Szabad Ifjusag*, Hungarian Communist youth journal, 18 December 1951).

Three other themes are constant: the Negro problem, any outrages being presented as normal and typical of the whole country; unemployment, sometimes said to have reached 25 million, as imperialism 'drains the last drop of blood and dooms the workers to hunger and poverty' (*Pravda*, 16 March 1951); the Dollar as an instrument of spreading American influence: 'the dollar is the expression of the impertinence and robbery committed by the U.S. misers' (*Moscow Radio*, 21 May 1951).

AMNESTY. 'A State which enjoys authority need fear no danger in putting an end to repressions on appropriate grounds if the extreme necessity for repressions has passed, and such action can only benefit such a State and further increase its authority, enlisting in its support an ever increasing number of new strata of society.' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia of State and Law*, 'Amnesty'.) On this reasoning, the amnesty proclaimed on 28 March 1953 for non-political prisoners serving sentences of less than five years was presumably an attempt by Stalin's successors to win a greater measure of popular approval.

ANARCHISM is a 'petty bourgeois, reactionary, social-political current, hostile to the proletarian scientific socialism' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1950, 'Anarchism'). Communists have always been bitterly hostile to anarchism, from the days of Engels' comment that William Godwin was 'decidedly anti-social' to Stalin's study of the subject, *Socialism and Anarchism*. Anarcho-syndicalism, or direct action by anarchist factory workers, is equally anathema. Communism, as a centralising movement, rejects the anarchist's suspicions of the State and considers that by demanding respect for individual rights even from a revolutionary movement, it is serving the ends of bourgeois morality. 'The anarcho-syndicalists carry their treacherous activities under the banner of the "protection of the rights of the individual and his free development".' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*.) The bitterest phase of relations between Communism and Anarchism was during the Spanish Civil War in 1936-9.

ANTI-SEMITISM, a permanent feature of life in Tsarist Russia, was repudiated by the Bolsheviks. Some of the leaders of the Revolution—for example, Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev—were themselves Jews, and so were many Communist party leaders at local levels. These developments did not, however, eradicate a deep-seated anti-semitism among the Russians; on the contrary, they may have done something to exacerbate it. The disqualification of a Jew simply for being a Jew, which is the mark of anti-semitism pure and simple, has thus no place in communist theory. But in practice this may prove something of a quibble. The communist leaders refuse to accept the view that Jewry has any of the characteristics of a nation. For them, a Russian Jew is a Russian citizen who holds the Jewish religious faith or has been raised in a Jewish cultural environment. His nationality and class affiliations are the characteristic things about him, not his Jewishness. This point of view has been held consistently since the early days, when the Bolsheviks repudiated the principle of organising Jewish workers in a specifically Jewish party, the Bund. 'The idea of a Jewish nationality has a plainly reactionary character not only among its consistent adherents (Zionists) but also among those who try to combine it with the ideas of Social Democracy.' (Lenin, *Works*, vol. 7, pp. 84-5.)

Social assimilation, with cultural and religious freedom, was thus the natural policy for the communist regime to follow. Jewish theatres and newspapers were permitted, and an attempt was even made to rival the growing attractiveness of the Jewish National Home in Palestine by the creation, in May 1928, of a settlement for Jews in Birobidjan, in Asia. This, however, attracted a negligible proportion even of Russian Jews, and its present population is probably not more than 140,000, only about 30 per cent. of them Jewish. There seems no reasonable doubt that the position of Jews in the USSR steadily worsened from the 1930s onwards. In 1940 the Western Ukraine, despite its large Jewish population, elected a list of fifty-five names to the Supreme Soviet, not one of which was Jewish. The Jewish and Yiddish Press was closed down; Jewish cultural movements brought to an end; and Jews virtually disappeared from prominent roles in the USSR and allied states. The Yugoslav Milovan Djilas has stated that an official of the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party 'boasted

to me of how Zhdanov had purged every Jew from the Central Committee' (*Borba*, (Yugoslav Daily), 14 December 1952).

After the creation of the Israeli State and the impetus this gave to Jews in Eastern Europe to emigrate and live in a Jewish community, propaganda against Zionism began to be couched in terms which ran with the hare of tolerance and hunted with the hounds of anti-semitism. Israeli leaders, though not attacked as Jews, were described as 'the patron of pogroms' (*Bucharest Radio*, 14 November 1950). Warsaw Radio asked its Yiddish listeners in America to drive out 'the Jewish warmongers, the agents of Wall Street' (19 April 1951). The Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto rising of 1943 were said to have been betrayed by 'the capitalist Jews and the leaders of the Zionist parties . . . base traitors, who collaborated with the Gestapo and the Hitlerite commanders, sent the Jews to extermination camps' (*Bucharest Radio*, 19 April 1951). This propaganda reached its pitch in the last months of Stalin's life. The Jewish relief agency, the Joint Distribution Agency, or Joint, which had helped in the emigration of so many Jews from Europe to Palestine immediately after the war, was attacked as a 'vile Zionist spy organisation' which relied on 'a group of decadent Jewish bourgeois nationalists' (*Bloknot Agitatora*, No. 3, January 1953). In January 1953 a 'plot' was revealed in which a number of doctors, including several Jews, were accused of trying to kill Soviet military and political leaders. This garbled story was discredited after March 1953 and Soviet propaganda became less exposed to criticisms of anti-semitism in its continued attacks on Zionism. The 'despicable adventurers' who had fabricated the story of the Doctors' Plot were accused of trying to kindle 'feelings of national hostility deeply alien to the Socialist ideology' (*Pravda*, 6 April 1953).

APPARAT, the administrative apparatus, usually of State or Party; the 'Party machine'.

ARAKCHEYEVISM is 'an arbitrary regime of crude military discipline' (Stalin, *Linguistics*, 1950), similar to that exercised by Arakcheyev (1769-1834), police chief under the Tsars Nicholas I and Alexander I; and refers to any local Soviet potentate who intimidates potential critics by threats of force. It was a favourite epithet of Stalin's, but has occasionally been used since his death. Mgeladze, former secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, was

said to have 'instituted an Arakchayev regime within Georgian science' (*Zarya Vostoka* (Dawn in the East), Georgia, 21 April 1953).

ARCHITECTURE. So-called 'Russian classical architecture' is in standard use throughout the USSR, varying from the frank copy of classical models for theatres to modern skyscrapers decorated with columns, ideological emblems and national motifs, such as crenellations and clock towers reminiscent of the Moscow Kremlin. This same style is exported from Russia to the smaller republics, with appropriate modifications. There is some resistance to it. The Lithuanian Directorate of Architectural Affairs, for example, is accused of 'lagging behind life', because instead of approving projects submitted to them 'in a businesslike manner', they 'introduce questions of taste into architecture', and protest against the 'excessive pomposity' of the Russian buildings. At Vilnius 'there were insistent proposals for the removal of artistic cast-iron balconies ornamented with national Lithuanian motifs' (*Soviet-skaya Litva* (*Soviet Lithuania*), 8 May 1953).

ART is frankly propagandist, and is to be used 'in the interests of the ideological education of the masses' (*Cominform Journal*, 4 May 1951). Subject-matter is thus more important than style; and intelligibility is essential, since what is intended to influence millions must be understood by millions. The late A. A. Zhdanov gave this requirement a quasi-ideological basis by saying that while not everything intelligible to the public was a work of genius, every product of genius must be so intelligible to a greater or lesser degree. Abstraction in painting and sculpture are thus abhorred; they belong to 'decaying Western art', and are part of its 'cult of ugliness and immorality' (*Tägliche Rundschau*, Berlin, 28 January 1951). The result is that to Western eyes, Soviet art seems to remain in the nineteenth century in respect of its technique. There is no room for a theory of art for art's sake, since all art is practised for the sake of Marxism-Leninism.

ASTROBOTANY is a 'new science', dealing with vegetation on Mars and Venus, 'founded' by Professor G. A. Tikhov of Alma Ata, who says that the adaptability of vegetation to the cold climate of Mars is 'another incontrovertible proof of the fact that life has emerged everywhere that conditions are suitable, and deals a

deadly blow to religious maunderings about a supposed divine origin of life' (*Moscow Radio*, 24 February 1951). On Venus, where the temperature is 80° C. or more, the vegetation is red and orange, because it needs less solar heat and reflects these rays, as do the red algae in the hot springs of the Pamir mountains (*Moscow Radio*, 17 June 1953). Professor Barabashev, who once spent forty-eight consecutive nights patiently and carefully observing the grey clouds and fogs of Mars, has now turned to Venus, where life has already emerged or will shortly do so in the 'large tracts of water' he believes that he has found there. Conditions on Venus are now comparable to those existing on the earth 300 million years ago. (*Moscow Radio*, 17 June 1954.)

ATOMIC DIPLOMACY refers to Western, and especially American policy towards the USSR when the USA held a monopoly of the production of the atom bomb. 'The collapse of atomic diplomacy became fully obvious when on 25 September 1949 *Tass* issued a communique stating that the Soviet Union possessed the secret of the atomic weapon.' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*.)

ATOMIC ENERGY. Soviet physicists 'discovered' the spontaneous fission of the uranium atom and made a 'significant contribution' to atomic bomb theory. 'The principles of producing a chain reaction were clear'; the main trouble was the need to expend labour in solving 'complicated scientific and technical tasks'. Hence, runs the Soviet apology for not having been ahead in construction of the bomb, the USA was able to solve the practical problem earlier because 'the main burden of the war against Germany was borne by the USSR' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*).

BASE or BASIS. 'The basis is the economic structure of society at the given stage of its development. The superstructure is the political, religious, artistic, philosophical views of society and the political, legal and other institutions corresponding to them.' (Stalin, *Marxism in Linguistics*, 1950.) This conception of Base and Superstructure is central to the Marxist interpretation of society. (See HISTORICAL MATERIALISM.) The logical paradox of the Bolsheviks is that by the Revolution of 1917 they began to erect a 'superstructure' for which, at least in Russia, no corresponding 'base' existed. They therefore began to create the base—a highly-indus-

trialised, State-owned economy—which in strict Marxist theory should develop through feudal and bourgeois stages to proletarian dictatorship and socialism. It was Stalin who *ex post facto* gave an ideological flavour to what had originally been a political decision apparently flouting the original Marxist idea of economic motivation and social determinism. He described the action as ‘a revolution from above . . . accomplished on the initiative of the existing power’ (*Linguistics*, 1950).

BDITYELNOST (see VIGILANCE).

BLAT, ‘influence’; the ability to induce the right person to produce the particular privilege—perhaps not strictly legal—that happens to be sought after, such as getting material in short supply for use in one’s own factory. *Blat* is exerted by the *tolkach* (q.v.).

BOLSHEVISM was born in Tottenham Court Road, London, in July 1903. The constituent congress of the Workers’ Social-Democratic Party of Russia, prevented from meeting in Brussels, transferred itself there and faced the task of agreeing on the organisation and programme of the party. There were fifty-eight delegates, of whom fourteen were consultative. From the beginning they were divided into two fairly equal groups, headed by Lenin and Martov. Lenin’s group, which had 23 votes against Martov’s 28 in an early vote, was described as ‘Iskraists’ (from *Iskra*, ‘the Spark’, the name of Lenin’s newspaper) or ‘hards’ (from its desire to render membership of the Party more difficult). Its rivals were ‘softs’, because it approached the membership problem in the spirit of Martov’s ‘the more people there are called Party members, the better it will be’. Lenin’s view of the relation between Party and working class was: ‘Our task is to form a clandestine group of leaders and to set the largest possible mass in motion’.

This division extended to the internal organisation of the party. Lenin wished to give the central committee greater powers, as against the rank and file (his famous ‘Democratic Centralism’) and when the vote was taken on this issue he won by 19 against 17, with 3 abstentions. Several moderates had left. The majority (*bolshinstvo* in Russian) became the Bolsheviks and the minority (*menshinstvo*) became the Mensheviks. The Party was split, however, and did not unite again until 1917. The Bolsheviks became a

majority among the Russian workers as a whole in the Soviet elections just before the October Revolution.

The word was maintained in the official title of the Soviet Communist Party (VCP(b)), or *Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (bolsheviki)*: All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) until shortly before the 19th Party Congress (October 1952). It was then dropped as no longer necessary, and 'Bolshevik' is now a historic term.

BOURGEOIS. In Marxist terms, the bourgeoisie is the class of owners of capital whose wealth and initiative break up feudal society and substitute a capitalist system. This in turn calls for concentrated production and a large working class or proletariat whose interests are in 'contradiction' to those of the bourgeoisie, and whose greater numbers and use of the Marxist 'scientific' analysis of society will eventually enable them to supplant it. The bourgeoisie is regarded as 'progressive' wherever it attacks pre-existing forms of society to carry through industrialisation and establish parliamentary democracy; but reactionary when it has become satisfied with the existing scheme of things and resists further revolutionary change. Communist technique, therefore, is to enter into alliance with any 'progressive' bourgeois revolution which breaks out and to maintain its impetus beyond the bourgeois and parliamentary and into the communist and soviet stage, as in the Russian Revolution of 1917. (Lenin, *Selected Works*, New York, 1943, vol. 3, p. 77.)

Feudal Bourgeois is a variant referring to a regime, as in pre-war Albania, where the new bourgeois and old feudal classes are composed of the same people. (*Tirana Radio*, 10 January 1951.)

Bourgeois is used less precisely as a term of abuse for people who, through opposition, indifference or personal distaste, cannot be counted on as supporters of a communist regime. 'Bourgeois survivals' in people's mentality make them unreliable citizens. Nationalists (e.g. Ukrainians) who wish their countries a modified form of government are 'bourgeois nationalists'. *Meshchanskiy* (petty bourgeois) is a term of contempt for anyone who prefers domestic comfort and a better immediate standard of life to the rigours demanded as a prelude to the promised long-term rewards for 'building communism'. The related but separate problem of the rise of 'bourgeois-mindedness' (presumably as a result of the

growing wealth of privileged groups in Russia) is dealt with under BURZHUAZNOST.

BRUCH is a German jargon term adopted in Russia in the late 1920s and refers to production rejects which have to be scrapped.

BUCHMANITES 'advocate the repudiation of class struggle and preach racism and other fascist theories'. They work through 'the notorious Moral Rearmament organisation' (*Tass*, 3 June 1953).

BUKHARINITES. Strictly, the followers of N. I. Bukharin (executed 1937). They are credited with having exposed the revolution to the danger of 'the revival and development of capitalist elements' by interpreting Lenin's qualified return to private trade in 1921 (NEP) as 'a full freedom of trade. They tried to distort NEP in the interests of the bourgeoisie struggling for the full freedom of trade and for the free play of market prices.' (*Moscow Radio*, 18 November 1953.) Their liquidation in the pre-war purges is excused on the ground that this 'forestalled the emergence of a fifth column, and prepared the country politically for active defence measures' (*Komsomol Rabochnik*, 22 February 1954). Since Bukharin opposed Stalin's methods of collectivisation of agriculture, a Bukharinite today is generally a 'Right-Wing Deviationist' who advocates a policy of wooing the peasants when the party line is to coerce them. Tito, for example, was accused by the Soviet Communist Party in 1948 of adopting Bukharin's 'rotten opportunist theory'.

BUREAUCRACY is a term of opprobrium in the USSR as elsewhere, referring to official laziness, shortsightedness and insensitivity. It is used not only of civil servants in government administration but of officials of Party organisations and industrial enterprises. The approved cure for it is 'criticism' followed by 'self-criticism' on the part of the offender; ventilation of examples in the Soviet press is encouraged by the authorities. The large amount of centralised planning renders the USSR vulnerable to bureaucracy, and there may be also national and historic factors tending to deepen the danger.

A typical and serious instance of 'a bureaucratic attitude' was described in *Izvestia* of 21 March 1951. It concerned Ekaterina

Dubovskaia, of Stavropol, who was ordered by a section court to be evicted from her room for non-payment of the rent. She produced receipts to show that she had, but the house manager said she had not. This was on 8 September 1949. Once evicted, Dubovskaia carried her case from court to court as far as the Supreme Court of the Russian Republic. This repealed the original verdict, and the judge who had originally evicted her now gave her a document reinstating her in her right to live in the room. She took her document to the relevant official and he filed it. She went to the chairman of the local council to complain and he turned her out of his office. She went to the chairman of the Town Council and he wrote 'a severe letter' to the chairman of the local council, who 'read it through and filed it'. A second letter produced no results. Dubovskaia paid several visits to the chairman of the local council; the chairman of the regional council—one stage higher than the Town Council—also wrote; the *Stavropol Pravda*, to whom she applied, referred her note to the regional representative of the Ministry of Justice. 'After that everything began from the beginning.' She applied again to the Supreme Court, which passed her application to the Ministry of Justice, which passed it down to the regional representative at Stavropol. 'To this day', said *Izvestia*, 'Dubovskaia has not been resettled in her room.'

Sometimes this bureaucratic attitude hides not merely indifference but deliberate self-seeking. 'Many organisations and senior officials', said *Pravda* on 19 April 1952, 'have been exerting pressure on farms and forcing them to hand over produce at reduced prices, a practice which is virtually the same as pilfering.' Even Party officials were involved in coercing farmers into handing over farm produce free of cost.

A popular method of drawing attention to evidence of bureaucracy is the *feuilleton*, or special article, in the newspapers. 'A *feuilleton* ought to be written about it', says an indignant witness of a bureaucratic incident, as quoted in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 6 October 1953.

BURZHUAZNOST ('Bourgeois-mindedness') is a phenomenon for which Communist governments keep a sharp look-out. *Literary Gazette* (27 May 1954) referred to recent Russian plays about 'wives who have become bourgeois' and said that such types 'certainly deserve to be reproduced on the stage, since they exist in actual

life'. Signs that 'old bourgeois manners' were creeping back into Hungary were noted by an author, Tibor Dery. (*Irodalmi Ujsag*, Hungarian literary magazine, 12 June 1954.) His housekeeper had begun to call him Mr. Dery instead of Comrade. He had even caught himself saying 'Good morning' in moments of abstraction, instead of the official greeting 'Freedom'. And he had been shocked to hear a factory mechanic address his superior as Sir; this he felt to be 'a betrayal of the workers' cause'.

CADRE. 'A man who is able to understand the guiding principles (of communism) and carry them out honestly.' (Stalin, quoted by *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, Budapest, February 1954.) It is most often used in the plural, to refer to the leaders of an organisation; e.g. 'Army cadres'; 'Party cadres'; 'Officer cadres'. So far as possible, cadres should be wholly reliable; but 'a right-wing brother-in-law, an unknown grandmother, or an American uncle might be found in the family of any cadre, and it is not right that he should be labelled untrustworthy for such slender reasons' (Ibid.).

CINEMA. Though the early film triumphs of the Soviet regime have not been repeated, the cinema is regarded as one of the most influential channels of persuasion open to the regime. In style and subject, modern Soviet films follow the rules applicable to all the arts: they are intelligible and optimistic and point a social moral. Of those released to non-Soviet audiences, *Song of Siberia* is as good an example of this as any; it is intended to encourage volunteers for life in the pioneering areas east of the Urals. (It is also valuable as an unconscious revelation of class stratification in Soviet classless society; parallel romances between two highly-paid intellectuals and two manual workers follow, in a new context, the similar parallelism of the eighteenth-century picaresque novel, where the lord finds his lady and the valet his serving maid.) Soviet films are justly celebrated for the quality of their colour and for the sensibility of their treatment of animals. There is a spontaneity and warmth in their handling of nature (and of that art nearest to nature, the ballet) besides which human behaviour and urban scenes produce the sensation that things are being treated as they ought to be rather than as they are.

It goes without saying that non-Communist films are almost invariably regarded with contempt, and film audiences are largely

preserved from their contaminating influence, though visitors to Russia have spoken of their popularity when available, *Tarzan* being a particular favourite. A *Tass* report from New York early in 1951 said that American films continued to be on a low level glorifying aggression, dealing with preparations for war, cowboys, gangsters, and 'empty love affairs'. An exception was the social criticism in the film *Born Yesterday*, in which a 'semi-gangster business man tries to bribe congressmen to put through a Bill for the advantage of scrap metal merchants'. In Britain matters were almost as bad. The British Government—'accessory of the transatlantic claimants to world domination'—had mobilised the cinema to help in propagating a new war. The first step in this campaign was to distract public attention, and this was done by applying Freudian ideas. The films were thus 'vulgarised to the utmost limits and degraded to the actual point of pornography'. Their usual heroes were weak-willed maniacs, schizophrenics and erotic lunatics. British 'realistic' films simply extolled the Labour Government's policy. But there were exceptions. British film workers sincerely fighting for truth, freedom, and justice, included the journalist and film producer Ivor Montagu. (M. Avarin in *Soviet Art*, quoted by *Tass*, 27 February 1951.)

It must not be thought that Communist critics are always so severe as this, or that they are always in accord. The Soviet article by Avarin referred to *The Red Shoes* as having been 'converted by the producers into a mongrel and decadent concoction full of erotic motifs and steeped in Freudian symbolism and allegory'. This was the film that the *Daily Worker* (24 July 1948) found to be 'authentic and exciting both in the sense of life observed and of film making'.

CLASS. In Marxist terms, a class is a social group bound by a common interest towards the material productive relations of any given society. In capitalist society there are two principal classes: the bourgeoisie, who own the means of production, and the proletariat, who work for them. The first of these two groups is held to exploit the second, whose subsequent revolt forms one of the 'contradictions' which are eventually to undermine the capitalist system. The idea that this conflict is inescapable, and that economic relations are the motive force of society, give a virulent fatality to the communist idea of Class War.

There have been two post-war developments in the Soviet attitude to class :

(1) *Outside the USSR*: Stalin, in *Problems of Linguistics* (1950) defined the limits of class war in societies still bourgeois and likely to remain so: 'as long as capitalism exists, the bourgeois and the proletarians will be bound together by every economic thread as parts of one capitalist society. The bourgeois cannot live and grow rich unless they have wage labourers at their command; the proletarians cannot exist unless they hire themselves to the capitalists. If all economic ties between them were to cease, it would mean the cessation of all production, and the cessation of all production would mean the doom of society, the doom of the classes themselves. Naturally, no class wants to incur self-destruction. Consequently, however sharp the class struggle may be, it cannot lead to the disintegration of society.' The 'muddled comrades' who thought otherwise were taking 'a primitive-anarchist view of society' that had nothing in common with Marxism. Stalin still maintained the view that the relationship between the two classes could finally be changed only by violence. What he called 'the law of transition from an old quality to a new by means of an explosion' applied 'of necessity to a society divided into hostile classes'.

(2) *In the USSR*: It is not claimed that a classless society has been created in the USSR. The 'exploiting classes', said Khrushchev, have been liquidated, and now 'Soviet society is composed of friendly classes' (*Pravda*, 26 August 1952). These classes, or 'strata' of the population, are defined as 'workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia'. 'Of course, workers and collective farm peasants still form two classes which differ from each other in status, but this difference in no way lessens their friendship.' (*Communist*, No 4, March 1953.) There is a 'moral and political unity' in Soviet society; but not yet, as Stalin's *Economic Problems* (October 1952) makes clear, an economic and social one. These classes are not 'hostile', however; their relations one to the other do not necessarily call for an 'explosion'. The former tension between classes must now be replaced by conscious direction on the part of the rulers towards the elimination of class differences. Revolution in future is to be directed by, not at, the government. Stalin said he had been able to collectivise agriculture 'because it was a revolution from above, because the revolution

was accomplished on the initiative of the existing power with the support of the bulk of the peasantry' (*Linguistics*).

CO-EXISTENCE or 'peaceful co-existence' as it is usually described, is the theory that although the world is divided into two irreconcilable blocs, there is no need for them to resort to a war of annihilation against each other, since they can live in a state of non-belligerence and take part in mutually advantageous trading relations. This condition will not continue indefinitely, but only for a 'more or less lengthy historical period' (*Problems of Philosophy*, Soviet bi-monthly journal, March 1953). The non-communist bloc is believed to be doomed, and so 'on the basis of the objective laws of society, all the peoples will inevitably attain the bright future' of Communism (*Pravda*, 2 November 1953). Even though they do not go to war, there can be no abatement of the tense international struggle between the 'historically-doomed forces of reaction and imperialism and the forces of democracy and progress to which the future belongs' (*Pravda*, 2 November 1953). The policy of peaceful co-existence is adopted by the USSR and commended by her to other States for prudential reasons: 'with the present alignment of forces . . . any other course is that of hopeless adventure and inevitable failure' (G. M. Malenkov, 8 August 1953).

The phrase thus does not mean, as a straight translation from jargon to living language would suggest, 'living peaceably together'. It is compatible with propaganda against, isolation from and peripheral risings against the non-Communist world; it retains the whole repertoire of Cold War but stops short of fighting between the major powers. Nor does it place the two blocs on terms of equality, for one is bound to win: 'the co-existence of capitalism and socialism, which is perfectly possible, is bound to result in the bloodless victory of socialism' (Imre Nagy, Hungarian Minister of Food, 3 April 1951). For the non-Communist, that is to say, it is a reprieve, not an acquittal; death from natural causes rather than violence. It is, to reverse Clausewitz, war continued by other means. It will involve 'peaceful rivalry' between the two systems for 'a long period' (*Pravda*, 28 March 1950); but an eventual resort to war need not be excluded. 'We have always said', commented Lenin, 'that it would be stupid for the revolutionary proletariat to renounce revolutionary wars which may be necessary in the

interests of socialism.' (*Works*, vol. 20, p. 68.) And Stalin asked: 'Why should not the proletariat take advantage of a favourable international and internal situation to pierce the front of capitalism and hasten the general issue?' (*Problems of Leninism*, p. 22.)

Unless and until such opportunities arise, co-existence can be made to seem not unattractive to the non-communist world by its promise of the avoidance of war, a reduction in rearmament costs and an opportunity for the business man to earn profits in supplying the economic needs of the Communist orbit. The military man is to be led to favour co-existence by setting before him the hazards of making war against what is now a formidable bloc, geographically and strategically. Soviet commentators place much reliance on this latter obstacle to war, and since the beginning of 1954 have begun stressing their capacity for aerial and underwater retaliation. Not all go as far as *Pravda* (28 March 1950) in saying that China's defection to Communism has 'tipped the balance decisively' in its favour. Mr. Malenkov more modestly remarked that 'the present ratio of forces' made the prospect of averting a third world war 'quite realistic' (Speech to 19th Party Congress, 5 October 1952).

The theme is not a new one, and the phrase itself was probably first used around 1924, possibly by the now unmentionable Bukharin. In fact, if not in name, it has been official policy since the early Bolsheviks discovered that their revolution was not going to spread abroad, and that they must find a theoretical basis for living in the middle of a world hostile or indifferent to them; a world which they must encourage along the road to Communism without provoking it to action that might destroy them rather than their 'historically-doomed' opponents. And although it was mainly directed to their foreign relations, it is also intended to persuade Communists who believe in revolution everywhere, at every opportunity, that a healthy respect for the military power, technical ability and political resilience of the 'capitalist' states does not mean abandoning or delaying indefinitely the 'inevitable' triumph of their cause.

As early as January 1918 Lenin said that though the triumph of revolution in Europe was 'beyond doubt', it would be a mistake to base the tactics of the Soviet Government on any calculation that this 'certainty' would be achieved 'in the next six months (or some such brief period) or not'. Revolutionary ambition on

the part of an economically and technically backward country was tempered by military caution and the need to import goods and skills from the outside world; and an early formulation of the policy thus called into being was given by Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign Minister, at the Genoa Conference in April 1922: 'in the present period of history, which permits the parallel existence of the old social order and of the new order now being born, economic collaboration between States representing these two systems of property is imperatively necessary for the general economic reconstruction.' And in his first speech after the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, Litvinov, then Soviet Foreign Minister said (September 1934): 'As to the peaceful co-existence of different social political systems at a given historical stage, we have advocated it again and again.' Stalin maintained this policy in March 1939, even though it involved buying security through an alliance with Fascism: 'We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as those countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union.' Mr. Jacob Malik reiterated the same theme when calling for a Korean armistice (June 1951): 'The Soviet Union bases its policy on the possibility of the peaceful co-existence of the two systems, socialism and capitalism.'

Co-existence was thus conceived in a spirit of self-preservation, linked with Lenin's appreciation that no precise date could be set for the 'inevitable' revolution. Yet Litvinov's remark about its validity during 'a given historical phase' and not for ever is a reminder that the extinction of capitalism is an aim as well as an article of faith for Communism. The *Soviet Diplomatic Dictionary* leaves no doubt that co-existence was not chosen by the USSR but forced upon her by events, and is not regarded as a permanent feature of world affairs: 'Lenin and Stalin, in their theoretical inquiries and in their practical work as leaders of the Soviet Socialist State, set out from an acceptance of the principle of the inescapable temporary co-existence of the two systems—the capitalist and the socialist.' This represents as nearly as the written word can what the phrase means in the minds of its first begetters, and what are the mental reservations behind its use. It is a feature of international life which Communism would prefer to be without, but which it is prepared to endure as a lesser evil, in the faith that one party to it will eventually cease to exist, thus solving

the many theoretical and practical problems to which co-existence gives rise.

The word appears to have gained currency in the non-Communist world in the last few years. Thus the Italian Premier, Signor de Gasperi, told the Italian Senate on 3 April 1952 that 'we recognise the possibility of co-existence between the Communist world and our own'. Sir Winston Churchill, too, in his Washington press conference on 28 June 1954, said: 'I am of the opinion that we ought to have a real good try at peaceful co-existence.'

COLLECTIVE FARMS (*kolektivnoye khoziaistvo*; in abbreviation *kolkhoz*) nominally consist of self-governing voluntary co-operatives of peasants who have pooled their land and own it in common, retaining for private ownership a house, an acre or more of land and some cattle for personal use. Each worker, or *kolkhoznik*, has to give between 100 and 150 work days on the common land. Work was formerly done on the 'link' system under which the same group, usually a whole family, worked on a definite area of the farm. This carried the danger that a hankering after the former system of private ownership might creep back; and in 1950 it was dropped in favour of the 'brigade' system. A brigade, or *artel*, chosen without regard for family connections, undertake particular functions—ploughing, reaping, processing, milking, etc.—as and where required. The link between a family and a specific plot of ground is thus weakened. A. A. Andreyev, who was succeeded by N. S. Khrushchev as agricultural specialist of the Politburo in 1951, first supported and then condemned the 'link' system. There are likely to be at least between ten and thirty families and perhaps 600 acres of land in a collective farm. Agricultural machinery is borrowed from State-owned machine tractor stations (MTS) and people have been found to recommend that these stations should be handed over entirely to the farms. Stalin decided strongly against this change before his death. (*Economic Problems*, 1952.) *Kolkhozniks* may sell in the free market any surplus from their private plots over and above their own needs and the compulsory deliveries they are called on to make to the State.

Collectivisation was a forcible operation which took place from 1930 onwards, on the direct initiative of Stalin and against the misgivings of some of his lieutenants. Communist theory called

for an eradication, as far as possible, of the peasant's 'bourgeois' wish to own the elements of his trade—as unreasonable, in Marxist eyes, as a railway porter wishing to own the waiting room of the station in which he works. The new town populations called into being by industrialisation also demanded a bigger food surplus than the old peasant subsistence farming could produce. The *kulaks*, or richer peasants, were eliminated as a social group, and most of the 25 million small peasant farms were joined together, until by the census of 1939 there were only 3 million 'individual farmers' or peasants, against 75.6 million *kolkhozniks*. The number of self-employing peasants has further declined, until they now represent a negligible element in the population. By 1950, about 85 per cent. of the arable and crop-bearing land in the USSR was farmed by 245,000 collective farms, comprising 18½ million families. The number of farms has since been reduced by amalgamation to 97,000, though the crop area continues to expand—by 7 million acres during 1952. (*News*, No. 8, April 1953.) Collective farms are faced with a labour problem, due to the drain of manpower to the growing industrial towns. There is a high percentage of women, children, and old people on the farms, and photographs of women chairmen are not infrequently given in the Soviet press. Lack of men in the middle-age groups was accentuated during and immediately after the war, when 'it happens frequently that youths of 14 to 15 years of age are appointed senior grooms and brigadiers' (*Kolkhoznoye Pravo*, Moscow, 1947, p. 158).

The collective farms are not to be confused with the State farms or *sovkhoz* (*sovietskoye khoziaistvo*), which are owned by the State and worked by government employees. There are about 4,000 such farms, some of them very large, and they employ between 500 and a few thousand families each. The *sovkhozi* were highly subsidised in the early days of the regime, but have been overtaken in number and significance by the *kolkhozi*.

COLLECTIVITY (*Kollektivnost*) or Collective Leadership was laid down as the 'main principle of Party leadership' after the death of Stalin, and subsequent descriptions have followed the one laid down in April 1953. (*Pravda*, 16 April 1953.) 'Individual decisions always or almost always are one-sided decisions.' 'The greatest force of Party leadership is in its collectivity and collective character.' Future officials and leaders could be trained only by

experience of 'collectivity in work'. Without it, 'individual leaders begin to conduct themselves as if they alone knew everything, as if they alone could say anything sensible and intelligible. . . . In a situation of this kind there is created an environment propitious for lack of principle and for the alien practices of obsequiousness and toadyism.' There must be 'businesslike, critical discussions and critical observation'. Collectivity in discussion and decision must not, however, reduce personal responsibility in execution.

A small example of what may be supposed to have been *kollektivnost* in action was the presentation of a nosegay to each of the principal Soviet leaders during the May Day parade in Red Square in 1953; and not just to one man, as in Stalin's lifetime.

COMINFORM. The Communist Information Bureau was formed in September 1947 at a meeting in Moscow of representatives of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, Roumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, France, and Italy. It was intended 'to meet the new distribution of basic political forces' and 'to disrupt the plan of imperialist aggression'. In order 'to strengthen the democratic forces of Europe', the Bureau was intended to unite the various parties, 'to work out a co-ordinated programme of activities, to evolve its own tactics'. Its first headquarters was in Belgrade, but after the defection of Yugoslavia it moved to Bucharest. It maintains a weekly paper, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, published in several languages. Of the eighteen members who attended the original meeting, two are dead (Zhdanov, USSR, and Poptomov, Bulgaria), one has been executed (Slansky, Czechoslovakia), three are under arrest (Gomulka, Poland; Pauker, Roumania, and Bastovansky, Czechoslovakia) and two have been evicted (Kardelj and Djilas, Yugoslavia). The ten who remain in favour are Malenkov, USSR; Minc, Poland; Gheoghiu-Dej, Roumania; Faraks and Revai, Hungary; Chervenkov, Bulgaria; Duclos and Fajon, France; and Longo and Reale, Italy.)

COMINTERN. The Communist International, linking the Communist Parties of the world with Moscow, was formed after the First World War and dissolved during the Second (1943). Its 'ultimate aim' was 'to replace world capitalist economy by a world system of Communism' (Programme of the 6th World Congress,

September 1928). It was a 'united World Communist Party', fighting for 'a World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, vol. 33, 1938 ed.). Its dissolution was explained as necessary because 'once the young Communist parties had become mass labour parties, the direction of these parties from one centre became impossible and inexpedient', and 'new forms of connection' between them were necessary. (A. Zhdanov, *The International Situation*, Moscow, 1947, pp. 43-7.)

COMMUNISM, as it is understood in current Soviet thinking, is more complicated than the simple forms of common possession and enjoyment of goods often attributed to primitive societies, and advocated by Plato for his ruling class of guardians. It differs essentially from these two prototypes of the various historic variants of communism—monasticism, perfectionist colonies, and so forth—in that it demands a high level of production before the experiment can be sanctioned; it refuses to equate leadership with class distinctions, which it is committed to eradicate; and it claims in practice a monopoly in explaining the nature and organising the development of communism for the Communist Party of the USSR, as the authorised interpreter of the 'science' of Marxist-Leninism. Soviet, like traditional communists, foresee a state of society in which goods are produced and distributed in accordance with the slogan: 'From each according to his abilities; to each according to his need.' Everyone would do the best he could, and make do with the least he could. Soviet Communism, however, while retaining this simple aim in principle, adds two essential features to the methods of achieving it.

(1) It must be based on and pass through a transitional form of Socialism, which is 'the common ownership of the means of production and the distribution of the product according to the work of each' (Lenin, *The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution*). Socialism, though establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat and endeavouring to eliminate the power of capitalism, is still held to be compatible with a vast differential in wages as between, say, unskilled workers and highly skilled technicians, especially those in industries whose expansion is sought. Indeed, for communists the development of production may call for a growing, rather than a narrowing gap between the rewards of different skills, in order to hasten the transition period to communism or in order to raise

the general level of technology or aptitude or to encourage investment instead of current consumption. Thus in Czechoslovakia in November 1951, to meet falling production of iron and steel, the difference between the basic pay of ordinary workers and technicians was raised from 1,660 crowns a month—5,010 against 6,670—to 7,268—5,640 against 12,908. Workers' piece rates were raised by one-eighth; technicians' bonuses were raised to more than double, thus showing that the development of Socialism could involve a growing disparity of incomes rather than a tendency towards equalisation. (Speech by Jan Bilek, Czechoslovak Minister of Foundries and Ore Mines, 14 November 1951.)

(2) The transition from Socialism to Communism depends on production at a level high enough to provide for everyone's needs under conditions of twentieth-century urban life. This can be built only on 'the Industrial Basis of Communism', whose approximate scope and possible date of attainment were indicated by Stalin in 1946, when he called for the production, in the course of three Five Year Plans (i.e. around 1960) of 50 million tons of pig iron, 60 million tons of steel, 500 million tons of coal and 60 million tons of oil. These targets were bound up in the aim of outstripping the industrial output per head of the main capitalist powers, and it is not clear how progress towards Communism has been affected by the increased production of the remainder of the world, particularly the USA. P. N. Pospelov, Director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow, delivering the Lenin anniversary speech in the presence of Stalin on 21 January 1952, stated that Communism was 'no longer a question of the distant future'. On the corresponding occasion in 1951 he had spoken of it as being a matter for the 'near future'. He spoke of its 'material-technical basis', pointing out that it involved mastering the most progressive techniques of production, and reminding his audience of Lenin's dictum that 'Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country'. He also made clear that two other reforms were called for. The Soviet economy, whatever the size of its industrial production or the state of its technology, must not have an Achilles' heel in its food supply—'the extent to which agriculture must depend on the whims of nature will sharply decrease. The builders of Communism will increasingly subjugate nature to their needs.' And there must be evolved 'a new man to whom work would become the prime need in life', a reform in human

psycho-physiology which makes the Soviet devotion to the methods of Pavlov (q.v.) more understandable.

The desiderata laid down for the achievement of Communism are thus: Soviet leadership of proclaimed communists; a Socialist political basis, as interpreted by the Communist Party of the USSR; superior techniques and a higher productive yield per head than under capitalism, together with a defined gross minimum volume of production; protection against undue fluctuation in farm crop yields and the evolution of a human being primarily motivated, not by hunger, sex or any of the more traditional appetites, but by an overmastering desire to work, with no corresponding wish to enjoy the products of his work if others could maintain their greater need of them.

The Soviet leaders profess to have no doubts that this ambitious plan can be achieved. Molotov has gone on record as saying that 'all roads lead to Communism', and even the date of their arrival has been laid down to within fifty years. 'The second half of the twentieth century will bring with it the victory of Communism throughout the world.' (*Problems of Economics*, April 1952.)

COMMUNIST. A Communist, in Soviet eyes, is a person who unreservedly accepts the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party and is prepared to support it even against the apparent interests of his own country or local Communist Party. The theory was explained by a Soviet Political-Scientific Society lecturer, Kosulnikov, over Moscow Radio in January 1951: 'The strategy and tactics of a Communist Party of any one country can be correct only if that Party does not confine itself to the interests of its own country and proletariat but on the contrary, taking account of the circumstances prevailing in that country, gives precedence to the interests of the international proletariat, the interests of the revolution in other countries. At present a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary is he who is completely and unconditionally prepared to defend the USSR.'

There have been several local applications of this principle. Thus the membership of the East German Socialist Unity Party (Communist-controlled) was reviewed, all membership cards scrutinised and a 'loyalty test' instituted. A member of the Central Committee stated (*Berlin Radio*, 9 January 1951) that 'every member and candidate should be judged by his attitude to the USSR. Every comrade should have the fullest confidence in the USSR, acknow-

ledge the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) as his teacher, appraise the international situation in its proper light and look to Stalin with affection and loyalty.' Directives on membership issued by the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Party (*Rude Pravo*, 13 April 1951) stated that the members chosen must be 'the best young workers and farmers, enthusiastic builders of socialism, and devoted friends of the USSR'. The party must have a class basis: 'no former bourgeois elements, kulaks, and industrialists must be accepted.'

In addition to purity as to class and sentiments towards the USSR, the Party demands of its members not merely passive assent but an energetic and active attitude. Those members who do not possess what might be called a vocation are encouraged to leave and little the worse is thought of them. An earlier issue of *Rude Pravo* said in December 1950 that 'honest people who love the Republic yet whose attitude towards party membership is not correct, should be enabled to resign voluntarily', by way of distinction from careerists, kulaks, 'alien elements' who must be expelled. Party membership was not to be thought of in a 'friendly, neighbourly way, almost everybody being considered a decent fellow', even though selfishness or even subversive activities might be concealed by outward conformity.

To give the rank-and-file Communist a sense of the privilege bestowed on him by membership, its grant is surrounded with difficulties. It becomes, anthropologically speaking, something of an initiation ceremony. 'The mere intention to join the Party should become an event in a young person's life', said the chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Youth League on 6 April 1951 in a speech to the Central Committee in Prague. Every prospective new member must be 18 years of age, produce two guarantors and be personally known to some members of the party organisation enrolling him or her. Full membership followed only after a period of probation: one year in the case of workers, two years in other cases. In choosing members, preference would be given to young people belonging to national mass organisations such as Trade Unions, Youth League, Sokol (physical training) movement, etc. Local Party organisations were told to look out for likely candidates in such mass movements and detail experienced members to prepare the young people so chosen for admission, keeping an eye on their reading and discussing current politics with them. When

the candidate was regarded as ready, he should be interviewed along with his guarantors by a Party meeting when his application should be 'clarified fully'.

CONTRADICTIONS. The so-called 'contradictions' of capitalism are of fundamental importance to Communism, whose present relevance and hopes of eventual triumph are bound up with proving first that they exist in fact as well as in theory, and second, that they cannot be cured without the drastic surgical operation of a proletarian dictatorship.

To the Communist the motive force of history is the dialectic : that is, the alleged tendency of any given situation to transform itself into its opposite, and subsequently from the tension so generated to evolve a new situation which in its turn is subject to the same process. This simple philosophical Rule of Three (Thesis; Antithesis or Negation; Synthesis or Negation of Negation) was borrowed from Hegel and, under the influence of nineteenth century scientific optimism, gave a picture of history not unlike that of a climber ascending a narrow cleft between rocks, first pressing forward with his knees on one face (thesis) then backward with his shoulders against the other (antithesis) rising in the process nearer the summit (synthesis).

To discover the 'truth' about any situation, as distinct from the appearances, the Communist is expected to find where and how this threefold dialectical process applies. In the case of capitalism he noted the transformation from its first confident mood as the victor over feudalism to its present more critical and less self-reliant condition, and explains it as being due to three major 'inherent contradictions' of the system : (1) Capital versus Labour. Large-scale production, employed to increase profits, calls for a large town proletariat who because of their concentration and lack of traditional religious and social restraints are well placed for threatening the capitalist and eventually expropriating him. That is to say, the capitalist, by the very nature of his urge to succeed, forges the weapon that must destroy him; and the more successful he is the more thoroughly does he make his destruction certain. (2) Capitalist versus Capitalist. To increase production and profits capitalists of different nations comb the world for raw materials and markets and inevitably conflict with each other, leading to wars in which patriotic feelings are exploited to hide the real causes. War between

capitalist nations is thus inevitable. (3) Imperialist versus Colonial. This search for raw materials and markets leads the capitalist into socially and culturally underdeveloped lands whose people, however, under the stimulus of these inter-changes, realise their backwardness and demand equality, thus creating a pattern as between nations similar to that between the classes in a single nation.

The existence of these three contradictions is assumed in any current Communist analysis of the outside world, though there are signs of discontent with events that do not appear to fit in with the traditional pattern. Examples are: the tendency of the proletariat to turn against violent remedies in proportion to the height of its standard of living; the alliance of all the leading so-called imperialist powers since the end of the Second World War; and the peaceful evolution of a new status by former colonial powers, as in the case of India. Contradictions must still be discovered, because they are necessary to the theory of Marxism. They must be discovered also because they are equally necessary to the practice of Soviet Communism. 'As long as we have not conquered the world', said Lenin, 'we must adhere to the rule that we must know how to take advantage of the antagonism and contradictions existing among the imperialists.' (Speech to Moscow Party Nuclei Secretaries, 26 November 1920. *Selected Works*, New York, 1943, vol. 8, pp. 270-80.)

It follows that Soviet Communism must be implacably hostile to any party and group which, recognising the existence of tensions or 'contradictions' in society or the economic system, propose to solve them by reforms stopping short of revolution.

The conception of Contradictions is a source of potential embarrassment to Communism. If they are essential to the working of the dialectic, which is in turn the motive power of history, why should they not apply equally to Communism? Is it not in fact possible to foresee and record, in orthodox Marxist terms, the 'contradictions' in Soviet society and to forecast an eventual transformation of the Soviet State and Communist Party? The Russian leaders, for whom the State has now become the initiator of the transformation to Communism, are quite aware of this philosophical dilemma. They have therefore invented and have begun to incorporate into their theory the doctrine of 'non-violent contradictions'. This idea, which had its fullest recent airing in Mr. Stalin's essay on linguistics in 1950, maintains that contradictions

cannot and must not be resolved by violence under a Marxist government; but that they cannot and must not be resolved any other way under a non-Marxist government. To the outsider, this has all the appearances of being a dialectical double-headed penny.

CORRECTIVE LABOUR (*ispravitelny trud*) is of three kinds :

(1) Working at one's own job at lower wages for periods up to six months, with loss of certain insurance and pension rights. This punishment is imposed for offences such as absenteeism.

(2) Exile from one's own home, usually to areas in Siberia which the government wishes to develop economically, but where normal inducements would not attract labour. It has some affinities with the Tsarist system of banishment (*sylka*) and does not involve confinement to camps, although there are penalties for escaping. This is used also as a form of resettlement for large groups whom the government decides to move from their old homes; e.g. the Chechens and Kalmuks.

(3) Confinement in labour camps (*trudovoy ispravitelny lageri*). This method of forced labour is the one which has attracted the most attention and criticism on the grounds both of its inherent nature and the conditions under which prisoners live and work. A large literature exists on the subject, much of it from former inmates.

The numbers concerned have been disputed. In 1931 there were 1,850,000 in 'all places of detention' in Russia, White Russia, and the Ukraine. (A. Y. Vyshinsky, *From Prisons to Educational Institutions*, Moscow, 1934.) Of the capital construction planned in the USSR for 1941, forced labour was to produce 14 per cent. It was also to produce 18 per cent. of industrial timber and 40 per cent. of the chrome ore. It is unlikely that the camps contain fewer than 4 or 5 million people, and many estimates have put the figure considerably higher. (Such figures compare with a maximum of 33,000 doing penal labour under the Tsars including 5,000 'politicals'.)

It is not necessary to commit a specific offence or even to be adjudged guilty by a normal court in order to receive a sentence of corrective labour. 'Punishment in the form of exile can be applied by a sentence of the State Prosecutor against persons recognised as being socially dangerous, without any criminal proceedings being taken against these persons on charges of com-

mitting a specific crime or of a specific offence and, also, even in those cases where the persons are acquitted by a Court of the accusations of committing a specific crime.' (USSR, *Basic Criminal Code*, Article 22 of 'Principles of Criminal Jurisdiction'.)

COSMOPOLITANISM is a 'reactionary, anti-patriotic, bourgeois outlook on things, hypocritically regarding the whole world as one's fatherland, denying the value of national culture, rejecting the rights of nations to independent existence . . . the ideology of American imperialism aspiring to world domination.' (*Dictionary of the Russian Language*.) It is 'the theory of the American capitalist aspirants to world rule' (*Deutschlandsender Radio*, 16 January 1951). It is used of any manifestation both within and without the Soviet Orbit that strengthens the cultural, economic, political, and military influence of the USA in other countries. The Frenchman who gives up wine for coca-cola (if such a one exists) is a cosmopolitan; so is an Eastern European made discontented with his conditions by studying American glossy magazines or films. These things, from the Soviet point of view, smooth the path for American 'imperialism' by spreading a common, world-wide conception of a 'way of life' and leading to the military and political integration of most of the world around the United States. This integration would take place at a higher level of material comfort and military power than Stalinism can yet provide, and would therefore be a disaster of the first magnitude for the future of Communism, which has its own recipe for such integration (see PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM) and naturally regards this as more 'scientific' and on a higher moral level than the American. In preventing this crystallisation of world power around an American core, the Soviet leaders encourage other peoples to resist any such diminution of their absolute national sovereignty as integration demands; for example, the Schumann Plan and the European Defence Community. This leads to implied alliances with extreme nationalistic groups, especially in the Arab World, which would be regarded as reactionary on purely social grounds, but is encouraged in so far as it strengthens resistance to the spread of American ideas or to any sacrifice of national sovereignty involved in defence agreements with the Western 'imperialists'.

What to non-communists appears to be over-eagerness to embrace Soviet methods and customs in the Communist world is,

however, regarded as a sign not of Cosmopolitanism but of genuine 'Proletarian Internationalism'. Soviet propaganda from time to time seeks to rouse British nationalism by references to Grosvenor Square, London, as though it were an intolerable invasion by American extra-territorial rights. There is no sense of solecism in voicing such protests while also reporting without irony such ceremonies as took place in a main square of a Communist capital on May Day 1951. The Bucharest Radio reported the scene early in the morning in Generalissimo Stalin Square, whose decorations included portraits of Stalin. Guests assembled in front of a statue of Stalin to hear a speech by Mr. Gheorghe Stoica, first secretary of the Bucharest Organisation of the Roumanian Communist Party, who said that the name of Stalin was deeply engraved on the hearts of Roumanians and was spoken with affection and gratitude by all who valued the independence and happy future of their country. Stalin's name was connected with the liberation of Roumania from the imperialist yoke and the historic victories of the working people under the leadership of the Party. By unveiling this statue of Stalin they made him their great teacher and guardian and honoured him accordingly. Stoica said that the Stalin Park of Culture and Rest was also to be inaugurated. The fact that it was named after Stalin was 'another proof' of the affection in which Roumanians held 'this most beloved friend of our people'. At the end of his speech Stoica called for three cheers for Stalin; and after Stalin's statue had been unveiled, the officials walked across the square and Premier Gheorghiu-Dej ceremonially opened the Stalin Park of Culture and Rest. This was followed by speeches, at the end of which one speaker, Gheorghe Apostol, proposed that a telegram be sent from the meeting to Stalin. Anton Jianu happened to have the text of a message on him, and the audience sent Stalin their 'warm greetings of affection and gratitude'. Then followed a march past, in which were carried banners bearing portraits of Stalin. Roumanian newspapers published special festival issues carrying photographs and 'appropriate slogans' in honour of Stalin. A photograph of the statue is to be found in the *Cominform Journal* of 4 May 1951.

CRIME, according to communism, is produced by social conditions: society creates the criminal. Russia has not been immune, however, from the world-wide post-war wave of hooliganism and

brutal murders. (See HOOLIGANISM.) An attempt to fit these facts to the theory says that 'despite the fact that in our country the social-economic roots of crime, such as unemployment, the exploitation of man by man, the concentration of immense wealth in the hands of a few people, etc., have been absolutely liquidated, a number of backward people have not yet got rid of the dregs of capitalistic relics from time to time finding expression in unlawful acts, including the abstraction of public property' (*Rahva Hää*, 26 July 1952). The death penalty (reintroduced for 'traitors, spies and diversionists' in 1950) was extended to cover 'premeditated murder in aggravating circumstances' in May 1954. It had been abolished in May 1947 as unnecessary in peace, and Mr. Vyshinsky described its abolition as 'the greatest proof of Soviet socialist humanitarianism in law' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*).

CULTURE. Cultured, or *kulturny* behaviour, is highly esteemed in the Soviet Union. Short of a criminal offence, to be called uncultured, or *nekulturny*, is as severe a social criticism as can well be offered. 'The epithet (uncultured) covers a multitude of offences, from what may be called the spectacular, like drinking eau-de-Cologne instead of vodka, to the more subtle, like carrying a parcel in the street if you are an Army officer.' (Edward Crankshaw in the *Observer*, 30 March 1952.)

What, then, is Culture? It is more than cultivation, in the sense of developing technical knowledge or special skills. It is more than culture in the loose sense of the word, meaning interest in books, theatre, and art. It is more than observance of good manners and respect for the conventions of society. It is in fact a combination of all three; and the relation of the individual to the community in Soviet theory renders its possession—or a genuine attempt to possess it—essential to the good citizen.

An outline of the meaning of Culture was given in a lecture by M. Filanovic to Moscow Radio listeners on 18 March 1952: 'a man's culture is judged by everything, from his appearance to his highest thoughts'. The basis of culture is admittedly knowledge: 'there is no culture without knowledge'. This, however, is no more than the basis; knowledge must be interpreted through an understanding of Marxism-Leninism to create a viewpoint and principles. 'One cannot consider a man to be cultured or educated who is not familiar with this doctrine, who is politically illiterate, who

is unable to plot his course through the events occurring in his country and abroad.'

Beyond essential knowledge and political literacy, the next stage in the cultural pilgrimage is further study to make the man or woman a better worker. 'Astonishment and censure are evoked by the sight of a man who never studies and does not seek knowledge.' At work the cultured man, acting on the late President Kalinin's dictum, knows 'how not to do anything superfluous'. (He will adopt, that is, time-and-motion studies to his methods of work, like a good Stakhanovite.) He will also keep his mind on his work : 'is it incompatible with culture to be careless and slack in one's work, to be undisciplined and absent-minded.' 'A cultured man has a consciously painstaking attitude to his work and to his civic duties, his duties to socialist society.'

So far the Man of Culture is the communist equivalent of the Industrious Apprentice. But he must beware of separating his 'general culture' from his 'cultural behaviour', his 'outer' from his 'inner' culture. He is warned by the fate of culture under capitalism : 'In bourgeois society very great attention is paid to outward culture, to the inculcation of so-called good manners, to the detailed observance of a vast number of artificial rules. On the surface this looks nice and even attractive; but only on the surface. In fact, all the apparent culture of the bourgeois public is false and hypocritical through and through. It exists only for the purpose of masking the true relationships between people, their mutual distrust, their rivalries, enmities and jealousies. . . . In bourgeois society people are taught from children to be guided by crude egotistical considerations, to conceal their true feelings, to be hypocritical and to lie, to kow-tow to the strong and to despise and oppress the weak.' This leads, in this mortality story, to the 'bloody crimes' of Korea. Communist society, on the other hand, 'cannot consider as cultured and deserving of respect any individual who has acquired only an outward veneer of good behaviour and remains lazy and ignorant'.

There is perhaps a measure of anti-climax in the practical examples of cultured behaviour which such an individual, 'raised to unprecedented heights' by socialism, will observe. He will show to other people, whether already known to him or not, respect, politeness, attention and alertness. 'Rudeness and contempt for other people are not only uncultured, they are also remnants of

capitalism.' 'A cultured young man will not remain seated in a railway carriage, in the Metro or in a tram in the presence of his elders or of women.' He will not 'demean himself before others or to hurt others by his uncouth behaviour'. He will speak correctly, grammatically, clearly and expressively. He or she will be tidy and clean in appearance, but there is 'no harm' in wanting to dress prettily 'and even smartly'. These are no more than examples, however; a code of conduct cannot be learned by rote. 'The rules governing cultured behaviour are wholly derived from the principles of Communist morality.' Having thus taught the relation between culture and morality, the speaker adds: 'The basis of Communist morality, Lenin taught, is the struggle for strengthening and achieving Communism. For the Soviet people everything is moral that serves the victory of the Communist order, everything that helps the Party, everything that helps State and people to build a new society and ruthlessly eradicate the remnants of the old and hostile world. This is the only correct point of view.'

Culture is not left to private initiative. In Roumania over 4,000 wireless sets were installed in Houses of Culture and over 100,000 'collective auditions' given in the early months of 1951. Hungary has a newspaper with the title of 'Cultured People' (*Muvelt Nap*), which delivered an article in February 1951 on 'the fight against enemy attacks on the cultural front' at a Budapest factory, where culture had not been taken over by the Communists, but had been left to the Social Democrats, with disastrous results. Examples of this uncultured policy were: not more than 80 out of 1,000 workers attended the infrequent 'scientific' lectures; the Works Symphony Orchestra had bought not a single Soviet score, nor had the Operatic Ensemble performed a single Soviet aria or duet; the amateur theatrical group had selected plays 'least suited for agitation work'; 'de-classed people' (presumably former bourgeois) had been employed as 'people's educators'; and the enemy (presumably the Social Democrats) had 'planted professionalism in cultural work by inciting the workers to demand extra pay for their unofficial work in the factory band and choir'.

Culture has indeed a hard row to hoe in Hungary. *Budapest Radio Journal* of 31 January 1951 said it was high time someone was looking into the survival of 'a characteristic remnant of the culture of the Horthy regime'—the existence of postcards 'with crude pictures and vulgar jokes' in the Budapest tobacconists'

shops, even in Rakosi Street in the centre of the city. These post-cards depicted mothers-in-law 'with biting tongues', henpecked husbands and ugly spinsters, 'effeminate men with lipstick and hair cream ogling doubtful-looking women'. 'All this is taking place in 1951 in Budapest, in the era of Socialist revolution! And when neighbouring shop windows are filled with charming postcards depicting the work and joys of people's Hungary.'

As might be expected, no uncultured behaviour compares with that of the Yugoslavs. Sofia Radio attacked Skoplje Radio on 12 January 1951 by describing the conditions of work there. 'Everything which one sees and hears in the radio building reminds one of a brothel in New York or London. . . . The principal occupation is telling dirty stories, spiced with swear words. . . . In all offices one can see employees, regardless of sex, with their feet on the table.'

At the other end of the scale is Soviet culture. It has its weak points; bad language, for example, is both uncultured and prevalent. An indignant locksmith, Mr. M. Gromor, wrote to the *Literary Gazette* (No. 62, 1952) calling for a 'struggle by the community' against such 'savage and uncultured behaviour' as the use of 'abominable words of uncensored abuse' in 'workshops, offices, tramcars, cinemas, shops, and railway stations'. Nevertheless 'Soviet culture is the most advanced in the world and the culture of new China is developing along Soviet cultural lines', said Huang Cheng, Chinese Ambassador to Hungary, at the opening of a New China exhibition in the Budapest Museum of Fine Arts on 10 February 1951. Jozsef Revai, Hungarian Minister of People's Culture, spoke of China's 'thousand-year-old culture' and said that both the small Hungarian and great Chinese peoples had been brought closer together through their enrichment by Soviet culture. Hungary had much to learn from Chinese culture, in particular how one should come to regard a national culture as 'a weapon pointed at the enemy's heart'.

DARWINISM is honoured in the USSR as the foundation of modern biological thought, being materialistic and basing itself on direct observation. Soviet biological achievements, said Feodor Dvoryankin, writing on the 69th anniversary of Darwin's death (*Literary Gazette*, April 1951), are invariably made from the standpoint of 'what progress has been made from the point where

Darwin left off?' At the same time the development of Darwinism outside the USSR is rejected, 'bourgeois geneticists' such as Julian Huxley are attacked and 'the modern theory of mutations' is regarded as un-Darwinian. Darwin's strength is seen to have been his 'historical methods'; his weakness by Soviet standards lies in leaving so much scope to chance. Soviet scientists, states Dvoryankin, cannot be satisfied with the theory of chance, and their watchword is 'science is the enemy of chance'. Soviet science is, in fact, Michurinite, and at this point Michurin's key quotation is interpolated: 'We cannot await Nature's favours; our task is to wrest them from her.' Nature, that is to say, must be 'enriched and transformed' and not merely 'utilised' ('which may well be plunderous exploitation and exhaustion of its productive forces'). This application of historical materialism from society to Nature not unnaturally affects the regions of biology, where the Soviet system believes in the possibility of creating 'new forms of organism in accordance with economic requirements' (*Moscow Radio*, lecture on 'The Bases of the Materialist Theory of Life', by M. Fegelson, 21 April 1951). There was room, in fact necessity, for gradual quantitative changes and rare qualitative changes in organisms. Darwin's mistake was to have seen Nature in terms of his own English society and the Malthusian struggle for existence. The Michurinists believed, on the other hand, that the factor determining change was not competition among the organisms themselves (i.e. the 'survival of the fittest') but changes in their environment. (This contrast is the essential feature of Soviet, as opposed to Western, biology. It carries over into the field of Nature the view of productive relations as the determining force in society, just as Darwin is accused of carrying over Malthus and *laissez-faire*. Biology thus becomes essentially a mode of Marxist philosophy, and cannot be entirely judged on the extent or quality of the evidence adduced, which in the case of the Fegelson lecture is the familiar claim by Lysenko to have shown the predominance of environment by transforming summer wheat into winter wheat, and producing grains of rye from wheat grains sown in mountain regions.)

Although the differences between Soviet biology and Darwinism are profound, a debt is acknowledged to Darwin, and in particular to his 1837 *Notebook*, which showed (Dvoryankin) that 'direct observation and study of instincts, heredity, mental heredity, hybridisation, could lead to the laws of variation which would

constitute the main object of our study and determine our conclusions'. His methods had been developed in Tsarist Russia by Mechnikov, Kovalevsky, Sechenov, Timirazev, and Severtson, and in the USSR by Michurin, Pavlov, Williams, and Lysenko. 'The emancipation of biology from Darwin's mistakes', said Fegelson, could not have taken place except under the Soviet system.

DEMOCRACY. To Communists, a majority has no particular sanctity and is called upon to do, not what it wishes, but 'its duty before the court of history' (*Literary Gazette*, November 1950). Since Communism's title deeds to power are its 'scientific' view of society, it does not feel called on to submit its policy, together with alternatives, to a free popular decision. Choice between parties is a 'drab formality' of *Bourgeois Democracy*; and Soviet citizens, whose own elections take the form of a plebiscite with no opposition, are assured that 'behind the screen of bourgeois parliamentarianism lurk the terror and dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. In bourgeois countries the State is ruled not by the people but by capital—by a handful of cosmopolitan swindlers who are prepared for the sake of power and profit to trample on their own legislation.' (*Moscow Radio*, 11 February 1951.)

Democracy is generally used with a qualifying adjective. *Bourgeois Democracy* is the parliamentary system in non-socialist countries; *Soviet Democracy*, the 'highest form', is the system in the USSR. Between the two is *People's Democracy*: a transitional system in which real power is in the hands of the Communist Party, which controls the police and the army and has established the Dictatorship of the Proletariat; but still feels the need to maintain a nominal alliance with other parties, governing with them through existing parliamentary forms. The word is usually used of the Eastern European countries occupied by Russia since 1945, though China is sometimes referred to as a 'people's democratic dictatorship' (*Cominform Journal*, 13 February 1953).

DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM is the principle on which Communist Parties, at least in theory, take policy decisions and carry them out. After general discussion (the 'democracy'), the party line is laid down and all members are expected to support it wholeheartedly, whatever their personal views had previously been (the 'centralism'). The phrase was coined by Lenin for his policy of

strengthening the power of the party leadership, and the 'centralism' has always been more notable than the 'democracy'. Nevertheless, Lenin accepted the existence of minorities and small groups within the party, with the right to mobilise opinions for and against particular lines of policy. Such groups disappeared after the 15th Party Congress (1927) and are no longer tolerated. Intervals between Congresses grew wider; annual in Lenin's time, the gap grew to thirteen years between 1939 and 1952. The Congress of the latter year approved all that was laid before it, with insignificant exceptions; and Democratic Centralism ceased to be much more than a name.

DEVIATIONIST is a Communist who, whether with good or evil intentions, strays from the path of the official party line.

DIVERSIONIST is a saboteur; most commonly used as part of the phrase 'spies and diversionists', referring to agents alleged to have been introduced by foreign intelligence services.

DREAMS. Soviet science, having no place for the subconscious mind (see PSYCHOANALYSIS), naturally cannot accept the Freudian or similar interpretations of dreams. 'The nature of dreams' is thus mechanistic, and Pavlov's explanation holds the field. According to him, sleep is 'nothing but a brake applied to the mass of brain cells, extending to a number of sub-regions of the brain. When some parts of the brain remained unaffected by this "braking process", dreams resulted.' (Dr. N. I. Katsapkin to Soviet Political-Scientific Society, *Moscow Radio*, 27 February 1951.)

EARTH. Soviet astronomers and geodeticists claim to have established 'a new and more exact determination of the shape and dimensions of the earth'. The Soviet scientist Alexander Izotov has discovered that the earth's radius at the equator is 850 metres greater than the figure given by the German Bessel and 140 metres smaller than that of the American Hayford. Modern work has also 'confirmed the belief propounded by Russian scientists as far back as the last century' that the earth is flattened along the equator (which has the form of an ellipse) and not merely in the direction of the axis of rotation. The earth is to be regarded therefore as a 'triaxial ellipsoid'. The average radius at the equator is 6,378,245

metres. The difference between the greater and smaller radii is 200 metres, while the polar flattening is in the ratio of 1:289.3. (*Tass*, 15 February 1952.)

Professor Boris Lichkov told the Moscow branch of the Geographical Society that the earth's shape and geographical changes in its crust were connected with its rotation. 'This, it has been established, is uneven', and fluctuations in the velocity of rotation, though long considered insignificant, became of great importance in the course of hundreds of millions of years. 'A change in the velocity of the earth's rotation causes a change in its shape. Under such conditions matter shifts under the earth's crust from the Poles to the Equator and vice versa', which was the main cause of the creation of mountain ranges. (*Tass*, 14 April 1952.)

Soviet scientists have not as yet reached a completely satisfying theory of the origin of the Earth. They are precluded by the nature of Marxism from adopting any which attributes it to either chance or to some exclusive factor which could not be duplicated in the rest of the universe. One theory which has gained much support in the USSR is that the earth built itself up of meteorites. Its crust is believed to be 2,000 or 3,000 million years old; but on the basis that a ton of meteorites fall on the earth every day, the process of building it up is thought to have started anywhere up to about 7,000 million years ago.

ECONOMIST. Apart from the professional meaning of the word, this has an ideological significance still occasionally met with. An Economist is one who accepts a Marxist analysis of society and believes in the inevitable rise of socialism, but maintains that 'the unaided evolution of inevitable economic changes can bring about the desired revolution without theoretical guidance' (N. M. Kiyayev, broadcast lecture on Bolshevik history, *Moscow Radio*, 3 April 1951). Lenin and Stalin held that such guidance was essential to introduce a socialist consciousness into the workers' movement 'from without', and this could only be done by a 'Party of a new type', armed with 'a fundamentally accurate and scientific theory concerning the events which it was desired to influence'. Communists must therefore be prepared to combat Economists.

EQUALITY. 'By equality Marxism means, not equalisation of individual requirements and individual life, but the abolition of

classes', said Stalin to the 17th Party Congress (1934) (*Works*, vol. 13). In this he echoed Lenin, who stated: 'Engels was a thousand times right when he wrote: "any demand for equality which goes beyond the demand for abolition of classes is a stupid and absurd prejudice!" Bourgeois professors tried to use the argument about equality in order to expose us by saying that we wanted to make all men equal. They tried to accuse the Socialists of an absurdity that they themselves invented. But owing to their ignorance they did not know that the Socialists (and precisely the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels) said: "equality is an empty phrase unless by equality is meant the abolition of classes." We want to abolish classes, and in that respect we are in favour of equality. But the claim that we want to make all men equal to each other is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of the intellectuals.' (Lenin, 'On Deceiving the People with Slogans about Liberty and Equality', *Works*, vol. 24.) Stalin, in the 17th Congress speech quoted above, outlined three different forms of equality in the various phases of transition from capitalism through socialism to communism. The first stage, the abolition of classes, involved: '(a) the equal emancipation of all working people from exploitation after the capitalists have been overthrown and expropriated; (b) the equal abolition of all private property in the means of production after they have been converted into the property of the whole of society.' In a Socialist society, it involved 'the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive remuneration according to the amount of work performed'. Only when Communism has been reached does the slogan of 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' apply; which condition Stalin defines as 'the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all working people to receive remuneration according to their needs'. The definition of equality at the present, or socialist phase, clearly does not call for anything approaching equality and in the size of wages and salaries paid for different classes of work. Hence the high differentials between, say, an unskilled worker and a key technician, which would hardly be tolerated elsewhere in the world, are dictated by a law of supply and demand in which skill and talent is both scarce and much sought-after; and the contrasts do not offend any Marxist principles as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin. The practical value of

the money incentive under socialism was explained in the Budapest newspaper *Szabad Nep* on 14 April 1951 as follows: 'The Marxist interpretation of equality means that each receives his share in the distribution of social wealth in proportion to his productive effort. This principle has to be upheld because as yet there are not enough products available to meet everyone's needs without regard to their work; and also because work for work's sake is not man's second nature as yet.' So it was right that men in higher positions should have higher salaries, for this would encourage workers to greater efforts in order to reach higher positions themselves. The higher the job, the greater the responsibility; and it would be unjust if those carrying heavier burdens were not better paid accordingly. This point of view is evidently not apparent to the Hungarian worker, and *Szabad Nep* encouraged party organisations to dispose of the 'prevalent, incorrect' views on the subject by giving the workers careful and patient explanations. That scarcity and the need for a tangible incentive does not wholly cover the subject, however, is made clear by Stalin, in the speech already quoted: 'Marxism proceeds from the assumption that people's tastes and requirements are not, and cannot be, identical, equal, in quality or in quantity, either in the period of Socialism or in the period of Communism.'

ESPIONAGE. 'Anyone who on any issue and in any guise whatever expresses hostility towards or doubts the correctness of the policy of the Soviet Union is an enemy agent.' This quotation from a pro-Stalinist Yugoslav emigré journal, as quoted by Sofia Radio in December 1950, shows the comprehensive nature of 'espionage' and the latitude allowed in defining a 'spy' in Communist countries. *Zycie Warszawy* explained how one can commit espionage without being aware of it: 'any Polish citizen who gets in touch with Anglo-American diplomats is to them a conscious or unconscious tool of espionage. This must end. . . . There must be no contacts, even those seeming most innocent.' (*Zycie Warszawy*, 12 December 1950.) Non-Communist or anti-Communist public men are profusely described in Stalinist publications in such terms as 'the notorious spy', 'the well-known agent of the imperialists'. On occasion some evidence is given to support the charge. Thus *Medjunarodni Novinar* (International Journalist) a journal run by Cominformist Yugoslavs in Prague referred in April 1950 to a

prominent Yugoslav as 'a notorious pre-war spy of the Anglo-Americans who, as a youth, was trained in that British spy centre the Young Men's Christian Association'.

EXISTENTIALISM, like personalism, is a 'fashionable' idea reflecting 'rotting bourgeois culture' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1950, 'Anarchism').

FAMILY. 'The appearance of a monogamous family dates back to the beginning of the slave-owning society, when the heritage of the personal ownership of the means of production became its economic foundation.' While among the 'dominating classes' property, its consolidation and increase, was 'the basic aim' of marriage; family and marital ties 'among the oppressed classes—under capitalism, among the proletariat—were of a different kind. Women helped men to earn a living, and so their position in the family was enhanced. 'Therefore, their marriage union was based not on gross material calculation, but on ideological affinity, friendship and camaraderie, which engendered true human love.' 'Lenin saw the proletarian civil marriage of love as the prototype of marital relations in a socialist society'; and now the Soviet family 'is the primary collective of Soviet society, its organic cell. . . . The main function of the Soviet family is the bringing up of children. . . . The cadres of the builders of communism are continually being added to by the rising generations.' There are still people who enter into matrimony 'lightheartedly and frivolously', even in Russia; but such 'people who reflect the survivals of the past' are 'isolated cases' who do not characterise 'our beautiful Soviet reality'. It is not true that the family will 'wither away' and 'become superfluous under Communism as parents are relieved of many household cares. 'What will the family be like under Communism? A detailed reply to this question cannot at present be given'; however, 'one can firmly assert that marital and family relationships and family life under the communist order will be brighter and happier than can be visualised by the strongest imagination' (*Moscow Radio*, 14 June 1954).

FASCISM refers specifically to the former regimes of Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany—'anti-fascism' being the banner under which ideological differences between the wartime allies

were hidden from view. More generally, Fascism is the stage at which in communist theory Capitalism averts a revolutionary crisis by taking real power away from parliamentary or democratic bodies or abolishing them completely. Italy and Germany remain the two countries in which this development is thought to have taken place in its completest form; where a 'fascist' regime relies on some constitutional organ outside itself it is qualified by an adjective. Greece is referred to as 'monarcho-fascist'. No such adjective is attached to 'the fascist Franco regime' in Spain (*Moscow Radio*, 10 January 1951) or to 'fascist' Tito Yugoslavia (*Warsaw Radio*, 24 July 1950). States not themselves fascist can commit fascist measures (the ban placed on the World Federation of Trade Unions in France was so criticised in January 1951); this is part of the process of 'fascistisation' or move from bourgeois democracy to full fascism.

FEBRUARY VICTORY. The communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. (*Cominform Journal*, 11 June 1954.)

FOREIGN POLICY. 'In foreign policy our chief concern is to prevent a new war, to live in peace with all countries. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government hold that the most correct, essential and just foreign policy is a policy of peace among all nations, founded on mutual trust, an efficacious policy based on facts and confirmed by facts.' (G. M. Malenkov, Stalin funeral oration, 9 March 1953.) Malenkov had previously given a somewhat more detailed analysis of Soviet foreign policy under four headings: (1) 'to continue the struggle against the preparation and unleashing of another war' and to support the Peace Campaign; (2) development of international trade; (3) to 'strengthen and develop inviolable friendly relations' with other communist countries; (4) to increase Soviet defences. (Speech to 19th Party Congress, 5 October 1952.) This may be compared with a four-point foreign policy laid down by Stalin in 1921 (*Pravda*, 28 August 1921) and reprinted in his collected *Works* (Moscow, 1947, vol. 5, p. 111): 'The tasks of the Party in foreign policy are: (1) to utilise each and every contradiction and conflict among the surrounding capitalist groups and governments for the purpose of disintegrating imperialism; (2) to spare no pains or means to render assistance to the proletarian revolutions in the West; (3) to take all necessary



ПАПИНА «ПОБЕДА».

HOOLIGANISM. 'Father's Triumph' is the bitter pun used to label this hooligan son of a State or Party official who drives around in his father's Pobeda (Triumph) car (Krokodil, 28 February 1954)

measures to strengthen the national liberation movement in the East, and (4) to strengthen the Red Army.' On the relations of the USSR with non-communist countries, Lenin is quoted by Stalin as saying in 1922: 'They are greedy—they hate each other intensely. Ours is a sure road. . . . We must keep a firm hand on the wheel and steer a sure course, and not yield to either flattery or intimidation.' (Stalin, *Works*, vol. 5, p. 136.)

FORMALISM means accepting criticism or acknowledging one's duty without letting this influence conduct. Thus a *Pravda* leading article (9 April 1951) said that certain enterprises had shown a 'formal attitude' to the organisation of competitions in industry, though a Moscow City Party Congress had drawn attention to their shortcomings.

In art, formalism is something more than undue emphasis on form, to the neglect of content. The two, in fact, cannot be separated; they are 'indissolubly linked' (Stephan Hermlin, speech to Congress of Young Artists of East Germany, 28 April 1951). Novel experiments in form are not encouraged, since they prevent communication between artist and public; but the criticism of formalism goes deeper than this. Formalistic artists are 'oblivious of their responsibility to society'; their formalism 'denudes art of its great importance for thought and society and drags it down into the morass of fatuity, mysticism and banality' (M. Orlov in *Tägliche Rundschau*, Berlin, 28 January 1951). It is above all a Western phenomenon—'pathological decadence and empty Western formalism'—which however affects the Communist countries; an example was a new fresco in the Friedrichstrasse railway station, Berlin, where workers were shown as 'distorted' and 'resembling robots'.

In literature, formalism does not refer to style but to 'treatment of an untrue, adulterated subject' (*Berlin Radio*, 8 April 1951). In music, formalism dispenses with melody and gave undue emphasis to some single means of expression, such as rhythm. A comprehensive example of formalism was the opera *The Trial of Lucullus*, with music by Paul Dessau and libretto by Ben Brecht. It dealt with the trial of the Roman general Lucullus by a court in the underworld, after death. It was performed in March 1951 and the Berlin newspaper *Neues Deutschland* criticised the music for being 'replete with cacophonies and intellectualistic

sophistications' and thus unfit for the 'progressive masses'. The underworld court was thought not to be an appropriate symbol. 'It is obvious that the world peace camp with its 800 millions constitutes anything but a "shadow court", for it has the power to bring all war criminals to justice in this world.' The opera was withdrawn, revised and subsequently presented again in Berlin in October 1951.

FRACTIONALISM. Organising or encouraging small groups within the Communist Party to influence or change its policy on specific issues. It is a forbidden activity. (See **DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM.**)

FREEDOM. Mr. Roy Howard, interviewing Mr. Stalin for the *New York Times* on 1 March 1936, asked whether the Soviet people were really free. Mr. Stalin replied: 'We did not build this society in order to restrict personal liberty but in order that the human individual may feel really free. We built it for the sake of real personal liberty, liberty without quotation marks.' The question was in truth an unanswerable one and Mr. Stalin, from every point of view but his own, begged it with his references to 'real' freedom and 'quotation marks'. For him, freedom consisted in discovering, accepting, welcoming, and acting in accordance with the laws of historical development; or in practice, following the lead of the Communist Party as interpreter of those laws. The Communist Party is a materialist theocracy; the believer has no need to feel deprivation of liberty, the unbeliever can never be free.

A hierarchy of differing freedoms is accepted by Communism, but they are all underpinned economically: 'the true freedom, the foundation of all freedoms (is), the freedom of the working masses from exploitation, unemployment and poverty guaranteed by the Stalin Constitution.' (*Moscow Radio*, 7 April 1952.) Freedom, even for the believing Communist, is thus essentially a social possession rather than a personal one. If a man in such an environment is unaware of his freedom, the fault lies in him and not in society. He tends towards anarchy. A character in an American novel, for example, was described by a Soviet reviewer as being unable to 'shake off his prejudices and the anarchistic view of "personal freedom" characteristic of the intellectual decadents' (L. Kislova in *New Times*, 8 August 1951).

FREUDIANISM is an 'idealistic concept' which 'denies the role of the cerebral cortex as established by Pavlov' (Dr. Vasile Marza, Roumanian Minister of Health, *Scanteia*, Bucharest, 25 March 1952); one of the 'idealistic philosophies which necessarily lead to Fascism and barbarity' (speaker at Czech Academy of Sciences Medical Conference, *Lidove Noviny*, 21 November 1951).

GENIAL is a word which does not mean in English the same as in Russian, and may be used to instance some of the pitfalls involved in transferring concepts from one language to the other. *Genialni* is the adjective of 'genius'; it means highly-gifted or possessed of great talents. It does not mean bluff, hearty or affable. It refers to capacity, not temperament. The Russian speaking of Stalin as 'the *genialni* teacher of progressive humanity' does not mean what may be supposed when the word has been literally (and perhaps over-genially) translated.

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM is the belief that the 'relations of production'—the way in which the material production of goods is organised and the relations between the classes producing them—form the 'Base' of society; and that this in its turn creates and determines the nature of the 'Superstructure' or the whole of a society's political, spiritual and intellectual life—laws, morals, ideas and so forth. These 'relations of production', originally geared, so to speak, to the needs of society and fitting the 'forms of production' then current, give rise to legal rights such as ownership of private property, and these are used by the people benefiting from them to keep the 'relations' unchanged, even when the 'forms' are modified. 'From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution.' (Marx, Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*, 1859.) In theory, Historical Materialism is the foundation of the edifice of Communism; in practice it has been little more since 1917 than the nameplate on the front door. The beginning of the 'epoch of social revolution' anywhere depends more on an estimation of the political and military possibilities than on the condition of the 'relations of production'.

HISTORY occupies the role of a substitute God in the materialist theology of Communism, presumably bearing out Voltaire's dictum

that if God did not exist it would be necessary to invent Him. History is Law: 'the truth of history is on our side—the iron law of historical development'. (*Moscow Radio*, 21 June 1950.) This is a natural law beyond the competence of governments and democratic majorities; hence the solemn warning to 'the American majority' at the United Nations to 'do its duty before the court of History' (*Literary Gazette*, November 1950). If not, the consequences would presumably be grave: 'History forgives nobody' (*Sofia Radio*, 8 February 1951).

Side by side with this immaterial, ethical nature, sternly pursuing determinist aims, History has the more pagan habit of assuming material shapes, like the gods of antiquity. It has two favourites. The first is a Wheel, to represent the triumph of progress; and it is a wheel that can go only one way. There are constant references to the folly of trying to 'turn back the wheel of History'. One such attempt was 'the aggressive policy of Truman', said President Bierut of Poland in *Izvestia* late in December 1950. The other favourite transformation is sometimes described as a 'trash basket' and sometimes more frankly as a 'dunghill' to symbolise how many people fail to see the true light and are thus abandoned by History. 'Arguments against Marxism were used in their time by Nicholas Romanov, Adolf Hitler, and the Emperor Hirohito. Now they are being dug up from the rubbish heaps of History by Acheson.' (Zaslavsky in *Pravda*, 27 March 1950.) Nazi generals have been swept on to the dunghill of History. (Tikhonov in *Izvestia*, December 1950.) American generals seeking allies in Europe were 'scavenging in the garbage of History' (*Moscow Radio*, 31 December 1950). Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek had long been cast into the 'trash basket' of History (*Trud*, January 1951).

HOLIDAYS are not a form of remuneration from the employer nor are they part of his welfare arrangements. They are a 'social obligation' and their purpose is 'preventive and curative'. It follows equally that the worker has no personal right to leisure for which he is at liberty to take money rather than a holiday. Society has 'a right to demand leisure for the worker so that he may remain fit for work'. Dismissal from a job does not forfeit a claim to a holiday, for even if the job has been lost for misconduct, and even

if it is followed by directed labour, fitness for work will still be required. Workers should not be made to work a particular period before being entitled to a holiday. This analysis was given by Dr. Kaul, legal correspondent of *Berlin Radio*, on 8 March 1951, basing himself on Article 16 of the East German Constitution, the Law for the 1950 Economic Plan and Soviet Military Authority Orders 112, 147, and 234. In the USSR and associated states, the pattern of holidays includes Sunday as the day of rest with public holidays for New Year's Day, Easter, and Christmas, plus May Day (May 1) and October Revolution Day (November 7). The 'Bolshevik Saturday' holiday won by the Czech miners between the wars was lost by them after the Communists gained power. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, told the Central Committee of the Mineworkers' Union that 'the five-day week which was the miners' revolutionary achievement during the First Republic is today a counter-revolutionary demand'.

HOOLIGANISM (*khuliganism*), a post-war phenomenon in Russia as elsewhere, though during Stalin's lifetime it was known only through reports of refugees who spoke of bands of lawless roughs, especially in the villages and larger cities. Since mid-1953 it has been widely publicised, and may have grown as a result of the amnesty of criminals in March 1953. In Ulyanovsk 'strong bands' of young criminals operated on the streets, robbing women going shopping and people on the way to the bank, the local militia proving unable to defend society from this hooliganism. (*Izvestia*, 22 June 1954.) The word is used of plain thuggery; the first capital sentence since the reintroduction of the death penalty was passed on a murderer who inflicted fifty knife wounds on a *komsomolets* who had turned him out of a propaganda room for hooliganism. (*Pravda*, 28 May 1954.) The next two death sentences were passed in Baku for 'hooliganism', in this case robbery with murder. It also refers to the playboy activities of sons of higher officials—the drunk and dangerous driver, for example (*Krokodil*, 28 February 1954); the *stilyag* who goes in for 'style' in his clothes and the *bikinist* who wears loud American-type ties; the *bezprizorny* (uncared-for), or gangs of homeless roughs; and it includes the 'drunken hooliganism' of authors who fight in public. (*Literary Gazette*, 6 April 1954.)

HUMOUR, to be acceptable, must escape on one side from the 'bourgeois' habit of 'aiming to produce laughter for laughter's sake' and on the other from the highbrow's 'over-refined intellectual joking'. 'Its unrestrained vehemence must not mislead the author to indulge humour for humour's sake, which results in lack of ideological content'; 'humour is, of course, part and parcel of satire' (*Rude Pravo*, 11 October 1953).

IMPERIALISM, in Soviet theory is the final and inescapable condition of the capitalist system, and the only alternative to it is proletarian dictatorship. It follows from this that in Soviet practice the world is divided into two separate halves, the imperialist and the communist. What is not communist is imperialist; and imperialism is held to be doomed.

Historically, this concept, which overshadows modern Soviet thinking, is not a basic tenet of Marxism but was contributed by Lenin. The word was first used in a modern form in Britain of the 1890s to explain the process by which the powerful and technically advanced countries of Western Europe were dividing large areas of the underdeveloped lands of Africa and Asia among themselves, usually in the form of colonies or spheres of interest.

An explanation was given by J. A. Hobson, the British Fabian economist in his book *Imperialism* (1902). He took the view that there was not enough purchasing power in the home market to absorb all the goods that industry could produce, and this created growing accumulations of capitalism that sought outlets abroad. When influencing, or being supported by a Government, this capital and its possessors took the form of imperialism, and piled up armaments and sought bases from which to control ever more land and ever wider markets.

This book had a profound effect on Lenin, who found in it a framework for his own Marxism, and produced his *Imperialism the highest form of Capitalism* in 1915. He accepted the view that the motive force of imperialism was economic (and not, for example, love of power); he argued that capitalism must necessarily become imperialistic as industry became larger in scope and monopolistic in form, and as the role of the banks as suppliers of capital increased. These mighty agglomerations of financiers and industrialists then became the real rulers of nations, manipulating their policies behind a screen of constitutional—perhaps even democratic

—forms. They sought opportunities for investing their surplus capital, they looked for raw materials for their industries, and they sought markets for the sale of their goods. As the capitalist nations were all doing this, they naturally fell foul of each other, and war resulted. Lenin shortly and simply explained the First World War in reply to a *New York Evening Journal* correspondent on 18 January 1920. 'The 1914-1918 imperialist war,' he said, 'was a war of the capitalists of the Anglo-French and Russian group against the capitalists of the German-Austrian group.'

He did not, it will be noted, include an American group. The emergence of America to a position of outstanding power has not in any way shaken official approval of Lenin's analysis but has certainly caused a change in its application. A major attempt has been made by the theoreticians and propagandists to show that Lenin was alive to this danger. This campaign reached a high pitch in a leading article in a Ukraine paper, *Radyanska Ukraina* (31 March 1951), which referred to 'Lenin's profound and exhaustive characterisation of American imperialism, branding it as the most gangster-like form of imperialism, the executioner and strangler of Russian freedom, active organiser of military intervention against our country, gendarme of Europe, enslaver of weak and small nations'.

The many attempts to find evidence of, or even provoke, tensions, bad feeling and struggles on the old pattern among the 'imperialists' cannot conceal the Soviet trepidation at the apparent consolidation of 'imperialism' under American hegemony, rather than its self-frustration through suicidal wars on the pattern familiar to Lenin. The security, and perhaps even the survival of the Communist system are clearly seen to be bound up with this unwelcome development, which Stalin, towards the end of his life, explained as a merely temporary one.

While therefore the attempt is still made to play off one imperialism against another (for example, in propaganda to Britain about America's alleged monopoly aspirations over Middle Eastern oil), it is recognised that the 'imperialist' world is powerful and even formidable and may have sufficiently recovered its old position, under the impetus of American productive power, to render a frontal attack impracticable. Hence great stress is laid on the contradiction between the imperialist and exploited power, and great hopes entertained that the colonial peoples will free

themselves by 'National Liberation Wars' as in Indo-China and Malaya. Robbed of possession of cheap raw materials, the imperialist countries will then fall victims to the domestic 'contradiction' between workers and capitalists. Hence the reason for the oft and variously quoted phrase, attributed to Lenin, about the road to Paris lying through Peking and Calcutta.

There is no reason to doubt that the Kremlin accepts this theory of Imperialism and explains American and other nations' actions in the light of it, rather than attempts to revise the theory in the light of their actions. To this extent it is difficult to see how the non-Communist nations, being imperialist by definition, can so act as to reassure it of their intentions. Yet it would appear that the time is ripe, even in the Soviets' own interests, for a new definition of Imperialism. On some points, this seems to have been implicitly recognised. The needs of the underdeveloped areas of the Soviet bloc, and the hopes entertained of the Moscow Economic Conference of April 1952 in trying to supply them, have pointed to one method of resolving the purely economic reason for imperialism's existence—the surplus left over from the home market. This is revealed as inherent in the technique of modern industry, rather than the ill-will of the industrialists; but if a means can be found of profitably disposing of the surplus in trade (as the Soviet rulers now suggest), then it necessarily follows that capitalism may have found a peaceful method of survival and self-renewal, that its downfall is no longer 'inevitable' and thus that the proletarian revolution has ceased to be inescapable. It can readily be seen that this request of the USSR for trade, and thus assurance that the principal cause of capitalist economic crisis can be cushioned thereby is a long way from pure Leninism, and represents a tentative approximation to a form of Communist Cobdenism or a proletarian version of Adam Smithian division of labour. Indeed, this very phrase was surprisingly used, though in quotation marks as if not quite to be taken in earnest, in the issue of *News* covering the Moscow Conference (1 April 1952). It referred to 'the dislocation of world trade, and, with it, of the normal international "division of labour"'. Again, 'labour is vitally interested in the normalisation of trade'; yet the conception of 'normal' international trade is an Adam Smithian one. 'Resumption of normal international trade' would keep up employment, maintain price levels and help 'dependent and underdeveloped countries'. The

distinctive feature of the proposed trade is that it should be on a barter basis. This need to trade, even at the cost of fortifying the capitalist system and hence, in theory, Imperialism, is possibly the reason why Stalin, in his *Linguistics* letters of 1950, referred to the occasions when even the spread of revolution must be halted in the interests of society in general.

In the Far East, definitions of imperialism can take bizarre forms: a witness at the trial of a Chinese Catholic priest was quoted (*The Roman Catholic Universe*, 11 January 1952) as saying that 'he is an imperialist because he lives upstairs and wears glasses'.

INFORMERS. It is the duty of a citizen in a Communist State to act as informer to the authorities on 'all mistakes, shortcomings, and remarks harmful to the interests of the community'. Anyone who 'informs in the public interest' is 'the mightiest and most honourable discharger of responsibility'. This explanation was given by Mrs. Gyula Alapi, head of the Hungarian Office for Information of Public Interest, in the same week as the Hungarian Government decided to offer financial inducements for such informing. Ordinance No. 250,530, published in the official gazette, *Magyar Kosloeny* (No. 32, 23 February 1951) laid down that members of the public who reveal cases of unauthorised slaughter of animals are entitled to a reward up to 5 per cent. of the value of the animals or animal products confiscated as a result. Public officials were already entitled to such a reward.

INTERNATIONALISM, or PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM. 'An internationalist is he who unreservedly, without hesitation, without conditions, is ready to defend the USSR because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and to defend, to advance this revolutionary movement is impossible without defending the USSR.' (Stalin, *Works*, Moscow 1949, vol. 10, p. 51.) (It may save some misunderstanding to note that the test of a Patriot, a Revolutionary, and an Internationalist is to all intents and purposes the same; and that the three words are merely alternative descriptions for the same person.)

To make Stalin's claim more readily apparent, Internationalism is often used with the adjective Proletarian. This is, however, a label rather than a more precise definition. Stalinist ideology does not recognise an internationalism that could be anything else, since

it holds that true nationalism is safe only in proletarian and revolutionary hands, its alternative being unacceptable distortions of nationalism ranging from 'bourgeois nationalism' (the exploitation of patriotic feelings in the class interest of the bourgeois) through 'chauvinism' (the use of such feelings to inspire hatred against other nations) to 'cosmopolitanism' (the world hegemony of the USA). 'Lenin pointed out that proletarian internationalism and bourgeois nationalism are irreconcilable slogans.' (S. Titarenko, *Patriotism and Internationalism, Soviet News*, 1950.)

'At present the only determining criterion of revolutionary proletarian internationalism is: are you for or against the USSR, the Motherland of the world proletariat? An internationalist is not one who verbally recognises international solidarity or sympathises with it. A real internationalist is one who brings his sympathy and recognition up to the point of practical and maximum help to the USSR in support and defence of the USSR by every means and in every possible form. . . . The defence of the USSR as the socialist Motherland of the world proletariat, is the holy duty of every honest man everywhere and not only of the citizens of the USSR.' (P. Vishinsky, 'Communism and the Motherland', *Questions of Philosophy*, No. 2, 1948.) As this shows, there is no dilemma in the Stalinist mind between the interests of one's own country and those of the USSR; and so in practice it is enough to discover what the USSR considers her own interests to be to show to the 'proletarian internationalist' his own. He is thus 'wholly devoted to the Soviet Union' and 'imbued with boundless love for, and fidelity to, the leader and teacher of working mankind, Comrade Stalin' (*Cominform Journal*, 2 February 1950). 'A true internationalist' was ready to defend the Soviet Union 'without wavering and without any conditions' (*For a Socialist Yugoslavia*, a journal of Yugoslav Cominformist exiles, No. 13, 1951). This loyalty extends to the Red Army: 'because our army is brought up in a spirit of internationalism . . . (it) is an army of the world revolution, an army of the workers of all the countries.' (Stalin (in 1938), quoted in *Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1940, vol. 47, p. 776.)

Any suggestion of merging the sovereignty of one non-communist state with another, or their association in political, economic or military *blocs*, is not, as might perhaps be expected, Bourgeois Internationalism—a phrase which does not and cannot exist for the Communist—but Cosmopolitanism.

INVENTIONS. Most of the machines that move or work on the land or the sea or in the air seem at some time or other to have been claimed as Russian inventions. So too do most scientific techniques and original ideas. This propaganda is for the most part aimed at home audiences, presumably to instil self-respect and national pride by convincing them that they belong to 'the most technically advanced country in the world' (*Moscow Radio*, December 1950). Detailed claims, with the evidence adduced for them, are listed below :

Aeronautics. Peter Nesterov first looped the loop on 9 September 1913; the manoeuvre has since been called 'The Nesterov Loop'. He was also the first to ram an enemy aircraft. (*Tass*, 9 September 1953.)

Aeroplane. Made by Mozhaisky in 1882, twenty years before the Wright Brothers. This is a recent claim; Mozhaisky is not even mentioned in the 1938 edition of the *Soviet Encyclopaedia*.

Airship. Capt. I. S. Kostovich built the dirigible in 1900; Count Zeppelin stole and later used his designs. (*Krasnyi Flot*, 7 April 1951.)

Animal. The Palaeontological Museum of the USSR Academy of Sciences showed a complete skeleton of the dinoceratosaurus, 'the oldest type of animal'. 'A whole graveyard' of them had been found in Mongolia, refuting the 'erroneous assumption' that this animal lived only in North America. (*Tass Agency*, 7 March 1951.)

Antarctic. 'Russian sailors under the command of Bellingshausen and Lazarev in 1819-21 discovered the Antarctic.' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1949-50, 'Atlantic Ocean'.)

Antibiotics. 'The foundations' of antibiotics were laid in the 1870s when *penicillium glaucum* was used in medical treatment. (*Moscow Radio*, 2 July 1952.)

Artificial Insemination. First used in a fish hatchery by the Russian biologist Vladimir Vrassky in 1857; he used a 'dry fertilisation' method. (*Soviet Information Bureau*, London, 8 February 1952.)

Atomic Fission. 'Spontaneous fission of a uranium atom' was discovered by the Soviet physicists G. N. Flerov and K. A. Petrzhak. (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1949-50, 'Atom Bomb'.)

Calculating Machines were invented and manufactured before 1750 by Yakobson, a Minsk watchmaker and mechanic; his

invention did 'all sorts of calculations' up to a million. (*Moscow Radio*, 7 March 1951.)

Chemistry. 'The science of physical chemistry was founded by Lomonosov in May 1752.' (*Moscow Radio*, 28 May 1952.)

Cinema Projector. Invented by a mechanic and a professor of Odessa University in 1893. (*Tass*, 5 September 1953.)

Crystallography. 'The founder of crystallography' was E. S. Fedorov. (*Moscow Radio*, 22 May 1952.)

Desert. The Gobi Desert, in Outer Mongolia, is 'the only territory in the world that has not been covered by seas for more than a hundred million years.' (*Tass Agency*, 7 March 1951.)

Detergents. Invented by G. S. Petrov in 1913. (*Izvestia*, 17 October 1954.) Marketed in 1954 under the trade name *Novost* (*Novelty*).

Dyestuffs. 'The whole modern dye-manufacturing industry is based on N. N. Genin's synthesis of aniline, made in 1842.' (*Moscow Radio*, 27 May 1950.)

Electric Arc Welding. The phenomenon of the electric arc was discovered by V. V. Petrov on 29 May 1802, seven years ahead of Davy; he is thus 'the founder of electro-metallurgy'. Electric arc welding was invented in Russia. (*Tass Agency*, 6 June 1950 and 29 May 1952.)

Electric Light Bulb. Invented by A. H. Lodigin in 1875, three or four years before Edison. (*Moscow Polytechnic Exhibit*.)

Electrical Measurement. Units of measurement for electrical current intensity and resistance, 'later given the foreign names of ohm and ampere', were invented by 'the Russian electrician' Yakoby and used in Russia for some years before being adopted elsewhere. (*Moscow Radio*, 27 May 1950.)

Electric Motor Boat. The same 'Russian electrician', Boris Yakoby, was said by *Literary Gazette* during 1948 to have invented the first electric motor, which he applied to a boat on the river Neva. A memorial plaque has been erected to him in Lenin-grad University.

Flying Boats. The Russian engineer Yakov Gakkel received a silver medal for his 'naval type monoplane' at the St. Petersburg International Aviation Exhibition in 1911, a year before Curtiss (USA) produced his first amphibious aircraft. (*Tass Agency*, 9 June 1951.)

Gas Turbine. World's first constructed for use in a small launch in 1897; idea of using them in aircraft also originated in Russia, and a patent was taken out by Gerasimov in 1909. A proposal for

a turbo-propellor engine followed in 1914; and in 1923 the Soviet inventor Barazov worked out the theory of an aviation gas-turbine engine 'containing all the essentials of the machines which exist today'. (*Moscow Radio*, 3 February 1954.)

Helicopter. 'I, as a pupil of Zhukovsky, succeeded in 1912 in building a one-propeller helicopter.' (B. Yuriev in *Literary Gazette*, 9 September 1952.) Lomonosov, however, demonstrated a model helicopter, 'prototype of today's machines' on 12 July 1754. (*Tass*, 11 July 1954.)

Hydrogenation Plant. 'The first in commercial use' was established in Russia in 1908. Mendeleyev was the first to advance the theory of catalysis. (*Moscow Radio*, 4 April 1952.)

Hydroplane (see *Naval*).

Internal Combustion Locomotives. USSR was 'the pioneer'; mass production began in 1947. (*Moscow Radio*, 24 June 1952.)

Interplanetary Flight. K. E. Tsiolkovsky (died 1935) 'worked all his life on problems of interplanetary communication by means of jet-propelled airships' (*Moscow Radio*, 18 September 1950). He was 'the first man in the world to prove' that rockets could develop tremendous speed if they could carry adequate stocks of fuel. Soviet science and technology will overcome 'the wide spaces beyond the clouds'. (*Moscow Radio*, 9 April 1951.)

Jet Aircraft. (These first appeared officially in the USSR on Aviation Day, 18 August 1946.) 'The first flight in the world in a jet plane was made in the Soviet Union in 1942.' (*Moscow Radio*, December 1950.) 'The first to work out the project of a jet aircraft' was called Kibalchich, while in a prison awaiting execution for attempt on the life of Alexander II (died 1881). He worked on a project for burning gunpowder in a cylinder. This, by emitting gases, would propel the cylinder upwards. (*Moscow Radio*, 9 April 1951.) However, K. E. Tsiolkovsky is 'the founder of the theory of the jet engine'. (*Pravda*, 20 June 1954.)

Mines (see *Naval*).

Mining. Russia had 'the first mechanised mine' in the world. (*Moscow Radio*, 4 August 1951.)

Naval. Russians invented—naval tactics for steam warships; sea mines; torpedoes; several types of ships, including the trawler; hydroplanes (by D. P. Grigorovich, 1913). (*Russkoe Voenno-Morskoe Iskusstvo*: Russian Naval Art, by Capt. R. N. Mordvinov. Moscow, 1951.)

Oilwell. 'The world's first oilwell' was drilled near Baku in 1846. The Russian engineer Shukhov was the first to use compressed air in wells to force the oil to the surface. (*Moscow Radio*, 18 April 1952.)

Parachute. Invented by a Russian called Kotelnikov. (*Pravda*, 20 June 1954.)

Penicillin. 'Everyone knows' that this, 'one of the most mighty instruments of contemporary medicine', was discovered by three Russians (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 13 March 1949) 'half a century before Fleming' and used for septic ulcers, wounds, boils, and syphilis. (*Pravda*, 17 March 1948.) The *London Daily Worker* was unaware of this, and referred to it as 'entirely a British discovery'. (27 November 1952.)

Quartz Crystal Clock (has for some time been a standard instrument in most modern observatories throughout the world; it is used to control the frequency of an alternating current within extremely close limits). 'Recently invented by Soviet scientists.' (*Echo Kraowskie, Cracow*, 25 June 1952.)

Radio. 'Invented' by Alexander Popov, in May 1895. ('The world's first radio apparatus—Popov's wireless telegraph' is in the Moscow Polytechnic Museum.) Invented a morse receiver in May 1898, applied it in 1899 by using radio to correct artillery fire at Kronstadt and for communicating with balloons. Invented 'walkie-talkies', first used in June 1900. Russia was thus the first country to possess portable radio sets, and radio was first successfully applied in the Russian Navy. (*Moscow Radio*, 22 February 1951.) (Not, apparently, with much influence on the course of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905.) The first man ever to communicate by radio was, of course, Sir Oliver Lodge, at Oxford in 1894.

Radiolocation. This out-of-date and thoroughly English word for what is now known as radar was used by *Soviet News*, 9 May 1950, and described as 'the product of Russian scientific and technical thought'. Popov was its 'discoverer', noting the reflection of radio signals exchanged between two ships in 1897. (*Moscow Radio*, 6 and 7 May 1951.)

Railway. 'The first railway in the world' was laid down in 1753 in 'the first mechanised mine in the world' (in the Urals). The Tsars obstructed engineers who wanted to build steam-driven carriages, so the first steam locomotives were not built until 1834

nor the first railway for them until 1836. (*Moscow Radio*, 4 August 1951.)

Rockets, 'first made in Russia in 1620'. (*Moscow Radio*, October 1950.)

Rubber, Synthetic. The world's first experimental factories were built in Russia in 1930. The method now used was invented by S. V. Lebedev: alcohol is distilled from potatoes or sawdust and then converted into divinyl by means of a catalyst. (Kryuchkov, *Synthetic Rubber*, Technical Theory Press, Moscow, 1951.) Lebedev evolved 'the world's first varieties' in 1926. (*Moscow Radio*, 8 February 1952.)

Seismology was 'founded' by Boris Golitsyn (b. 1862); he opened his first seismographic station at Leningrad in 1906. (*Moscow Radio*, 2 March 1952.)

Steam Engine. Polzunov (d. 1766) invented the first stationary steam engine 'twenty years before James Watt'. (*Tass Agency*, 25 May 1951.) (Watt's invention was made in 1774.)

Submarines have been described as a development of the method used by the medieval fishermen of the Crimea, who swam below the surface, using reeds through which to breathe.

Telegraph. Electro-magnetic telegraphic apparatus demonstrated by P. L. Shilling in 1832 (five years before Morse) (Caption in Moscow Polytechnic Museum). Descriptions of the duplex and quadruplex system of electric telegraphy were published in Russia in 1859. (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 19 August 1952.) (These systems were invented respectively by Stirnes, 1871, and Edison, 1874, both Americans.)

Telephony. The idea of telephony through cables was invented by Vlasev and used between Odessa and Nikolayev in 1893. (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1952.)

Telephony, High-Frequency. 'First proposed by Ignatyev in 1880.' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1952.)

Television. B. L. Rosing, of St. Petersburg, 'demonstrated the practical possibility' of cathode telescope television in May 1911. In May 1951 the Gorki House of Scientists (Leningrad) met to celebrate the '40th anniversary of the world's first television broadcast'. (*Krasniy Flot*, 26 May 1951.)

3-D. The stereoscopic cinema was 'invented by the Soviet designer Ivanov and first introduced to the public in Moscow in February 1941.' (*Moscow Radio*, 17 October 1953.)

Torpedo (see Naval).

Tramcar. A pamphlet was issued in Moscow in April 1952 by the Russian Publishing House of Municipal Economy under the title of *The Tram is a Russian Invention*. B. Yakoby (see Electric Motor Boat) was the first to suggest them, but the many galvanic batteries needed to supply current proved too expensive. When dynamos were available, the idea of transmitting electric current through rails 'took shape in the mind' of I. A. Perovsky. (This idea appears to have come to him in September 1874) (*Tass*, 6 September 1950); and in 1876 ordinary railway tracks were used for current transmission (*Tass*, 6 September 1950). A double-decker carriage was run along rails, propelled by electric power, in a St. Petersburg park on 22 August 1880; but the Society of Horse-Drawn Railways saw a dangerous rival in electricity and saw to it that the invention was 'buried'. Siemens' electric railway from Berlin to Lichterfeld, built in 1881, 'wholly copied Perovsky's design, except for certain differences which made Siemens' carriage inferior to the St. Petersburg one'. (The story of the tramcar not only illustrates how the Russians think of everything first, but also how the stupid foreigner is unable to profit by experience.)

Tractor, Caterpillar. Patented by F. A. Blikov, a Russian farmer, on 20 September 1879. A steam 'waggon with endless bands for carrying freight along highways and rural roads' (*Moscow Radio*, 23 July 1952).

Turbines. Russians 'first studied the possibility of generating electricity by means of water turbine'. Leonard Euler, of St. Petersburg, first formulated the theory; Ignaty Sofronov built one in 1837. (*Moscow Radio*, 13 February 1952.) Kuzminsky built the first gas turbine in 1897; Gerasimov took out a patent for a gas turbine for aircraft in 1909 (see Jets); Nikolsky produced a turbine to propel an airscrew in 1914. (Lyapunov, *Gas Turbines*, Moscow, 1951.)

Underground Boat or 'Mechanical Mole', invented by Engineer Tribelev, who first 'carried out many observations on moles which, as is well known, have no equals among animals for their speed in moving underground'. The Boat is shaped like a cigar, with a cutting drill in front and four jacks at the back to press on the side of the tunnel and push the machine ahead. It scoops about 40 feet of tunnel, 4 feet in diameter, every hour. (*Moscow Radio*, 5 January 1952.)



LOVE. 'I don't know whether I love you or not; but when I look at your production results I feel I do.' A 1952 cartoon from Krokodil satirising plays which are excessive in their antiromanticism.

Vaccination. Jenner had his information from the British Ambassador in Constantinople, whose source was a book, published in 1713, describing the practice in Georgia, where it had been carried on 'since the earliest times'. (*Moscow Radio*, 2 February 1951.)

Viruses. Filtered viruses were discovered by Gamalyeva (1886) and Ivanovsky (1892) who thereby founded 'virusology'. (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 1952, 'Viruses'.)

Vitamins. Lunin was 'the first to gain any knowledge' of them (about 1881). In 1951 the Soviet Ministry of Health set up an annual Lunin lecture to deal with the theory and practice of 'vitaminology'. (*Moscow Radio*, 17 April 1951.)

Wooden Paving. Archaeologists have found that the streets of Novgorod were paved with wood over 200 years before French or German cities, thus proving it was originally 'the leading town in Europe for public order and amenities'. (*Moscow Radio*, 8 January 1952.)

Russian priority is also claimed to some extent in connection with the rise of British naval and mercantile power, for the naval stores sold 'at very low cost' by Russia—timber, pitch, sails and rigging—'enabled' the Royal Navy to win 'its brilliant victory' over the Spanish Armada. (*News*, 15 November 1953.) Modesty appears to supervene in one case only. In a popular book, *Talks about Magnetism*, by a Mr. Bosman (Moscow, 1951), the author admits that 'it was the Chinese who discovered the compass'. Turning this generous admission to good account, he adds that it is 'a fact which Western scientists are hushing up'.

KHALTURA, attacked by Malenkov in his October Revolution anniversary speech in 1949 and discussed by *Pravda* (June 1950), is black market operations indulged in by undertakings with the connivance of those taking part. A factory using metals, for example, may deflect as much of its supply as it dare to making toys or household goods and selling them for high prices on the local black market. The high prices received augment the workers' modest wages and give them an incentive to silence. The word *khalturshchik* appears to be in general use as 'black market operator'. The campaign for consumer goods in 1953 may have lessened this phenomenon.

The modern jargon meaning has grown out of the older use of the word, which referred to the habit of doing one's work shoddily, with bad taste or technical incompetence, and generally 'pot boiling'.

KOLKHOZ (see COLLECTIVE FARM).

KOMSOMOL is the usual name for the Soviet Communist Youth league, and is formed of the initial syllables of that title in Russian : *Kommunistichesky Soyuz Molodezhi*. It consists of young men and women from 14 to 26 and had a membership of 18.8 millions in March 1954 (*Tass*, 20 March 1954), compared with 15 million in March 1952 and 9.3 million in March 1948 (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 19 June 1952). It was 'formed and nourished by the Communist Party as its militant assistant and reliable reserve' (*Communist*, No. 7, 1952); and over 4 million new Party members graduated from it between 1939 and 1952 (*Pravda*, 7 October 1952). A Komsomol member (*Komsomolets*) is expected to 'help the Party to train the rising generation in the spirit of communism' (*Communist*, No. 7, 1952). He or she is expected to shame, and if necessary denounce, slackers, absentee workers, and 'botchers' and improve technical and general knowledge among the workers by their personal example.

The word seems to be in use among the upper reaches of Communists as a synonym for actions showing more enthusiasm than wordly wisdom. Stalin once angrily called Dimitrov a *Komsomolets* (*Dedijer, Tito Speaks*, p. 327).

KULAK is the Russian word for 'fist'. When used of a man, it comes to mean 'tight-fisted one', and since that is a description that fits so many peasants—especially well-to-do ones—it was extremely useful to the Bolsheviks in cementing the early alliance of town workers and poor landless agricultural workers. It is, however, a term of abuse rather than a definition. There are three strata of peasants: those without any land; those who work their own land; and those who can afford to pay others to work their land for them. Kulaks normally belong to the third category, though not necessarily synonymous with it. The line is drawn at different points according to the tactical needs of the Communist Party at any given time. A kulak, therefore, is any peasant who opposes the current policy for agriculture.

KULTURNY (see CULTURE).

LEFTISM. Most political movements, and especially revolutionary parties holding power, are faced with the need to balance the purity of their principles against the compromises inevitable in day to day administration. In the Communist Party there is a constant danger of two kinds of deviation from the Party Line (apart, of course, from the specific and personal deviations such as Trotskyism, Bukharinism, etc.). There will always be people so bemused by the need for tactical agreements with opponents (for example, during the Popular Front period of the 1930s), that they tend to compromise some vital interest either thoughtlessly or from having once tasted the fruits (the Dead Sea fruits, as Communism believes them) of parliamentary power. This is Rightist Deviationism, or Rightism. At the other extreme are Communists who take their proclaimed principles so literally that they are unable to summon up enough mental flexibility to appear to go back on them, whatever the advantages to be gained. The man who, having been instructed to abuse Social Democrats as 'social-fascists', cannot then bring himself to join with them for some specific aim (e.g. encouraging the West German Social Democrats in opposition to German rearmament during 1951, giving unwanted support to Labour candidates in the London County Council elections in April 1952) is guilty of Leftist Deviationism or Leftism. The Leftists permit enthusiasm to outrun discretion; they are the men and women with *trop de zèle*. M. Revai, the Hungarian Minister of Culture, told the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party Congress on 24 February 1951 how such people were 'doing the work of the enemy'. When the influence of Western literature was criticised, they were the people who banned the works of Cervantes and Swift; and thus, implied Revai, made the Government look ridiculous.

Leftism began as a serious phenomenon after 1917, when the survival of the Russian Revolution demanded that foreign Communist Parties, organised in the Comintern, should not alienate socialist and trade union movements by dwelling on ideological differences, but should seek to win their sympathy and so lessen the chances of successful 'imperialist' intervention in Soviet affairs. The classic formulation at this early stage was given by Lenin in his *Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder* (May 1920). This

laid down that 'to reject compromise on principle is childish', and demanded that Communists should learn 'how to combine the strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism with an ability to make all the necessary compromises—to tack, make agreements, zigzags, retreats, and so on'. (See RIGHTISM.)

LENINISM is 'the one and only ideology in the USSR.' (*Pravda*, 22 April 1951.) Although the Communist Party was often referred to in Stalin's lifetime as 'the party of Lenin-Stalin', thus raising Stalin to Lenin's level on the historic and organisational side, the only hyphen normally permitted where ideology was concerned was Marxism-Leninism. Stalin was 'the great continuer of Lenin's cause', who had 'brilliantly developed' the 'inextinguishable ideas' of Leninism (*Cominform Journal*, 18 April 1952), and as 'the great continuer' he is referred to since his death.

Whereas Marx and Engels 'gave mankind a precise, scientifically based theory for the liberation of the working masses from the shackles of capitalism', Lenin carried their 'scientific Socialism' a stage further, particularly in respect of (a) carrying the theoretical analysis of capitalism up to its modern, or 'imperialist' stage; (b) the practical experience of the October Revolution; (c) the form of organisation of the Communist Party as a 'militant staff of the working class' rather than a mass party taking part in parliamentary life. These quotations are from a leading article in the *Cominform Journal* of 18 April 1952: it adds that 'any deviation from Leninism, from proletarian internationalism, means betrayal of the cause of the working class, betrayal of the interests of one's people'.

LIBERALISM as a theory of personal initiative and a technique of free market economy is regarded by Communism as part of the wider functioning of bourgeois morality and capitalist enterprise. The term is, however, occasionally used, but in a looser sense; sometimes with a degree of respect, as when liberal opinion in the non-Soviet world is to be courted, at other times as a synonym for a lackadaisical free and easiness and want of clearly defined principle. An example of the latter was given by the Budapest newspaper *Szabad Nep* on 25 April 1951, calling for the 'consolidation' of 'work discipline', and accusing foremen of not reporting shortcomings on the part of workers to the management. 'This kind of

liberalism' gave free scope to the enemy. The word is an example of how Communist usage changes according to the effect it is intended to produce. Thus in a single issue of the *Cominform Journal* (1 June 1951) it is used both flatteringly and pejoratively. Philip Frankfeld, an Ohio Communist leader, is quoted on page 4 as accusing the Joint House Committee on Subversive Activities in Ohio as singling out for persecution and attack 'progressives, liberals and communists'. A review of volume 13 of Stalin's *Works* on the other hand, on page 2, refers to the way in which he 'mercilessly criticised and stigmatised the rotten liberalism which prevailed among some Bolsheviks' who thought (in 1931) that Trotskyists and 'Trotskyite-minded people' still represented a trend of Communism.

LOVE. Since for Communism it is the productive relations of society (in an economic sense) that makes the world go round, love loses its romantic primacy and becomes as much a matter of social responsibility as of private choice. In the USSR, where writers, artists and makers of films have had more time to absorb the new view, love has tended to settle down into a simple, uncomplicated relationship between two people whose main interest in life is not each other, but their places in society. An example of this is to be found in the film *Kuban Kossacks*, where a star worker of one collective farm loves a boy from another, as do the respective managers of the farms. The solution, after a degree of dramatic heartache that comes nowhere near to tearing the fabric of their economic relationships, is solved by the marriage of the lovers—and of the farms, thus serving the policy of enlarging farm undertakings for greater efficiency. (See AGROGORODS.)

In countries that have more newly arrived at Communism, this balance between romance and responsibility has been less happily achieved. Criticised for turning out old-fashioned, saccharine love stories, authors have tended to play for safety. This of course produces dull books and stories and films, and people lose interest in them. Yet people must be encouraged by the example of literature to choose acceptable models for their own conduct, and one such model is the citizen happy in his work and happy in his home, convinced that all is for the best in the best of all possible social systems. Hence Mr. Revai, the Hungarian Minister of Popular Culture, gathered a conference of theatre and film producers,

actors and authors in Budapest on 13 October 1951 and said he had learned that the kiss had been banned from Hungarian films for the past two years owing to a 'narrow-minded, false conception of the class war' and a 'stupid conception' of Marxism-Leninism. 'New dramatists', he said 'cram their plays and films with ideology and seem to think that a play can be written by taking five ounces of competitive labour, three ounces of love, three ounces of sabotage, three ounces of marriage conflict, put the whole into a pan and stir well.'

The problems of socialist love had already been discussed publicly in Hungary. Budapest Radio said on 10 January 1951 that love in a capitalist society was 'romance on the conveyor belt', a commodity for sale like any other. Among the upper classes love was marked by 'sensational scandals and immoral and frivolous amusement'. Outside 'this lucky group'—apparently a Freudian slip of the tongue!—the imagination of the millions became infected by the luxury and money-made glitter, and their desires were contaminated by filthy literature.

In a land of 'realised socialism', on the other hand, love was sincere, beautiful, and pure. This ideal was illustrated by quotations from a chapter of the Soviet writer Maltsev's novel, *With all One's Heart*. In this chapter a young man and a girl, young Communists and members of a collective farm, go skiing with a party at a nearby farm. They are shown some agricultural machinery and 'mechanised production processes'. The girl was so engrossed with a detail of the construction of one of the machines that she was left behind. The young man waited for her, and as it was dark by the time they left the farm together, he mistook the way and led her through a fox-breeding farm and some cow-sheds. The hero did no more than try to warm her frozen hands; 'breathing hotly down her neck' and trying to kiss her, at which she burst into tears. To make sure that they would meet again, he lent the girl his gloves and they parted 'filled with glowing happiness'.

LYSENKOISM. Trofim D. Lysenko (b. 1898) is the son of a Ukrainian peasant, and from an early age interested himself in new varieties of plants, combining practical work with study at agricultural institutes until his early twenties. He evolved his own version of Michurinism, concluding that the characteristics of plants are not irrevocably transmitted by genes and chromosomes (the

genetic theory); but that each plant recapitulates in its own life all the stages of the evolutionary development of the species to which it belongs, and that if the experimenter chooses the right 'stage' at which to interfere, he can change not only the future of the plant itself, but cause the changes to be transmitted to later generations. This is clearly an attractive theory for Marxists who believe that material environment determines personality (see also PAVLOVISM); and if true is of great practical consequence in improving the food supply of a country with a climate like that of Russia, by developing cold-resisting species of plants. His main claims are:

- (a) *Vernalisation*: That 'hard' winter wheat can be soaked through the months of frost and planted as 'soft' wheat in spring with no ill effects;
- (b) *Hybridisation*: That grafting produces new strains—e.g. cold-resisting apples, pears and grapes which will grow in Siberia. (A disciple claims to have produced a strain of apricots which it is hoped will grow as far north as Moscow, withstanding frosts up to 40°C. (*Tass*, 17 January 1952); he himself claims to have proved the possibility of breeding a new type of grain called 'wheat-rye' (*Moscow Radio*, 13 April 1951).
- (c) *The Cluster System* of planting (sometimes hardly distinguishable from the medieval field rotation system) by which kind of 'collective' of varieties which do not compete one against the other is planted together, thus reducing the need for labour and fertiliser and producing bigger yields.

To virtually all non-Russian biologists, and probably to most Russian ones also, Lysenko's theories are regarded as completely bogus. His practical successes were regarded as a collection of old wives' tales and rule-of-thumb experiments which did not bear out the theoretical implications that he read into them. His main strength appeared to lie, however, in his ability to understand the mentality of the peasants, and to fire them as a crusader for productivity with enthusiasm for trying new methods of cultivation and new varieties of plants.

In 1948, however, he passed from being a rustic evangelist to becoming an officially-sponsored authority on heredity, and silenced all his rivals by announcing that he had the support of the Communist Party Central Committee and of Stalin personally. Some commentators saw behind this biological conflict a vaster political

one, and the names of G. M. Malenkov and A. A. Zhdanov were linked as rivals, with Mr. Malenkov as Lysenko's supporter and protector. Some colour was lent to this interpretation by the fact that Yuri A. Zhdanov (son of A. A., and head of the science section of the Party's Agitation and Propaganda Department), who had criticised Lysenko, recanted in a personal letter to Stalin and promised to 'repair my errors by deeds' in the very month that his father died.

It can certainly be assumed that no serious criticism of the victorious professor could be made without weighty political backing; and none was forthcoming until Professor N. V. Turbin (who had supported him in 1948) complained (*Botanical Journal*, December 1952) that the Lysenko theory of species formation 'claims a monopolistic position in our science' and another contributor spoke of Lysenko's 'errors' and accused him of departing from the principles of both Darwinism and Michurinism. Lysenko reacted violently and the critics were silenced. On 12 February 1954 he received the Order of Lenin for 'long service and irreproachable work' and on the 20th he compelled the board of his own Institute of Genetics to award a degree, which they had previously refused to do, to one of his main supporters, Mr. V. S. Dmitriev, who had been head of the agricultural planning section of the State Planning Commission until 1953. Three days later Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, first secretary of the Party, talking on agriculture to its Central Committee, attacked Mr. Dmitriev among others, and referred sarcastically to Lysenko as his 'protector'. On 26 March *Pravda* brought the incident of the doctorate into the open, printing a letter which accused Lysenko of responsibility for a 'mockery of Soviet science' and revealing that the board had met yet once again and deprived Mr. Dmitriev of the degree they had been so unwilling to give him. (Khrushchev's speech also outlined, without mentioning names, the losses to Soviet agriculture from the indiscriminate use of the Lysenko planting methods.)

The Party's ideological organ, *Communist*, took up the 1952 criticisms of monopoly on 4 April 1954 and said that a 'free struggle of opinion' over his theories was 'necessary'. (It was at this point that the London *Daily Worker* (13 May 1954) delivered itself of an article 'The Lie about Lysenko', in which it gave 'the perfect answer to cold war warriors . . . who have been claiming

that he has been "disgraced"). A few weeks later Professor Turbin appeared in the *Journal of General Biology* (5 July 1954)—whose editor had bitterly attacked him in 1952—to complain not only of Lysenko's monopolistic tendencies, but to attack him on the grounds that he had 'clearly falsified' his evidence (e.g. in saying that he had turned pine trees into spruce) in some cases; that it was unverified in others (e.g. the transformation of wheat into barley); and that some of it did not prove new species formation at all, but could be explained as normal variation of hybrid seed (e.g. the transformation of hard wheat into soft). Darwin's theory of natural selection, with slight modifications, was said to be quite capable of explaining the phenomena to which Lysenko had drawn attention. (See also MICHURINISM.) Two possible hypotheses, neither exclusive of the other, is that Lysenko, having reached the limits of his practical usefulness to Party and State, does not now have to be humoured as a 'scientist' and can be deflated on the theoretical side; and that he is, as many thought him to be in 1948, a counter in a wider political game.

MALTHUSIANISM, or NEO-MALTHUSIANISM as it is sometimes called, is a word revived in the USSR to deal with people who are concerned about whether the world will be able to produce enough food to supply its growing population. Soviet publicists believe, or affect to believe, that this is not a genuine worry on the part of scientists concerned with soil fertility and nutrition, but a deliberate attempt on the part of the 'imperialists', particularly in America, to (1) convince workers at home that poverty is due to over-population and not to the capitalist system; (2) justify war against the more populous states of Asia. *Pravda* (7 June 1952) dealt with this theme, calling Malthusianism 'the ideology of cannibals'. It suggested that 50 to 70 per cent. of the cultivated land of capitalist countries was useless or likely to be so, and so there was a call for war to solve the food problem. 'In Korea hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed by the United States invasion troops, who have now embarked on bacteriological and chemical warfare with the aim of wiping out all life on Korean soil.' This is presumably an attempt to give some kind of ideological underpinning to the otherwise unsubstantiated accusations, and to provide Asia with a cogent reason for uniting against America.

The present population of the world is something over 2,000 million. *Pravda* claimed that it could support 8 to 11,000 million by 'the rational use of modern productive methods'.

The USSR claims that its own population is increasing by over 3 million a year, but that current irrigation projects will provide food for an extra 100 million.

MARSHALL PLAN, 'a means of gearing the policies and economies of the "Marshallised" countries to the narrow and selfish plans for the establishment of Anglo-American domination in Europe'. (USSR Foreign Ministry's declaration on the NATO Pact, January 1949.) It has 'a military character', and is 'the economic weapon of the Atlantic Treaty'. (*Moscow Radio*, 3 April 1951.)

MEDICINE. The Soviet Union, claiming to have been the home of penicillin (see INVENTIONS), naturally prides itself on the progress of medicine. The more widely publicised branches of this subject are :

Angina. 'Preobrazhensky's cure' consists of diet, 'the use of sulphanide compounds like streptocide or sulphazol', measures to prevent infection such as breathing through the nose, treatment of the teeth and avoiding hot drinks. (*Moscow Radio*, 26 February 1951.)

Antibiotics. These appear to follow non-Communist types, but with Sovietised names, e.g. Granituzin (invented 1942) for wounds, septic peritonitis and tonsillitis; Chloromycetin, originally from fungus, now synthetic, for typhus and typhoid and (in association with Synthomycin) for dysentery, especially in babies; Albumycin, for pulmonary diseases of children up to the age of 3; Microcit, for septic wounds; and of course *Penicillium Glaucum*, 'invented 80 years ago'. In addition to micro-organisms, Soviet medicine uses Lezacin, Epitrin and Ecmalin from animal tissues; and, from cherry and garlic, 'volatile substances deadly to microbes'. (*Moscow Radio*, 2 July 1952.)

Old Age is best kept away with soda baths and soda injections. (*Tass*, 26 April 1951.)

Ulcers and *Hypertonia* are the result of disturbances in the function of the cortex, caused usually by nervous overstrain finding initial expression in neurosis and neurasthenia. 'The assertion of foreign scientists that hypertonia is caused by disturbed

functions of the kidneys is wrong.' (*Moscow Radio*, 14 May 1952.) The treatment is sleep. (See SLEEP THERAPY.)

Whooping Cough. 'An interesting new cure' is used by Dr. Szczurkowski, of Sosnowiec, Poland. He takes patients down coal mines and the change of atmospheric conditions and temperature has cured 'some dozens of children'. (*Warsaw Radio*, 25 April 1951.)

METAPHORS. If, as the psychologists assert, the metaphors and similes a man uses are often a better guide to his meaning than his straightforward arguments, those of Communism deserve attention, for they are many, vivid and often unexpected. No one can fail to note, for example, the belligerent metaphors employed even when their whole purpose is to advocate peace ('to declare war on the imperialist war'; to 'batter the warmongers to death' and so forth) (see PEACE); the military metaphors employed for a political party ('militant staff of the working class') (see LENINISM); the 'victory' of socialism promised—or threatened—in the same breath that the doomed capitalists are asked to co-exist peacefully. Other metaphors scattered through this glossary are the common currency of Stalinist journalism: the Monolith, the Purge, the Birth Pangs of a new order, the Wheel of History which cannot be turned back, the Road of History on which there is only a one-way traffic.

Variants of these metaphors are numerous. Thus the Communists are 'both the midwives and parents of the new life emerging' (Jozsef Darvas, Hungarian Minister of Education, *Budapest Radio*, 27 April 1951). There is a trace of aggressive medievalism: the Bulgarian Army is 'a formidable mailed fist, ready to smite' (*Sofia Radio*, 12 December 1950). An especial favourite, given a new lease of life by the Nuremberg trials, which in their turn are a welcome precedent to be quoted against selected victims, deals with hanging. The most ingenious variant on this theme is: 'Peace is hanging by a silken thread. If they can only unite, the Germans can transform this thread into a firm rope on which the warmongers . . . can finally hang themselves.' (*Berlin Radio*, 16 January 1951.) Perhaps there is a trace of Bonapartism—or could it be aristocratic pride?—in the tart reminder that functionaries of the United Nations were expected to have standards 'other than those of people in the haberdashery or grocery trades' (Alexandrov in *Pravda*, 30 October 1950). The grocer was

Mr. Trygve Lie, 'Salesman-General of Wall Street'; the haberdasher was presumably President Truman.

The terms of abuse—the imperialist 'cannibals', 'the sharp-nosed dwarf of the White House' and so forth—are vivid but tend to monotony, being for the most part variants of corruption and catastrophe. A French novelist, a British biologist and an American Service Minister are chosen as examples of 'heroes' of capitalism; they are 'nothing but repulsive warts on the tentacles of a filthy octopus gripping the whole world in an attempt to prevent it from moving. . . . The workers of the world must tear from the hands of the imperialists the weapons of annihilation invented by these fiends. . . . May the degenerate ravings of the bourgeoisie continue to feed on scenes of corruption and human destruction. Yes, the roof is cracking over their heads; but we will not, we cannot, allow them to drag the whole world with them.' (*Moscow Radio*, 21 June 1950.)

Communism not only breeds distinctive metaphors of itself; it excites them in others. The most complex yet encountered was Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's description, as Director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (11 August 1950, *US News and World Report*) of 'How Communists Operate'. 'The Communist Party', he said, 'is today a Trojan horse of disloyalty, coiled like a serpent in the very heart of America. It may mouth sweet words of "peace", "democracy", "equality", and flourish gay slogans of "international solidarity" and "brotherhood of men", but its body and feet are from the Russian bear. Wherever the Trojan horse of Communist fifth columns has walked, the indelible footprints of Russian imperialism remain behind.' This two-legged horse, presumably made of wood, talking like a human being, behaving like a serpent and leaving a bear's footprints, is perhaps a not unworthy beast to match the filthy octopus with the repulsive warts in the cold war of political zoology.

MICHURINISM is the theory, based on experiments by the self-taught Soviet horticulturist Michurin (d. 1935) and developed by Lysenko (see LYSENKOISM) that the changes made in an organism by its environment can be inherited by succeeding generations. 'Michurinite science' is said to have increased by 2,800 times the area under fruit-bearing plants in the USSR. (*Tass*, 6 June 1950.) Michurin is described as having 'educated' his plants (Academician

Yakovlev, *Moscow Radio*, 6 June 1950) and to have pointed the way to the 'transformation of the organic world for the good of humanity' (Professor S. I. Isayev, *Moscow Radio*, 7 June 1950).

MILITARY SCIENCE (*voyennaya nauka*) and MILITARY ART (*voyennoye iskusstvo*). Current Soviet military thinking is summarised in two articles on these subjects in the *Soviet Encyclopaedia* (Vol. 8, Moscow, 1952).

Military Art is the art of warfare, and the USSR 'has inherited the glorious military traditions of the Russian people as embodied in the military achievements of such outstanding Russian military and naval leaders as Alexander Nevsky, Peter I, Rumyantsev, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ushakov and Nakhimov'.

Soviet military art has also inherited the experience of the Paris Commune, the Moscow revolt of December 1905, the October Revolution, the Civil War, the Great Fatherland War, and it has been created in its present form by 'the greatest army leader of all times and all nations—J. V. Stalin'.

Military Science, also evolved by Stalin, goes further, comprising three factors: the art of war, economics and policy-making. 'Bourgeois ideologists view wars without regard to the political and economic potentialities of the State. They see the secret of victory in what they allege to be the constant and unchangeable principles of the military art, including the theory of the "lightning war". Therefore, bourgeois experts in military research are incapable of creating a military science and reduce it, in essence, merely to military art.'

Stalin, on the other hand, 'based the most important sections of military art on the direct, organic ties linking the progress and result of a war with the nature of the State's political and economic regime, with the conditions of its rear, the quantity and quality of its armaments, the morale of its army and the degree of preparedness and training of its cadres'.

War is thus only one of three factors which the Soviet leaders may bring into play in conducting their 'Military Science' with respect to the rest of the world. 'Political and economic potentialities' are the other two.

MONOLITHIC is one of the most used and best loved of communist adjectives, for it expresses the condition of perfection

sought in both ideology and organisation. 'In collective work, in collective leadership, in the monolithic unity which is characteristic of our Party and its Central Committee, is the tremendous force of guidance of the country's life by the Communist Party.' (*Communist*, No. 4, March 1953.) The party is monolithic when 'carved from one single block, having one single will and uniting all shades of thought in one stream of political activity' (*Moscow Radio*, 17 April 1953). The word can be used in a more general sense than that of describing the party geology. Reference was made by *Communist* to the 'monolithic unity and cohesion of party and people'. The metaphor can also be mixed. The party carved from one single block, must also, said the same broadcast, have 'steel-like unity and cohesion', leaving it apparently in a transitional and transubstantial state between the Stone and Iron Age of political development.

MORALITY. 'With changes in the form of the social structure, morality also changes. From the point of view of Communist morality, "moral" is only that which facilitates the destruction of the old world and strengthens the new, Communist, regime.' (*Short Philosophical Dictionary*, Moscow, 1941, under 'Morality'.) 'The policy of the Bolshevik Party determines the nature of morality, philosophy, science and art in Soviet society.' (Professor Berezhnev, *Moscow Radio*, 9 April 1951.)

MTS. The Machine and Tractor Stations were founded on 5 June 1929 near Odessa, and numbered 9,000 by the time of their 25th anniversary, disposing of over a million tractors (in 15 h.p. units), 300,000 combines and 'hundreds of thousands' of lorries. (*Moscow Radio*, 5 June 1954.) They, and not the collective farms themselves, thus dispose of the machine-power available to Soviet agriculture and so 'represent the main levers of State direction of collective farms' (*Moscow Radio*, 2 April 1954). As 'the industrial, material and technical base of the collective farm system' (*Pravda*, 13 September 1953) they have an ideological as well as an economic significance for the Soviet rulers: 'Our Party has found in the MTS a form of economic relations which makes it possible correctly to combine the interests of the collective farms with those of the State.' (*Moscow Radio*, 2 April 1954.) The Stations do not rely on the farms for the operation of their machines, but have their own

'vast army' (1,200,000 tractor drivers alone were mentioned by *Tass*, 4 June 1954) of drivers, mechanics and skilled workers. (*Moscow Radio*, 5 June 1954.)

MUSIC. 'Only the national element and what appeals to the masses is virile and constitutes real art', wrote V. Konstantinov, discussing music in the Soviet Youth newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on 16 December 1950. This definition is in line with the decree passed by the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee on 12 February 1948 on the initiative of A. A. Zhdanov. In this decree the Committee, tightening up the hold of ideology on every branch of national life, after the wartime concessions to nationalist and similar feelings, turned its attention to music. The occasion of the decree was an opera, *The Great Friendship*, by the composer Muradeli, and this led to a criticism of the 'formalistic trend' in Soviet music as directed against the people and leading to the 'liquidation' of music. The Party called on composers to become conscious of the Soviet people's 'lofty demands' on Soviet creative works and achieve an upsurge in work, advancing Soviet musical culture along the path of Socialist realism.

The third anniversary of the decree was celebrated by a number of symphony concerts, including works written since the criticisms were made, intended to take note of the progress achieved. The 'first successes' of the composers (an oratorio *On Guard* by Prokofiev; *The Song of the Woods*, by Shostakovich, and Myaskovsky's 27th Symphony) were 'a shining example to musical workers of the people's democracies, who are fighting to overcome bourgeois influences and for the development of music on new foundations' (*Literary Gazette*, 10 February 1951). A *Pravda* leading article of 10 February 1951 praised Soviet composers who, inspired by the decisions of the party, were composing new realistic works and dealing with 'the great themes of the present day'. Added to the importance of the theme, *Pravda* found three valuable features of the new works: 'clarity of form, an appeal to wide audiences and a striving for melodic richness.' The whole tendency of music, it is clear, is intended to be propagandist, to encourage the listener to devote himself ever more strongly to aims regarded by the Soviet leaders as socially desirable; and to this end music is expected to be popular in form. In opera particularly 'there is still a striking lack of tune, especially in the arias'. 'The inexhaustible melodic wealth of

national songs is not being used skilfully enough by composers. All this reflects a lack of mastery and a feeble understanding of life.' There must be no sort of suggestion, it appears, that all is not for the best in the best of all possible worlds. 'In the songs of some composers one still meets strains which are alien to Soviet songs; for example, melancholy, tearfulness and vulgar sentimentality. The Soviet song is bold, spirited, lyrical, joyful and sincere, and tolerates no cheap adornment and no decadent café vulgarity.'

To encourage each other from falling into these pitfalls, not to mention 'cacophonies and intellectualistic sophistications' intended for 'stagnating intellectuals' (*Neues Deutschland*, quoted by West German News Agency, 22 March 1951) composers are asked to hold conferences to discuss their problems. Despite the 1948 decree, however, it was 'surprising' that the Union of Soviet Composers had not held a single large-scale meeting of this kind in the course of the following three years, in order to talk in an 'atmosphere of bold and principled criticism of shortcomings' (*Pravda*, 10 February 1951). Poland went a stage further. *Warsaw Radio* announced early in February 1951 a meeting of 200 instructors of workers' orchestras and choirs in textile factories under the slogan of 'Song as a mobilising factor in the fight for the implementation of the Six Year Plan'.

This mobilisation of music for political purposes is nowhere better seen than in Eastern Germany. The importance of music in German life and in moulding German character is fully appreciated by the Russians. An Association of German Composers and Music Theoreticians was founded in the Academy of Arts at Berlin on 3 April 1951, and the audience included the President of the Republic (Wilhelm Pieck), the President of Parliament (Herr Dieckmann), the Prime Minister (Herr Grotewohl), the Vice-Premier (Herr Ulbricht) and the Minister of Education (Herr Wandel). The Soviet delegation included Tikhon Khrennikov, Secretary General of the Soviet Composers Union, the composer Shaporin and the Soviet musical theoretician Professor Yarustovsky. Both Khrennikov and Yarustovsky spoke. The former encouraged new German composers to urge German unity, oppose remilitarisation and 'chase the Americans out of their country'. They must abhor abstract subjects, unconnected with real life, but should choose work as a subject. A praiseworthy instance of this was the 'Mansfeld Oratorio' by Herman Meyer, which 'depicts

the 750-year-old history of the Mansfeld cupro-ferrous slate mining'.

Yarustovsky, on the other hand, gave guidance on technique and not merely warned against Formalism, but explained what this was in musical terms. 'Its principal characteristic is that it dispenses with melody, the foundation of all that is beautiful in music.' Classical music employed harmony and rhythm only to emphasise the melody. 'Its second characteristic is the exaggerated use of a single means of expression. In most formalistic works, for example, rhythm is exaggerated; and some protagonists of formalism have even turned the piano into a percussion instrument. Some musicians maintain that the twentieth century has evolved a universal language of music, a kind of "musical esperanto". They cultivate a music completely dissociated from the national and individual principles of the artist. In reality, however, this "musical esperanto" is French neo-impressionism, which exponents of formalism have declared to be the law for their creations.'

Music should, on the other hand, 'express progressive content in a national language'. The tendency to blot out the boundaries of national art had originated in the USA (see COSMOPOLITANISM) and even among the 'progressive nations' there were two-faced composers who 'wrote passable folk music' but also 'quietly composed works for their intimate circle according to all the rules of formalism'. They must learn not to confine their progressive views in an ivory tower.

The East German President Pieck called for the development of 'a great and genuine folk music' to preserve the West Germans from 'destructive cultural barbarism'. The conference adopted a resolution saying that music could make a big contribution towards awakening a new consciousness among German workers, deepening their zest for and understanding of life. (*East German News Agency*, 5, 6 and 8 April 1951.)

A speaker at the same conference discussed the contrast between serious music and light music, which was 'a residue from the class divisions in imperialist music'. Most current light music was a cheap mass product with which capitalist firms earned large sums of money, and such music—'American song-hit cosmopolitanism'—was 'intended to bring out the coarser side of people, to hamper their spiritual development and make them amenable to war preparations' (Ernst Hermann Meyer, quoted by *East German News*

Agency, 6 April 1951). The Central Committee of the East German Socialist Unity Party (Communist-controlled) dealt with this same problem in its resolution on 'Cultural Successes of the German Democratic Republic' (*East German News Agency*, 18 April 1951). 'Hit-tune cosmopolitanism', it said, 'is another important medium for brutalising people and destroying the natural cultural heritage. Formalism and trash perform a definite function in the interest of anti-humanitarian imperialism and its war aims.'

It is not always easy for Soviet critics and artistic authorities to discover what is, and what is not commendable. Thus five Third Class Stalin prizes, each valued at 25,000 roubles, were awarded for the performance of an opera, *With all my Heart*, by H. Zhukovsky, which *Soviet Art* hailed as 'a great and significant step forward in the creating of classic Soviet opera'. On 5 April 1951 a performance of this opera in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, was attended by Stalin, Molotov, Beria and Mikoyan. On 19 April *Pravda* said that the music, libretto and production lacked profundity; the characters were 'devoid of lively human qualities; their spiritual world is impoverished'; the arias were 'devoid of real melodic and dramatic vividness' and the setting failed to suggest 'the modern advanced, technically equipped collective farm'. It showed 'miserable, rickety wattle fences' and workers using scythes. On 25 April *Tass* announced the dismissal of the Director of the Bolshoi Theatre (A. V. Solodovniko) and the Chairman of the Arts Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (I. P. Lebedev).

As a result of such reversals of fortune, Soviet impresarios seem to have decided to play for safety, and composers found themselves once again under a 'tutelage system', in which their projects were approved, refused, discussed or amended even before they had been written. (This was the system under which Eisenstein had eventually found it impossible to go on making films in the USSR. He said of the officials who worked it: 'instead of trusting me, they are afraid of the scenario. If they were capable of picturing the images to themselves, they would make the film instead of me. Result: I do no more shooting.') Aram Khatchachuryan, the Soviet composer, pleaded in *Soviet Music*, November 1953, that this tutelage should be ended and the composer be trusted 'to do his work on his own responsibility. . . . Let us have no more "directives" from our bureaucrats, with their constant worry about being on the safe side.' His argument was that these interfered with the duty of the

artist 'to find the true solution to his problems in the light of the vital tasks the Party has set us'. Though himself favouring innovations in technique, he said composers must aim at 'realist innovation founded on the traditions of classical art', and not 'formalist' innovation; and he quoted 'Comrade Zhdanov's words: "The new must be an improvement on the old, otherwise there is no point in it."'

No particular response to his appeal was noted in subsequent months, and the political implications of music remained to the fore. The slogan of the Prague Spring Musical Festival of 1954, for example, was 'true music for the peaceful collaboration of nations'; and in June 1954 some band leaders and café singers in Budapest lost their licences for playing and singing 'cosmopolitan music'; i.e. the extremer forms of jazz.

MVD is the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del*) of the Soviet Union, formerly known as the NKVD (People's Commissariat, *Narodni Kommissariat*, of Internal Affairs) which in 1938 succeeded the OGPU (Unified State Political Administration). This, in its original form of GPU (State Political Administration), followed in 1922 the CHEKA (*Chrezvychaynaya Komisiya*, Extraordinary Commission), a word formed from the initials, vchk, of the All-Union Extraordinary Commission for the suppression of counter-revolution, speculation and sabotage. The present Ministry was created in 1946, when the description of departments of state as People's Commissariats was abandoned. At the same time its functions were split. The MVD retained the police and corrective labour camps, but a second Ministry, the MGB (*Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*, Ministry of State Security) was created to control the security police and frontier forces. The armed forces of the police, sometimes estimated at up to 500,000 men, remained with the MVD. The MGB was abolished in 1951 and its work incorporated in the MVD, but a State Security Committee was re-created in March 1954 and taken from the MVD and put directly under the control of the Council of Ministers.

NAMES. Soviet citizens are expected to give their children Russian names, like Nina, Ludmilla, Tamara and Svetlana, shunning foreign importations such as Azalia, Isolda and Eldorado. These examples were given by *Literary Gazette* (26 August 1952), which equally

warned against ultra-modern extravagances. Girls had been called Elektrifikatsiya (electrification); Detektor and Radiola had also been used, and one Ivan Petrov had changed his name to Kraking Kombainov (cracking combine).

Another Petrov, the Soviet MVD official who decided to stay in Australia in 1954, said that he had formerly borne the name of Proletarsky.

For the early revolutionaries, changes of name were a matter of common prudence, though their choice could still express personality: J. V. Djugashvili, for example, took the name of Stalin (the Man of Steel); and V. M. Scriabin that of Molotov (the Little Hammer). (There is some doubt about the origin of the names of Lenin (V. I. Ulyanov) and Trotsky (L. D. Bronstein); Lenin may have taken his from the River Lena; Trotsky from an Orthodox priest who impressed him as a youth.) Mr. Molotov's colleagues in the post-Stalin leadership are the first generation to make use of their own names.

NATIONALISM is one of the Janus-words of Communism with a different connotation according to the context. In a non-communist country it is a defence against 'imperialist cosmopolitanism', for 'in the era of imperialism the nation has become a progressive revolutionary force of outstanding importance' in resisting the imperialist, and particularly the United States' attempt to dominate the world by breaking the 'moral backbone' of the nations. (*East German News Agency*, 20 February 1951.) However, when this national spirit provides any sort of resistance to the hegemony of the Communist Party it becomes reactionary, and is denounced under the title of 'bourgeois nationalism'. 'Bourgeois nationalism is today not an innocuous and romantic pan-Slavism, but a dangerous enemy and a criminal associate of international reaction.' (*Novo Slovo*, Czechoslovakia, 24 February 1951.) National feelings, unless carefully controlled, have always been a subject of wary suspicion to communist leaders. 'The Ukraine is an independent republic', said Lenin in 1922. 'That is all right. But in Party matters it sometimes (what is the politest way of expressing it?) takes a roundabout course, and we have to get at them somehow. For the people there are sly. I will not say they deceive the Central Committee; but somehow they edge away from us.'

NATURALISM (see SOCIALIST REALISM).

NOBEL PRIZE. Strindberg's phrase, 'the dynamite money', is seized on with avidity. The juries, 'those senile custodians of the Nobel strongbox', have 'repeatedly evinced their political intolerance, the narrowness of their scientific outlook, their utterly reactionary nature, in regard, among others, to Russian culture and exponents'. Although in 1904 the physiology prize was awarded to 'that brilliant Russian scientist, Ivan Pavlov', this could not be done without 'some opposition', and for the most part the awards were to such people as 'a reactionary nonentity, Sully-Prudhomme', 'the whiteguard emigré Bunin', 'pygmies in literature' such as Eugene O'Neill, and in 1947 came 'an insult to millions of French people' when a prize was given to Andre Gide—'that unprincipled literary weather vane, foul decadent, who fawned on the German invaders and afterwards sold his pen to the American imperialists'. (*New Times*, No. 11, 1951, pp. 28-31.) The Communist equivalent and rival to the Nobel Prizes is the Stalin Prize 'for the strengthening of peace between nations', founded in honour of Stalin's 70th birthday (1949).

NORM is the quota of output required as a minimum in a given period of time, and usually refers to the amount a worker is required to produce to receive a standard wage. Overfulfilment of the norm is generally rewarded by progressively increasing bonuses. The more some individuals show that they can surpass the norm, the greater is the tendency to raise the norm itself; and industry becomes a kind of convoy in which the pace established tends to that of the fastest, rather than the slowest. Stalin laid down that national plans and those of individual factories 'must be based not on average production norms but on progressive norms to ensure a further development of production. They must be based on a systematic increase of labour productivity, the full exploitation of resources, the economic use of material, the systematic increase of the quality of production.' (*Moscow Radio*, 17 January 1951.) However, said *Communist*, No. 7, May 1953, 'planning and directing economic organs still do not always take into account the achievements of the pace-makers of production and the mobilising force of socialist competition, which makes advanced experience the property of the masses'. One Ministry was reproved for establishing an hourly norm of 20.8 tons of clinker from a type of stove which in 'a number of factories' was already turning out

up to 25 tons. 'Progressive norms' are made more acceptable by mechanisation, encouragement of new techniques and popularisation of more economic ways of working; but there is considerable popular resistance to the idea. 'In a spinning factory (in Hungary) a politically conscious woman pointed out that her norms were too low: next day she found her machine had been tampered with by unknown culprits and it took hours to repair.' (*Szabad Nep*, 29 July 1950.) In the same country one worker threw into a pool of water the tools of a colleague who had achieved 188 per cent. of his norm, with the question: 'Do you work like that in order to get the norms raised?' (*Szabad Ifjusag*, 22 April 1953.) It was the imposition of new norms, requiring an extra 10 per cent. of work from building workers for the same wages, which touched off the East Berlin riots of 16 and 17 June 1953.

OBJECTIVE is something factually existing, as Subjective is a private, and possibly erroneous impression of truth. That the earth is a sphere and goes round the sun is an objective truth; that the earth is flat and the sun goes round it is a subjective feeling. Ruskin is sometimes credited with bringing these two terms into general use. They have been found useful by the Marxists, who use them often, though with the proviso that the truth in question is as seen by Marxism-Leninism. In this sense, anyone who worked for European unity might be subjectively a progressive, but objectively a cosmopolitan working for imperialism.

OBJECTIVISM is an opprobrious term, often meaning what the rest of the world would describe as impartiality. The Communist agrees that there are objective facts in nature to which he must bow (see Objective); but he reserves the right to say which facts are objective, and when they have become so: the Party 'has always set the people tasks as soon as the objective conditions are right for their fulfilment' (*Moscow Radio*, 29 January 1954). Objectivism is opposition to the party line on the grounds that it does not correspond with objective reality. Historians are prone to it; for it is associated with 'an exaggerated attachment to facts' (*Problems of History*, Soviet monthly, No. 12, 1948), whose true significance may have escaped the scholar and be apparent only to the Party's central committee. Politically, it is a 'rightist' disease, since it sees obstacles where the Party says they do not exist and therefore

tends to compromise; hence the 'Bukharinist rightist deviations towards objectivism', in contrast to the 'Trotskyist leftist deviations towards subjectivism' (*Moscow Radio*, 29 January 1954) or the refusal to see enough obstacles in the external world. Objectivism is not an incurable affliction. Academician G. F. Aleksandrov, who accused himself of it in 1949, was appointed Minister of Culture in 1954.

OCHKOVTIRATELSTVO ('rubbing glasses') means 'pulling wool over people's eyes', and is one of the series of vivid single words—such as *bditel'nost* (security-mindedness) and *rotozeystvo* (gullibility)—popularised from time to time in order to concentrate attention on some weakness in Soviet society that the rulers wish to improve. *Ochkovtiratel'stvo* refers especially to bogus, or doctored statistics put out by individuals or undertakings to get the credit (and the practical rewards) for non-existent achievements. For example, I. S. Vinogradov, director of the Orel textile machinery plant, wrote about his methods of 'highly productive and profitable work' but forgot to say that some of the machines he was describing had not yet been built. (*Pravda*, 15 June 1952.) The Kharkov instrument plant sent out a consignment of telephones, but without bells. Indeed, no bells existed, but the invoice said that they 'will be coming'. (*Pravda*, 22 June 1952.) Details of non-existent acreage under cultivation, imaginary cattle and feeding stuffs and imaginary public works are other offences. So is the erection of shacks publicised as new 'retail stores' even after they have fallen to pieces. (*Trud*, 18 April 1952.) 'Figures, figures—and nothing more', said *Pravda* ruefully (5 August 1952), adding that people who insist too strongly on figures show a wrong approach to human beings and 'an inability to handle human reserves'.

PANSLAVISM, the nineteenth century movement for cultural unity among Slav peoples, was encouraged by the Tsarist Governments as a means of spreading Russian political influence. To the Soviet Government it was a reactionary tendency, relying largely on race and (especially in South Eastern Europe) on the Orthodox Religion. It thus acted as a potential brake on revolutionary fervour and class solidarity. Nevertheless, the emergence of Russia from the backwardness of the Tsars, her development as an industrialised Great Power, could not fail to attract for her a considerable

degree of respect and even sympathy from other Slavs. As German power rose in Central and Eastern Europe, after 1933, this sentiment increased, and was a factor that the Soviet Government could not well neglect, particularly after the German invasion of 1941. Local risings against the Germans, as in Yugoslavia, took much of their strength from the way in which the war was regarded as a struggle between Teuton and Slav; and in Bulgaria the pro-Russian sentiment was so strong that even the pro-German regime was unable to declare war on the USSR. Under these circumstances the Soviet Government encouraged a version of Panslavism, and All-Slav conferences were convened. The defeat of Germany brought all Slavs within one political orbit, and although the Yugoslavs subsequently defected, the nature of the Tito-Stalin quarrel was such that Panslavist propaganda could not have healed the breach. Panslavism had thus lost its old reason for existence and was superseded by Communist ideology; but to help in maintaining cohesion within the orbit a modified and attenuated form was retained in order to remind non-Communists that they had some common interests with their fellow Slavs. The expression of this new form of Panslavism was the inauguration of a Day of Slav Literature and Culture and of Cyril and Methodius (the two Saints credited with the invention of the cyrillic alphabet used in Russia, Bulgaria and Serbia). When celebrated in Sofia on 24 May 1951, demonstrators carried 'blue peace flags and portraits of Cyril and Methodius, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, Dimitrov and Chervenkov'.

PARTY. The Communist Party is not a political party in the non-Communist sense of the word. It is, as it is often said, a party 'of a new type'. It does not, for example, accept rivals when it possesses the power to dispense with them, for it is 'a body, not in the bourgeois sense of the word of a party amongst many, but . . . the leading force of a society which is putting socialism into practice' (Nejedly, Czech Education Minister, *Prague Radio*, 4 March 1951). It is 'the leading force' in that it is more important than the State itself, which is in effect little more than its administrative instrument. 'The Party governs the State.' (*Moscow Radio*, 25 May 1950.) It is the leading force in that it acknowledges no bounds on its competence. 'The Party is our dear father who takes affectionate care of us, educates us, opens our eyes and straightens our spines.'

(*Szabad Nep*, 16 January 1951.) And it is the leading force on a third count in that, whatever alliances it may make on the way to power, once it has arrived there it sucks the marrow from its allies, eventually tossing the bone away and establishing one-party rule. Thus the Bolshevik Party, having only a quarter of the members in the Russian Constituent Assembly, broke it up by the use of troops in January 1918, and later in the year excluded its Left Social-Revolutionary allies from all share in the government because of disagreements on policy. A similar process may be seen since 1945 in Eastern Europe. (See *PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY*.) The Party controls the Army, the police and the means of publicity, such as the Press; Party leaders have leading positions in the Government; and official appointments, both in the administration and in such bodies as theatres and universities, have to be approved by the Party at relevant levels. 'Not a single important decision', said Stalin, 'is taken by them (the organs of government) without corresponding directions of the party.'

This exclusiveness springs only partly from the tendency of men in power to consolidate and add to their authority. Its main motive force is the adoption in politics of the dynamism and fanaticism that in the past has occasionally been imparted by a sense of religious election. Indeed, the fact that Communism is a philosophy of history before it is a political instrument gives to it a strength and a degree of irreconcilability which a purely political programme would be unable to generate. The nearest parallel is the astonishing degree of hard work, self-will and sense of determinism born of the wedding of calvinism and early capitalism. So it is not on the platform, in the ballot box or the division lobby that communism is to be met, understood or tamed. Where the socialist may dispute degrees of nationalisation, the conservative the reforms that may safely be admitted in the traditional pattern of society, and the liberal the upper limit of import duties, the communist calls, even on the day-to-day level of politics, for absolute obedience to a cosmic law; of which, fortunately for himself, he remains the only qualified interpreter. He is like a ramblers' club secretary who chooses the destination, and not only holds the map but insists on interpreting its symbols. The political implications of this law are that 'capitalist' society is doomed and must eventually be succeeded by 'socialism', and that the meaning of socialism can only be pronounced upon by the leaders of the communist organisation

built up in the USSR. These are not submitted as hypotheses to be put to the test of practice, but as the revelation of a scientific law of history, the essential features of 'Marxism-Leninism', and the basis of action for all orthodox communist parties throughout the world. The Party is thus, in its own eyes, the conscious will of history in human affairs. It can, therefore, invoke eternal sanctions to command respect for its decisions; but it can also operate immediate and physical ones, too. The spiritual arm and the secular arm are both on one and the same body. The faithful have thus not even the limited room for manoeuvre which they possessed in medieval Europe when the two were separate and could have differing interests. The Party is controlled from the centre and not the reverse; and its 'scientific' working knowledge of the inner workings of history absolve it from any need to justify its conduct in the face of either majority opinion or traditional moral law.

It is this which induces in non-Communists, and often in Communists themselves, a sense of something inhuman, particularly noticeable when old and apparently respected party leaders are brusquely pushed to one side because of what the party considers to be their mistaken judgments, even when there is no question of treachery on their part. The victim, as well as his judge, usually accepts this situation. This is not merely because he accepts the view that 'in the Party there cannot be two disciplines—one for leaders and another for the rank and file' (Party Rules, 1952). By being a communist he acknowledges that the Party should be 'monolithic'; that is, all should act in the same way; that it should work on the principle of 'democratic centralism'; that is, that the line laid down by the leadership, nominally after general and free discussion, should be scrupulously carried out by the rank and file; that individual judgment is not to be set beside that of the Party, since its will is sanctified by the mandate of history. ('The individual is nothing', as Mayakovsky—who later committed suicide,—wrote in his poem *The Party*.) To the loyal Communist, these apparent personal disasters afford as little cause for complaint as the collapse of a bridge to an engineer. He would ask how he had transgressed the laws of nature, and would not adduce his former successes as reasons why they ought to have been suspended in this one case. Indeed, such mechanistic similes are never far from the mouth of the Communist. Stalin, in an often-quoted

phrase, is said to have described writers as 'engineers of the human soul'.

It is Stalin, too, who has explained how the Party's exploitation of its belief in eventual triumph may compensate what for an outsider appear to be its intolerable assaults on private self-respect. He pointed out in words which, looking at the men he once chose as his agents both in Russia and abroad, can scarcely fail to be without irony, that 'persons of moderate abilities can become really outstanding if their ideas and desires are in true accord with the requirements of their time' (Professor Babkin, *Moscow Radio*, 23 April 1951).

(The rules of the Soviet Communist Party, as adopted at the 19th Congress in October 1952, were printed in the *Cominform Journal*, 22 August 1952.)

PARTY LINE is the official policy of the Communist Party on any given subject. It is binding upon all members, whatever their private opinions. There can be no 'agreement to disagree' or modification for the sake of a conscientious objection.

PATRIOT. A patriot, like an internationalist, is in Soviet eyes anyone who believes that the interests of his own country necessarily and always coincide with those of the USSR. 'Hungarian patriotism without love of the USSR does not and cannot exist', Colonel General Mihaly Farkas, Hungarian Minister of Defence, told the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party Congress on 25 February 1951. 'To differentiate—be it for one second—between patriotism and internationalism is to run the danger of bourgeois nationalism or bourgeois cosmopolitanism', said the Czech Minister of Defence (General Alexej Cepicka) (*Glasgow Herald*, 15 March 1951). The reasoning behind this conclusion is summarised in S. Titarenko: 'Patriotism and Internationalism' *Soviet News*, 1950. Patriotism is love of country; the bourgeois, however, betray their country for the sake of profits (e.g. Thiers' attack on the Paris Commune and the cry of the 1930's, 'Better Hitler than the Popular Front'). By contrast 'there stands out prominently the genuine patriotism of the common people, the working masses, by whose labour all the good things of life are created'. Since socialism is regarded as representing the workers' interests, it follows that 'the concept of patriotism merges with the concept of democracy and

socialism'. Since the Communist Party regards itself as the only organ of true socialism, it follows equally that 'in our times only the Communist and Workers' Parties, adhering to the platform of Marxism-Leninism, cherish and give expression to patriotic ideas'. Hence 'it is impossible to love one's country, to serve her interests and defend her national sovereignty, without the unity of the working people of all countries, without close friendship with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies'.

PAVLOVISM. Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936), the Russian physiologist, is highly regarded by the Soviet leaders, partly for the international fame he won before his death by his studies of instinctive and conditioned reflexes; partly for the impetus he gave to the study of the relationship between diseases and the psychology of the individual; but mainly because his teaching is held to the 'the firmest scientific support of dialectical materialism' through its 'clearly expressed materialistic nature' (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 18 July 1950).

According to Lenin, matter is primary and the 'spirit' or 'soul' is secondary to it. Human consciousness is thus a function of matter; the mind a function of the cortex. Pavlov reached similar conclusions. All psychic activity is for him the cumulative result of various conditioned reflexes or 'temporary nervous cohesions' in the brain crust. (The best-known conditioned reflex is the salivation of the dog at the ringing of a dinner bell.) There is thus no immortal soul, independent of a physiological basis in the brain. Pavlov 'delivered a crushing blow against the basis of idealism' and in favour of Lenin's dictum that 'the brain is the organ of thought' (*Moscow Radio*, 3 August 1950).

There are immense political consequences in this theory for a government which intends to 'change nature'; and much internal propaganda is based on the same principles of association as Pavlov's dinner bell. The idea of 'Soviet Man' is bound up with them; and the Soviet Government's methods of dealing with its own subjects can be fully understood only in the light of its belief, taken from Pavlov, that human conduct can be effectively (and at some stage entirely) determined by outside stimuli (e.g. propaganda, rewards, punishments). Pavlov's work is thus an important psychological prop for modern Communism; hence 'it is obvious that there is a tremendous political significance attached to the task of smashing Pavlov's enemies' (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 18 July 1950).

Moreover, Pavlov's work opens up the possibility that transformations of human personality made in one generation may not have to be renewed in the next. He believed in 'the possibility of acquired nervous characteristics becoming hereditary' (*Moscow Radio*, 3 August 1950). This is the point at which Pavlov and Michurin meet. (See MICHURINISM; LYSENKOISM.)

PEACE is a constant subject of communist attention; equally constant is the use of belligerent metaphor in its advocacy. Whether this is because peace is a tactical need that must not be allowed to preclude a final communist triumph, or whether peace as a subject of propaganda lacks dramatic force and requires tension and contrast for its presentation, does not wholly emerge from the evidence. Not everyone goes so far as the Czech writer Frantisek Kubka, who quotes with approval (*Prague Radio*, 17 January 1951) a miner's remark that 'we will batter the warmongers to death with peace', but that 'peace must be fought for' is a recurrent theme. Kizil, Metropolitan of Plovdiv (Bulgaria) signed the World Peace Council's appeal in April 1951, 'because I am not only a pacifist but also a militant fighter for peace'. The Communists are 'the best soldiers in the army of peace' (*Budapest Radio*, 16 January 1951), a sentiment which the Czechs qualify thus: 'a politically educated, well trained and physically fit soldier is the best guarantee of peace' (*Czech Telegraph Agency*, 26 January 1951). The co-existence of capitalism and socialism is only possible if 'the people' 'compel' their governments to agree; the masses must 'contain' the 'imperialist war fury'. Thus the US State Department policy of 'containment', a concept taken from military strategy, is adopted; and the Peace Movement plans its activities as a military operation. This confusion, whether it be in aims, purposes or methods, leads to the *Pravda* leading article of 22 April 1951, where the aim of Soviet foreign policy—'a stable peace and lasting co-operation' is followed by the comment that 'our party has conquered and will continue to conquer'.

The defence of peace is not inconsistent with the preparation for, and even participation in war. Thus the Chinese volunteers in Korea resorted to arms 'only because they want peace' (*Moscow Radio*, 18 January 1951). The Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Association held its second national congress on 31 March 1951 as part of the Peace Congress. Its task, said *Szabad Nep* (31 March 1951),

was to teach every patriotic worker 'the technique of defending peace', which included the training of 'sharpshooters, radio operators, motor mechanics, etc.' A similar new voluntary organisation for the defence of peace was set up in Bulgaria in March 1951 to train 'thousands of sharpshooter pilots, glider pilots, parachutists, riders. etc.' Two shockworkers promised to do their stint for peace by becoming bearers of the People's Sharpshooter Badge before they were called up for the Army.

'Peace' as thus interpreted is preserved from criticism by severe Laws for the Protection of Peace. In East Germany 'warmongering' could be punished by death in certain cases; and the law appeared to assume jurisdiction over West Germans and to make anyone advocating German association with NATO liable to penal servitude. Penalties in Bulgaria go up to life imprisonment; in Poland up to fifteen years; in Czechoslovakia ten years. In Hungary, on 27 April 1951, Geza Doni, an electric meter reader, was given ten years at the Miskolc district court for 'spreading warlike rumours and inciting against the cooperative movement while reading meters' and for criticising 'two people's educators' who were trying to induce Mr. Katona, a tailor, to sign the peace petition. (*Budapest Radio*, 28 April 1951.) In East Germany, a 17-year-old high school pupil, was given three years' juvenile imprisonment for producing and distributing leaflets during the 1950 election campaign seeking 'to discredit the peace policy of the German Democratic Republic' (*Weimar Radio*, 2 April 1951).

So far as Russia is concerned, it has been frequently noted that the word for Peace (*Mir*) is the same as for the World and for the Village Community in which some commentators have found a native Russian predilection for a form of collectivism. While these punning similarities ought not perhaps to be stressed too far, it must be clear that phrases about fighting for, defending and conquering *mir* rouse overtones in the Russian mind that are absent elsewhere.

PEASANTS are 'the barbarians of civilisation', said Marx in 1850 (*The Coming Struggle for Peace*); a separate class but a disunited one, shapeless as a sack of potatoes (*Eighteenth Brumaire*). Lenin saw that the town proletariat, particularly where it was weak, as in Russia, needed and could achieve an alliance with the poorer peasants, who could be induced to support a revolution to break up the big landed estates. He therefore divided the peasants tacti-

cally into three classes : rich *kulaks*, who hired others to work for them; middle peasants who owned and worked their own land; and hired labourers, or semi-proletarians. (*The Agrarian Question*, 1908.) This tactical alliance, forged at the moment the Russian armies were disintegrating on the German front, enabled Lenin to consolidate his power after 1917, but neither he, nor later Stalin, ever regarded the peasant as the equal of the town proletariat; and while his help was welcome, indeed indispensable, there was no question of him sharing power or influencing Communist philosophy. The interests of the peasant, however poor, are held to differ fundamentally from those of the proletariat. Once he possesses land of his own, he is prepared to call a halt to revolution; he is satisfied, and becomes a conservative or reactionary force. He thus represents a survival of 'bourgeois' mentality and a brake on the entire system, keeping alive the idea of private property in a society dedicated to collectivisation. (More practically, he has neither the will nor the organisation to provide enough food for a population rapidly drifting to the towns.) Even 'honest and well-meaning peasants' seemed to find a contradiction between giving them land in 1945 and compelling them in 1951 to allow it to be included in collective farms. Such people must be asked 'in good faith' whether they really believed that the land could go on belonging to small peasants who produced from a given area less than half the amount that could be produced by a collective farmer using combine harvesters and modern methods. (*Szabad Nep*, 3 April 1951.) And the Hungarian Communist leader Matyas Rakosi told the Party Congress (February 1951) that the peasant, considered as a worker, preferred socialism to capitalism; but as a trader in his own produce he was selfish and preferred to grow, not what the country needed, but what was most profitable to him.

The long-term plan for agriculture under Communism aims, therefore, at liquidating the peasants as a class and creating a rural proletariat. Farm work would be a job like any other, and not 'a way of life'; and farms would be regarded as food producing and processing factories. (See COLLECTIVE FARMS; AGROGOROD.)

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY is 'a dictatorship of the proletariat without Soviet form', a government which 'as a result of Soviet victory and with the help of the Soviet Union, helps the working people under the leadership of the working class to proceed from

capitalism towards socialism', according to Matyas Rakosi, the Hungarian Communist Secretary-General. It is thus an intermediate stage between 'bourgeois democracy' and 'Soviet democracy'. It is a system in which effective power is in the hands of the Communist Party, which controls the police and the army and has established the dictatorship of the proletariat, but may still maintain a nominal alliance with other parties, governing with them through parliamentary forms. The word is usually employed of the eastern European countries brought into the Soviet orbit after 1945. The idea appears to have originated with Stalin, who in 1920 criticised Lenin's *Theses on the National and Colonial Questions* because they did not supply a transitional form for future Soviet states, like Germany, Hungary and Roumania, which might object to incorporation in the Soviet Union. (Lenin, *Works*, 2nd and 3rd Russian edition, vol. 25, p. 624, footnote.)

This conception was complicated in Eastern Europe after the Second World War, for the communists did not seize power by revolution. Partly because of their own organisational weaknesses, partly as the result of wartime agreements between Russia and her Allies, they had to act as members of coalition governments. At the same time they had no intention of accepting this role permanently, and their tactics towards unshared power took the form of a sustained operation on military lines against their nominal allies; by, for example, demanding one key ministry after another, organising street demonstrations in favour of proposed laws, breaking up estates which they later intended to put together in collective farms, and working within the forms of parliamentary democracy. The theory and name of people's democracy were devised to explain and justify their actions. (The process by which the Communists worked has been frankly described by Rakosi in *Társadalmi Szemle*, Budapest, February-March 1952. An English summary will be found in *East Europe*, 10, 17 and 24 April 1952.) (See SALAMI TACTICS).

The definition of a People's Democracy can vary with the longitude, however. In the Orient it can be said to have been reached without either 'Soviet form' or proletarian dictatorship. The people's democracies there—China, North Korea, Mongolia and Viet Minh—are not yet expected to undertake 'the transition to socialism'. Their case was studied by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences in November 1951, and it



RELIGION. Two young Communists, who ought to be convinced atheists, allow themselves to be married in church. The bridegroom complains that the priest is too slow and they will be late for the Komsomol committee meeting (Krokodil, 10 April 1954)

was pointed out that there the governments, though led by the Communist Party, had first to overcome economic and cultural backwardness; this needed a long time, and 'does not permit the resolution of bourgeois-democratic tasks to be speeded up quickly, as can be done in the European People's Democracies'. In addition to workers and peasants, the Party must rely for some time on the skill, knowledge and ability of merchants, small industrialists and bourgeois, and so the People's Democracy theory is stretched to cover delay in setting up proletarian dictatorship. But no more than delay. 'Salami' tactics will be used sooner or later. The Oriental Institute divided the 'national bourgeoisie' in an eastern country into 'big and medium'. The 'big' group 'has a tendency to make a deal with the imperialists and is the most short-lived and least reliable participant' in the coalition.

Nor must the orientals look exclusively to China for their future development, since they cannot count on acquiring for themselves the 'vitally important advantage' that the Chinese revolution possessed: its revolutionary army.

China, in any case, occupies a place apart. She is never referred to as one of 'the countries of the people's democracy', although she is credited with having 'achieved an unprecedented rallying and unity of its people and consolidated the state system of the people's democratic dictatorship' (*Cominform Journal*, 13 February 1953.)

PLUMBING tends to be much the same the whole world over, only in the Soviet Union it is more so. This from time to time causes such disillusion among well-intentioned visitors that one might suppose that the future of Marxism hung on a lavatory chain. The Russians themselves have no such illusions or inhibitions, and bad plumbing is one of those national scandals which may be brought into the open and discussed at length. Confined in the West to the music hall, where taps emit gas and gas pipes spout water, the misdeeds of the plumber are serious news in the USSR. Here is *Trud*, the trade union newspaper, on 13 January 1952, reporting conditions in Minsk:

'Last summer a new residential house in Instrumentalnaia Street was turned over for exploitation. . . . However, on the first day the lodgers had to experience a bitter disappointment. Turn the new shining taps as they might, no water came out. There was no water, not only on the highest floor, but also none on the ground floor.

Instead another fact soon became apparent—all the cellars were under water. It turned out that the main water pipes in the house had been wrongly connected. . . .

‘“Nothing helps, however much we complain”, says one of the lodgers.

‘Half a year has gone by since the house was turned over for exploitation and the wrongly connected water pipes are still not in order. Dampness has put in an appearance. The plastering is going to pieces. The house deteriorates more and more.

‘Unfortunately not a few examples of the same kind could be adduced.’

POLITBURO. The political bureau (*politicheskoye buro*) of the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party (known since 1952 as its Praesidium) is its executive organ for deciding policy; and is hence the real government of the USSR. It is ‘the highest organ not of the state but of the party, and the party is the highest directing force of the state’ (Stalin, 1925). It is ‘the organ of the operative direction of all branches of socialist construction’ (Kaganovich, 1934).

First set up on 10 October 1917 to carry through the Revolution (with Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov and Bubnov as members) it was later disbanded as potentially too powerful; but the central committee proved too unwieldy to take quick decisions, and it was subsequently revived with five members: Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Bukharin and Kamenev. Enlarged (Krestinsky, Zinoviev and Kalinin) and established as a permanent organ, March 1919 (8th Party Congress) it became the instrument of Stalin’s personal rule. It was replaced in October 1952 (19th Party Congress) by a Praesidium of twenty-five full and eleven candidate members and reduced in size after Stalin’s death (March 1953) to ten full and five candidate.

The Politburo averaged nine members with a maximum of six alternates; and had only forty members in all during its thirty-five years of existence. Of these, fourteen were alive in July 1954; seven had died natural deaths; and nineteen had committed suicide, been murdered, shot or disappeared.

POLITRUK (*politicheskii rukovoditel*: political guide) is the modern and attenuated form of the old Political Commissar

attached to units of the armed forces. He is known more officially as the Zampolit (*zamistityel politicheskim dyelam*: deputy for political affairs) and he is responsible for the political education of the troops. Originally the commissar had equal authority with the military commander, whose orders he countersigned; but during the 1937 Army purge most of the commissars were themselves purged, as it was thought they had come too strongly under the influence of the professional soldiers. After the setbacks of the Finnish campaign (1939-40) the commissars were demoted and became *politruks*, with an advisory and educational role. After the German invasion, the commissars were re-established (July 1941), with the power of immediate execution of suspects. After Stalin-grad the commissars were again abolished. They received military ranks and became political advisors or *pompols* (*pomoshchnikpo politicheskim dyelam*: political helper). Since the war the military commander has been placed in 'undivided control' of his unit (see YEDINONACHALYE), and the *politruk* finds himself in a somewhat ambiguous position. He is responsible for indoctrinating the soldiers with the official ideology (e.g. by lectures, discussions, books) and as such shares some of the odium of being associated with the State's administrative machinery, such as the MVD (Ministry of the Interior) and OKR (counter-espionage), though he has now none of their powers. The Government, on the other hand, can never be quite certain that the *politruk* will remain wholly uninfluenced by day to day association with the military point of view.

PRODUCTIVE FORCES. In the communist view the dynamism of society, and especially its degree of harmony or proneness to revolution arises from the tension between Productive Forces (that is, the capital equipment for producing wealth, as distinct from the raw materials) and the Relations of Production (that is, the class structure of society, the degree to which a ruling class is competent or otherwise economically, and so forth). Stalin even laid down a so-called 'law' that 'relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces'. This 'law' can be invoked by classes likely to benefit by it, but only when circumstances are ripe. Thus the significance of the French Revolution was that the bourgeois brought relations of production 'into conformity with the character of the productive forces which had arisen in the bosom of the feudal system'. The Russian

revolution 'created new, socialist relations of production and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces', 'not because of any particular abilities' the revolutionaries possessed, but because they were 'vitaly interested in doing so'. Clearness in seeing an opportunity and self-interest in pursuing it were thus seen by Stalin as the motive force of social change.

He also believed, however, that Productive Forces (which are 'the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production' as he ambiguously defined them) change more rapidly than Relations of Production; these in turn lag behind. (He is presumably saying that technical changes produce effects on society but that its class structure does not respond to them immediately.) This 'lagging' takes place under socialism as well as under feudalism and capitalism, for 'even under socialism there will be backward, inert forces that do not realise the necessity' for change; but there is no need for this disharmony to turn to conflict, since the proletarian triumph has by definition ended all exploitation, and 'socialist society does not include obsolescent classes that might organise resistance' (J. V. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Moscow 1952, pp. 54-7).

PROFITS play an important role in Soviet economy, particularly in finding the wherewithal for 'socialist accumulation', that is, for new capital to expand Soviet industry. In addition to a turnover tax, one third of the profits of an enterprise is, on an average, ploughed back into it. A director's fund, to be spent on increasing production, building and renovation and workers' welfare, takes from 1 to 5 per cent. of profits if the plan is attained and from 15 to 45 per cent. of profits in excess of the plan. If the plan is not implemented, no allocations are made to this fund. These figures were given by a speaker on 'The profit-earning capacity of socialist enterprises and its economic significance'. (*Moscow Radio*, 20 May 1952.) He stated that the more an enterprise produced and the higher the quality of its output, the greater were its profits.

It is evident that the 'profit motive' is active in the USSR, and indeed must necessarily be in an expanding economy in the process of industrialisation. The economic function of profit is as honoured under Communism as it ever was under Capitalism. The difference between the two systems, in the words of the same speaker, was

that in capitalist countries 'the *personal* profit motive was the *sole* incentive to production'.

PROJECTS. The Great Projects of Communism, or 'The Projects' consist of a series of transport and irrigation canals and power plants. They are intended as one of the major steps in the transition from Socialism to Communism (see COMMUNISM) by helping to supply the 'industrial base' regarded as essential. The projects are in detail:

The Volga-Don Canal (63 miles; opened 27 July 1952);

Gorki Power Plant (400,000 kW. capacity);

Kuibyshev Power Plant (the world's largest; 2,000,000 kW.);

Stalingrad Power Plant (1,700,000 kW.);

Stalingrad Canal (irrigates 15,000,000 acres);

Turkmenian Canal (683 miles; irrigates 3,212,000 acres; power plants with 100,000 kW.);

Tsimlyanskaya Canals (irrigate 1,600,000 acres) and Power Plants (160,000 kW.);

South Ukrainian and North Crimean Canals (342 miles; irrigate 3,700,000 acres);

Kakhovka Power Plant (250,000 kW.).

These projects are not expected to be completed until the 1960s.

PROLETARIAT. The word was adopted by Marxism from the French *proletariat*, the poorest of the workers, and this in turn carried over the meaning of the Roman *proletarius*, the man whose only property is his *proles*, or children. In its more recent form it preserves some of its old connotation, and has a wider social significance than the more functional expression, 'working class'. Capitalism creates so much more wealth and so many more methods of controlling nature than any previous system that it offers the opportunity of a more prosperous and self-reliant life to humanity. But, in classic Marxist theory, this very success dooms the capitalist, whose techniques are employed against him by the vastly more numerous proletariat whose existence they have made possible. 'Capitalism creates not only the material conditions for socialism; it also creates the proletariat which is its grave-digger.' (Tass, article for the Soviet local press on the 135th anniversary of Marx's birth, 30 April 1953.) The spade employed by the proletariat in its role of social sexton must, however, be the

Communist Party. (See CONTRADICTIONS; PROLETARIAT, DICTATORSHIP OF THE.)

PROLETARIAT, DICTATORSHIP OF THE. The essential instrument, in communist theory, for the transition from capitalism to socialism. The forms in which it is clothed are of secondary importance—they may, for example, be of Soviet-type, as in Russia in 1917, or parliamentary, as in Eastern Europe after 1945, or result from military victory, as in China from 1949. What is essential is that the Communist Party shall wield unrestricted power, using the trade unions to popularise its will among an obedient people. Or, in Stalin's words: 'the dictatorship of the proletariat consists of the directives of the Party, plus their execution by the mass organisations of the proletariat, plus their transformation into life by the population.' (*Problems of Leninism*, p. 142.) 'Dictatorship' in this context is not a loose word but a 'scientific concept' according to Lenin, who described it as 'unlimited power based on force and not on law' (*Problems*, p. 134). This dictatorship is the yoke under which all capitalist societies must pass; it is 'the inevitable law of the revolutionary movement in the imperialist countries of the world', including Britain and America. (*Problems*, pp. 44-5.) 'The dictatorship of the world proletariat is an essential and vital condition precedent to the transformation of world capitalist economy into socialist economy.' (*Programme of the Comintern*, September 1928.) This world-wide aim began with success in the USSR: 'the goal is to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries', said Stalin in 1917. (*Foundations of Leninism*, Moscow 1945, p. 67.) That is the warning to the capitalist: for the revolutionary the 'law' teaches that socialism cannot come about, as social democrats hold, by a peaceful transformation of bourgeois society and parliamentary democracy. 'It can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, of the bourgeois army, of the bourgeois civil service, of the bourgeois police.' (*Problems*, pp. 44-5.)

PROLETKULT is a telescoped form of 'Proletarian Culture' and may not unfairly be described as a kind of Left Wing Deviation in artistic matters. It is the view, held by some Communist artists, especially before a revolution or in its early stages, that there is

nothing to be learned from the past, that considerations of style ought not to apply, since the material—a raw slice of current proletarian life—is everything. Proletkult stands at the opposite end of the spectrum to Formalism. It was still considered vigorous enough in Germany to merit specific denunciation by the Socialist Unity Party of the Eastern Zone in 1951, as ‘an obstacle to artistic development which completely neglects artistic form and places exclusive emphasis on content. It is quite wrong to hold that our cultural aims can be realised only by means of subjects spotlighting our present tasks, and that artistic form is completely without importance; in other words, that there is no need to carry on our classical heritage of culture. On the contrary, the further development of artistic work in our Republic is impossible unless a link is established with the great achievements of the past and with that classical heritage of culture.’ (East German News Agency, 18 April 1951.)

Hans Eisler, brother of Gerhart Eisler the former East German propagandist, was denounced for his new opera *Johann Faustus* on the grounds that Proletkult was no longer called for; making representatives of the people speak in ‘an uncouth, degrading and stupid manner’ revealed an ‘estrangement from the masses’.

PSYCHOANALYSIS is a ‘reactionary pseudo-science’ especially popular in the United States, according to the 1952 edition of the *Soviet Philosophical Dictionary*. The Nazis are alleged to have used it to justify their ‘man-hating practices’; and now ‘Freudianism and neo-Freudianism serve as one of the ideological weapons of Nazi-fied American imperialism which uses the “principle” that the subconscious dominates the conscious in order to justify and develop the lowest, basest impulses and instincts in men’.

Soviet science has not always repudiated psychoanalysis entirely, and in the early 1930s Professor Luria, of the State Institute of Experimental Psychology in Moscow said that ‘Marxist psychology must be analytic’ and claimed to have verified by experiment some of Freud’s hypotheses. Such views reflected administrative latitude, however, and not ideological doubt. There is no room in the Marxist picture of man for unconscious mental processes; and Pavlov’s teachings on consciousness reinforced Stalin’s materialistic dictum: ‘Our Ego exists only in so far as the external conditions which evoke impressions in our Ego exist.’ This was another

version of Lenin's claim that psychical phenomena, and the human psyche, are reflections of the external world in the form of ideal images. Quoting it, the Soviet psychologist N. Chernakov declares that 'it is impossible to conclude that voluntary and emotional processes arise from the biological depths of human beings'. By 1940 the official view of Freud had hardened, and the *Soviet Encyclopaedia* of that year, while granting a 'therapeutic significance' to psychoanalysis, condemned it for 'giving a narrowly biological interpretation to all forms of man's psychic activity', rather than 'comprehending them as a product of social and historical development'.

PSYCHOTHERAPY in the Soviet Union restricts itself, because of the lack of belief in the existence of the 'unconscious', to suggestion, persuasion, argument and a direct appeal to rational consciousness. Doctors are said to have recommended the Northern Seas for 'depressed patients', the Crimea for 'states of agitation', and travel on the Volga for 'a calming influence on the nervous system'. This phraseology recalls to non-Soviet ears, if not the 'humours' of sixteenth-century medicine, at least the form of medical advice popular in the palmy days of the Hydropathic Establishment; and indeed, in 'the development of Pavlov's ideas for use in health resorts' new techniques were promised at the Pyatigorsk Institute for Balneology. This body, like the Central Institute for Studies of Health Resorts, had failed to take account of the central nervous system in their researches. It is here, according to Professor Fedor Andreyev, a pupil of Pavlov and a Stalin Prizewinner, that 'the mechanism which withstands disease and ensures health is concentrated', and 'not in the periphery of the nervous system'. The connection between forms of disease (among them bronchial asthma, ulcers and high blood pressure—see SLEEP THERAPY) and the brain was denied in the 'pseudo-scientific' assertions of physiologists like Sir Charles Sherrington. (*Moscow Radio*, 3 July 1950.) Soviet psychiatrists appear to be not without irony, however. Zhdanov, at the 18th Party Congress in 1939 quoted, as an example of excesses then being committed, the case of party members who during the purges 'have resorted to the aid of medical institutions in the effort to insure themselves. Here is a medical certificate issued to one of these citizens: "Owing to his state of mental health, Comrade So-and-so is not fit to be used as a tool by any class enemy."'

REALISM in art involves 'a high standard of craftsmanship, vigorous optimism and buoyancy', with 'profound kinship for the people' (*New Times*, 21 March 1951). (See SOCIALIST REALISM.)

RED. The Russian word *krasniy* is a pun of some value to the Communists; it means both beautiful and red. Red Square was so called long before the 'Red' Revolution.

RELATIVISM is the (almost wholly mistaken) belief that orders from above may be adapted to one's own view of local conditions.

RELIGION. 'The USSR is a country with an atheist outlook on the world', says the *Soviet Encyclopaedia* under the heading of 'Atheism'. Religion is, all the same, 'tenacious and full of life, and it continues to exist as a survival of the past'; it prevents believing workers from mastering science and hinders their upbringing 'in the spirit of the Marxist-Leninist outlook on the world'.

This outlook is both simple and uncompromising. Primitive man invents an omnipotent god to console himself for his own impotence in the face of nature. Later, after the arrival of capitalism, the worker though exploited in this world is kept from revolting by promises of heaven in a future one. For these reasons, 'religion is the opium of the people' (Lenin, *Socialism and Religion*, 1905), preventing them from analysing their real situation and acting upon it. To both the Communist Party and the Soviet State, religion remains a drug: the vexed question of whether religion is tolerated in the USSR depends upon the degree to which they are prepared to permit a controlled indulgence for addicts beyond recall. New addictions are discouraged; old ones are permitted within limits, for the sake of social peace at home and political advantage abroad. So the Soviet State can, as necessary, profit by the links between the Russian Church and other Churches abroad; Orthodox Church interests in the Middle East are officially encouraged; and the millions of Muslims in the USSR enable her to appear at will in the role of a major Islamic power.

'Communism and religion are incompatible and irreconcilable' (*Nauka i Zhizn* (Science and Life), November 1949); hence, as Stalin said in 1927, 'the Party cannot be neutral regarding religion, and it conducts anti-religious propaganda against all and every religious prejudice, because it stands for science, and religious prejudices

are opposed to science'. (Conversation with the first American Workers' Delegation, 9 September 1927.) This 'science' is dialectical materialism, which 'teaches that the world existed on its own from the beginning and is fully knowable', as opposed to religion, which 'teaches that the world was made by God, that it is not knowable and is full of mysteries which can never be revealed'. The Communist view is thus based on a philosophical incompatibility between itself and religion; there is no room for religion in its scheme of things. 'We consider religion to be a fallacy, and we struggle against it by education. . . . We do not persecute anyone for religion', said Kalinin (*Komsomol Rabotnik* (Komsomol Worker), June 1947).

Education begins with the Komsomolets, or member of the Young Communist League. For him, 'religion cannot be a private affair. If he believes in God and goes to church he is failing to fulfil his duties. It means that he has not as yet rid himself of religious superstition, and has not become a fully conscious person.' Instead, he must spread among (presumably non-Communist) youth propaganda about 'the worthlessness of the religious world outlook' (*Molodoe Bolshevik* (Young Bolshevik), Nos. 5-6, 1946). 'Young Communists must not only be convinced atheists, but must actively combat the spreading of superstition and prejudice among the young.' (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 18 October 1947). The Komsomol Congress of March 1954 showed instead that some members were being married in church. A cartoon in *Krokodil* (10 April 1954) shows such a wedding, with the bridegroom complaining to the bride that the priest is so slow they will be late for their Komsomol committee meeting.

The spreading of religious ideas is forbidden by law. Article 122 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (1948) states that 'instruction of persons under age or minors in religious doctrines in State or private educational institutions and schools, or the violation of rules established for this, is punishable by corrective labour for the period of one year'. 'Instruction of any type of religious doctrine given in schools to minors is one of the forms of the infringement of the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the Constitution of the USSR.' (*Commentaries on the Criminal Code of the RSFSR*, 1946, p. 168.) The Soviet teacher, forbidden by law to transgress this freedom *not* to worship, is further expected to encourage what might be called the freedom to disbelieve. 'A Soviet teacher is obliged not

only to be an unbeliever himself, but also to be an active propagandist of godlessness in others.' (*Teachers' Gazette*, 26 November 1949.) Despite this, there are still young men and women brought up 'like any other young person' (i.e., not in theological colleges) who still have religious prejudices and believe in 'some spirit or fate' (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, May 1951).

In dealing with the general public, who are neither minors nor communists, the cruder methods of the inter-war Union of Militant Godless have been abandoned, although some of its prominent figures, such as Professor Oleshchuk, have reappeared as lecturers for the All-Union Society for the Propagation of Political and Scientific Knowledge, formed in May 1947 as a sort of Marxist equivalent to the SPCK. It followed two years after a decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to begin 'a widespread development of scientific enlightenment of the masses, the organisation of lectures on natural science, a constant exposure of religious superstitions and prejudices' (*Soviet Encyclopaedia*, Anti-Religious Propaganda). The president of the society, the late Professor Vavilov, stated in *Izvestia* late in 1949 that 39 million people had attended lectures organised by the society, which had nearly 5,000 lecture halls in rural areas. Titles of lectures include 'The Origin of Religious Festivals and Rites'; 'The Origin and Class Nature of Christianity'; and 'The Origin of Islam and its Class Nature'.

The Party, however, constantly presses for further efforts. *Pravda* of 14 February 1951 referred to the criticism by the Moscow Communist Party Committee that the city's mass education programme lacked 'aggressive scientific atheist propaganda'. The newspaper commented that 'natural science lectures are rarely given, are not aggressive in character, only feebly expose prejudices and superstitions, do not disclose the reactionary essence of religious ideology and fail to show examples of the harm religious survivals cause to Communist construction.' But Party members were told by their First Secretary, N. S. Khrushchev, in November, 1954, that in opposing religion they must refrain from insulting believers.

During the war the Orthodox Church supported the Soviet Union's war effort against Germany and secured for itself a position of somewhat greater toleration, refusing to compromise its doctrines and canons but declining to associate itself with any political activity hostile to the Soviet State. It does indeed serve some of the

political aims of that State, though usually in the support of objectives which are not, at least palpably, Communist, but rather of general humanitarian interest. Examples are the presence of a bishop during the war on the State Commission for the Investigation of German Atrocities and the post-war support for the Peace Movement. The reasons for the support of the latter are different from those of the Communists—though of course the political effect may be the same—as can be seen from extracts from the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*: 'We should like to think that a wide participation . . . of persons holding different religious and even political views will become a "day of salvation" and will bring many of them to the realisation of the moral beauty and grandeur of the Christian teaching' (December 1950); and 'In any weather and in any wind the church hastens to sow the seeds of the new life brought to earth by Our Lord Jesus Christ in order to reap the fruits of the Kingdom of God and fulfil her world-saving mission. It is with the same purpose in view that the church takes part in today's problem of averting a new war' (January 1951). The *Journal* is one of the few church periodicals which are published. Some books are also published; but not Bibles, Gospels or prayer-books. More churches have been opened since the war, and the number of theological seminaries has increased.

The activities of the Russian Orthodox Church are not confined to the USSR. Thus in June 1951 the leader of a delegation to Albania, Mgr. Nikon, carried a letter from Alexius, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, to Archbishop Paissi, head of the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church. The letter said that 'the unity of our belief and our common aim to work for the cause of peace throughout the world draw us closer together and unite us in a single Christian family and give us strength to pray to God to ensure peace and bring happiness to His holy churches'. The Albanian archbishop replied that his church had drawn inspiration from the great Russian Orthodox Church. Removal of the Albanian Church from the orbit of the Istanbul Patriarchate to that of Moscow is so clearly to the political advantage of both the Soviet State and the Russian Church that they have a common interest in acting together. Soviet hostility to the Vatican is also shared by the Orthodox of Eastern Europe who, especially in areas of mixed religion like Yugoslavia and Albania, react vigorously against any suspicion of expansion on the part of the Catholic Church. Thus,

the same Archbishop Paissi, in his Easter message in 1951, attacked the Pope as 'the present Vatican arch-priest' who, with his 'confederates', were 'the enemies of all Christians. They are denying Christ and trafficking with His divine principles. The clergy and the faithful of our Church are fortunate to live in a free country where the masses are the masters.' A more openly political intervention, also from Albania, was the telegram from the head of the Bektashi sect of Muslims (Ahmet Dedi) to the World Peace Council, protesting against the French Government's measures against the Council, 'under Anglo-US orders' (*Tirana Radio*, 28 April 1951).

Religious vestiges, though so thoroughly condemned by communism, still seem to cast their sunset radiance—or at least an afterglow—through the imagery of leading Communists. Thus Matyas Rakosi, the Hungarian Vice-Premier, castigated 'the incorrect and sinful policy of the Yugoslav leaders' (speech to Hungarian Workers' Party Congress, 24 February 1951). The Hungarian Minister of Education, Jozsef Darvas, attacked 'the Satanic beasts of prey' of the capitalist world. (Speech to Hungarian Writers' Association, 27 April 1951.) The Czech Minister Nejedly told *Prague Radio* listeners on 21 January 1951—a Sunday—that 'the new world is today so strong that the gates of hell will never prevail against it'. *Moscow Radio* said on 25 October 1950 that 'our democracy is as different as Heaven from Hell from the mercenary and completely rotten bourgeois democracy'. And even Stalin may have been reverting subconsciously to the days of his theological studies when he said that the revolutionary glories of Russia fill the hearts of the workers with 'feelings of revolutionary national pride, capable of moving mountains, of creating miracles' (J. V. Stalin, *Letter to Demian Bedny, Works*, vol. 13).

REVOLUTIONARY. 'A revolutionary is he who without arguments, unconditionally, openly and honestly without secret military consultations is ready to protect and defend the USSR, since the USSR is the first proletarian revolutionary State in the world that is building Socialism.' (Stalin, *Collected Works*, Moscow 1949, vol. 10, p. 51.) This conclusion is drawn from the following chain reasoning. The proletarian revolution is all one, the world over. It began in Russia. '... the victory of the revolution in one country, in the present case Russia, is not only the product of the uneven development and progressive decay of imperialism; it is at the

same time the beginning of and the groundwork for the world revolution.' (Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 113, 1941 edn.) Hence the interests of Russians and non-Russians are the same. 'The USSR has no interests which are at variance with the interests of world revolution and the international proletariat naturally has no interests which are at variance with those of the Soviet Union.' (Knorin, 'Fascism, Social-Democracy and the Communists', in a speech to the 13th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, December 1933.) Hence free-lance activity in a revolutionary cause becomes treason: 'He who thinks of defending the world revolutionary movement without and against the USSR goes against the revolution and is bound to slide down into the camp of the enemies of revolution.' (*Cominform Journal*, 2 February 1950.)

RIGHTISM, or Rightist Deviationism, is the failure on the part of a Communist to realise that coalitions or agreements with other political parties and splinter groups, whether socialist or not, can never be more than temporary and tactical accommodations for a limited objective. The Communist movement, from the days of Lenin at least, has believed that the parliamentary system is an obsolete, bourgeois phenomenon. In Communist eyes, a Marxist has ceased since the Russian Revolution to be merely someone who accepts the reality of the class struggle; he has become one who agrees that it can be resolved only through the dictatorship of the proletariat—that is to say, by a one-party, non-parliamentary system in which all power is exercised by the Communist Party. Parliamentary activity must therefore never be allowed to absorb the energies, compromise the principles or restrict the freedom of action of Communist Parties. Where these dangers arise, they must either quit coalitions in which they are being reduced to impotence or absorb and weaken the other parties, moving steadily towards single-party rule. This basic feature of modern Communism was explained at length by Lenin in *State and Revolution* (September 1917) and *Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*.

A typical Rightist situation arose in the British Communist Party early in 1952 and was revealed and presumably stamped out at the Easter Conference. Rank and file members, encouraged to maintain links with non-Communist mass organisations (since 'peace', trade,

the breakdown of NATO and the end of Western rearmament is presently more important to the USSR than restricted advances by Communist Parties alone), had suggested an understanding with Mr. Aneurin Bevan's supporters. This was rejected on the grounds that this was not a mass organisation (that is, it would commit the Party without procuring corresponding advantages) and that Mr. Bevan was personally unacceptable, being a friend of Marshal Tito. (See *Manchester Guardian*, 14 April 1952.) There is a further danger which can hardly have gone unnoticed in Moscow, although it was not pointed out by Mr. Pollitt. Mr. Bevan has made clear in his 'political testament', *In Place of Fear* (Heinemann, 1952), that while not rejecting a description of his socialism as Marxist, he does not visualise attaining any of his aims by extra-parliamentary methods, and as against Lenin he quotes Marx for the belief that this is possible, in Britain at least. He thus occupies a position which, in a Communist, would be a classical case of Rightist Deviation. (See LEFTISM.)

ROTOZEYSTVO, a compound of loafing, day-dreaming and gullibility amounting at times to an almost moronic unawareness of what is really going on, is a vice against which an active propaganda began at the end of 1952, following the 19th Party Congress. The *rotozey* is the man who is too simple, or lazy, or self-absorbed to keep a curb on his tongue and a lock on his secret papers. He is thus an easy victim for the criminal as well as for anyone who wishes to discover State secrets. 'Gullible people are the accomplices of the enemy' (*Pravda* headline, 31 January 1953). 'Gullibility is the culture medium for spies and saboteurs. So long as gullibility exists amongst us there will be wrecking. This means that to liquidate wrecking we must liquidate gullibility in our ranks.' (*Trud*, 27 January 1953.)

Many examples of *rotozeystvo* have been given by the Soviet press. In Volkovysk a certain Kruglov appeared and said he represented a higher Party organ. He was shown round various industrial enterprises, inspected the files and held meetings of Party activists. Only later did it transpire that he was a 'speculator and a criminal'. In the same area the head of a village co-operative was a *rotozey*. He took insufficient care of the official noteheading and rubber stamps, so that these were used for 'various criminal machinations' (*Zvyazda* (*Star*), Minsk, 28 January 1953).

Comrade Prokoshin, deputy head of the administration of the Krasnoyarsk district of the Ministry of Justice, gave a typing job to Comrade Rogovaya, without troubling to inquire into her credentials. After two days of typing from the archives of the local people's court, she disappeared with a packet of unused official forms. The chairman of the Red Cross in the same town (Comrade A. S. Tsekhova) gave her a job—she was now called Fomenko—as senior economist, cashier and typist. Within a week she left with a typewriter and 15,000 roubles. She turned up in Irkutsk, where the chairman, Comrade Baev, quickly promoted her to be head of the secretariat of the local court. Here she secured a passport (presumably to facilitate her movements from place to place in Russia) by using the forms stolen at Krasnoyarsk. 'Taking advantage of the gullibility of the legal officials', she set several criminals free with forged documents and again disappeared. After a few months she began work as Anna Kudlai in a motor tractor station and left shortly afterwards, again with a typewriter, together with 5,000 roubles of ready money. She was finally arrested at Dnepopetrovsk and sent to prison. But, asked *Pravda* (24 January 1953), would the judges remember that 'the gullible people who helped the adventurers in all her criminal acts' also 'deserve stern punishment'?

In another case, I. Redrov was appointed accountant and cashier of two Moscow secondary schools, although he lacked any experience for the job. He treated himself to 415,000 roubles (about £37,000 at the nominal rate of exchange), mainly from the social insurance fund. Despite this, he was offered a second similar job, from which he acquired first a further 300,000 roubles and later twenty-five years' imprisonment. (*Trud*, 5 February 1953.) Another accountant, Sviridov-Ryabov, was offered his post at the Vyazemsky butter factory immediately after he had completed a ten-year prison sentence. Having taken it, he put himself at the head of 'a gang of plunderers of socialist property', selling butter in the Moscow area—presumably on the black market—to a total of over 1 million roubles. (*Agitator's Notebook*, No. 3, January 1953.)

Another ex-criminal Murlykin, out of prison for theft and swindling, went to the Donbas coal enrichment trust, produced a diploma with the seal of the Azerbaijan geology prospecting technicum and persuaded the *rotozeys* of the trust that it was a diploma from a Donetsk industrial institute. He became a director and shift

engineer of various factories, committed various 'crimes' and disappeared. He later turned up in Kazakhstan as supervisor of one of the combines of the Ministry of Ferrous Metals. Here he stole 100,000 roubles and disappeared to Central Asia. (*Literary Gazette*, 3 February 1953.) The scale and intensity of the campaign against *rotozeystvo* suggest that this disease is an economic danger as well as a potential security risk. Indeed, in the instances quoted already from papers appearing inside the space of twelve days, four private persons are alone credited with taking possession of £164,000 worth of the State's money. The places where the defalcations have taken place show that the phenomenon (see also KHALTURA) is not confined to any one area of the USSR. The circumstances of the cases, involving the appointment of unskilled men and women and even discharged prisoners to posts of responsibility, often technically exacting, point to either an extremely low standard of social duty on the part of the Soviet managerial class or to such a dearth of skilled labour that risks are willingly taken in order to maintain the administration of enterprises at an acceptable level of efficiency.

The virtue corresponding to the vice of *rotozeystvo* is *bdityelnost*, vigilance.

RUSSIANS. A little over half of the population of the USSR is Russian, mostly living in the largest of the sixteen republics of the Union—the RSFSR, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, whose capital, like that of the Union, is Moscow. Until the Second World War, the use of the word 'Russian', except in reference to these people and their state, was frowned upon; the adjective to be used in all possible circumstances was 'Soviet'. The Revolution was held to have created a new form of society, in which all nationalities had equal rights, and any claims for superiority on the grounds of size or past achievements was outmoded chauvinism. Stalin had made himself personally responsible for the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union, and this apparent ability of scores of nationalities to live in peace was a major propaganda advantage.

Yet as Russia and the Russians had been the sinews of Tsarist expansion from the eighteenth century, so after the German attack in 1941 were they the heart and soul of resistance. While nominally nothing changed in the relations, in practice the

nationalities policy was considerably modified after the war. Some groups, like the Volga Germans, were moved entirely from their homes, as were Greek minorities; and nationalistic tendencies in art and literature were carefully watched and often tartly repudiated, especially in the Ukraine. At the same time, the place of the Russians was improved. The new attitude was signalled in Stalin's toast at a Kremlin reception for Red Army Commanders on 24 May 1945:

'I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people, because it is the most outstanding nation of all those going into the composition of the Soviet Union.

'I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people because it has merited in this war the general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet people among all the peoples of our country.

'I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people because it is not only the commanding people but also has a clear mind, a staunch character, and endurance.'

Stalin also referred to the Russian primacy in the workers' movement: 'The revolutionary workers in all countries unanimously applaud the Soviet working class, and above all, the Russian working class—the vanguard of the Soviet workers—as their acknowledged leader.' (J. V. Stalin, *Letter to Demian Bedny, Works*, vol. 13.) This quotation effectively disposes of the subterfuge, sometimes adopted by Communists, that the centralisation of their movement in Moscow is a geographical accident with no nationalistic implications.

Komsomolskaya Pravda of 24 January 1951 described the Russians as 'elder brothers' of the other nationalities. They established the USSR, of which the RSFSR is the first among equals. The RSFSR possessed rich natural resources, but its greatest treasure was the Russian people, 'the great nation that gave the world Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoy, Glinka and Tchaikovsky, Gorky and Chekhov, Pechenov and Pavlov, Repin and Surikov, Suvorov and Kutuzov'.

Some of this exuberance is explicable by the fact that an election campaign was under way in the Russian Republic, whose Supreme Council Chairman (M. Tarasov) referred to 'the leading role of the RSFSR and its people', while a Moscow Radio talk by M. Utkin pointed out that the Russian people had always been pre-eminent in the spheres of art, science and political develop-

ment. (This latter theme is developed at greater length under the heading of INVENTIONS.)

SALAMI TACTICS is a phrase invented by Matyas Rakosi, the Hungarian Premier and Communist Secretary-General to explain the process by which the Communist Party in a coalition government goes about the task 'to cut out reaction in slices'; or, in more literal terms, forces its nominal allies to purge and weaken themselves and finally make themselves incapable of resisting a Communist seizure of complete power. (See PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY.)

-SCHINA is a suffix best translated by '-ery', as in Whiggery and Popery, covering not only the ideas but the general ramifications of a movement, and used with a somewhat deprecatory flavour. (See ZHDANOVSCHINA, currently most used of all.) In Russia it is often associated with the name of a man, e.g.:

Kolchakovschina: the events surrounding the White Admiral Kolchak's campaign during the Civil War;

Manilovschina: feckless behaviour by local officials, referring to Manilov in *Dead Souls*, who let his estates go to rack and ruin because he was too lazy and listless to do anything about them;

Suvorovschina: the behaviour of an Army officer who, though lacking Suvorov's genius, is rude and rough to his men while secretly holding them in high esteem;

Yezhovschina: refers to the purges conducted by the police chief Yezhov before his fall; symbolises the subjection of the party to the secret police.

SCIENCE has two meanings: (1) Natural Science, such as physics, biology, astronomy. In this connection it also bears connotations which it has been loosing in Western Europe since the nineteenth century; for example, 'scientific' may be used of something as a virtual synonym for 'anti-religious'. To be worthy of the name, however, it must have a practical significance: 'pure' science is thought to be a contradiction in terms. Thus Szeged University, in Hungary, works on the principle that science has no value unless it is applied to practical life. (Rector interviewed in *Kis Ujsag*, Budapest, April 1951.) (2) Refers to the highest 'science' of all in Soviet eyes—Marxism-Leninism which deals with 'the science of

the laws of development of nature and society, the science of the revolution of the oppressed and exploited masses, the science of the victory of socialism in all countries, the science of building Communist society' (*Cominform Journal*, 4 May 1951).

SECTARIANISM refers to the activities of evangelical Christian sects in the USSR, in particular those of nonconformist tendency which preach 'a special refined variety of religion . . . a supposedly "pure Christianity"' (V. G. Sokolov on 'Present-day Sectarianism and its Reactionary Role', (*Naukai Zhizn, Science and Life*, No. 9, 1950). The author quotes Lenin as saying that 'any, even the most refined and well-intentioned defence or justification of the idea of God, is a justification of reaction' (V. I. Lenin, *Works*, vol. 17, p. 85).

'To "reconcile" religion with Communism itself as a product of Christianity' was unacceptable, said Sokolov. The All-Union Council of the Evangelical Baptist Christians had told foreign Baptists in 1947 that they 'fully share the social-economic principles of Communism as not being contrary to the teaching of Our Lord Jesus Christ'.

In reply, Sokolov states that 'all the sectarian propaganda about the "compatibility" of Communism and Christianity, to the effect that sectarians are also builders of Communism is nothing other than an attempt to mask the reactionary substance of sectarian precepts and morality, to lead Soviet man astray.

'The preaching of "love for all people" under conditions of acute struggle between the old rotting world of capitalism and the new growing world of Communism, of the feverish preparations by the Anglo-American imperialists for a new war, is in essence nothing other than the lulling of the vigilance of Soviet people. Under these conditions the preaching of "love for all people", no matter what good intentions the sectarian preachers embellish it with, is a gospel not of philanthropy but of misanthropy. Real philanthropy specifically includes sincere hatred for the enemies of labouring humanity.'

Sokolov called for 'a systematic ideological struggle against the anti-scientific reactionary ideology of sectarianism'.

SELF-CRITICISM. Government by a single party, itself committed to 'monolithic' unity of policy, presents a number of political and psychological problems, such as how to weed out the in-

efficient, how to provide the stimulus to action and the watch on corruption that an Opposition gives elsewhere, and how to prevent unorthodox views from creeping in. The method employed is 'Criticism' and 'Self-Criticism'. Criticism may be from below (e.g. a local Communist committee may be criticised by a group of workers for putting an ineffective or corrupt manager in their factory) or—more usually and more importantly—from above, when the leaders decide, as apparently they did before the 19th Congress in October 1952, that the lower organs need a spring clean. Then they invite criticism from the rank and file, indicating at the same time the lines it should take, and the ordinary party member is encouraged to feel that he may expose selected skeletons in the Party's cupboard without fear of victimisation. Self-Criticism is an acknowledgment by the person criticised of the validity of the accusations made against him, and is a usual preliminary to reinstatement in the Party's favour.

SHAKESPEARE is the subject of constant attention from the Soviet and allied world. He is, first of all, something of a touchstone proving the depth of Communist culture. Thus the Khamza Theatre of Tashkent commemorated the 335th anniversary of his death by putting on its 450th performance of *Hamlet* (*Tass*, 22 April 1951), a performance which the Shakespearian scholar, Professor Morozov, found to be 'interesting, deeply thought out' (*Moscow Radio*, 23 April 1951).

Again, Shakespeare's breadth of interest makes it possible to quote from him in support of almost any propaganda line momentarily in favour. The Peace Campaign is backed by quotations from *Richard II* showing that he preferred peace to war; his love of England is used to suggest that he would reject 'the England of today, no longer free and independent but a servant of the Americans' (*Budapest Radio*, 23 April 1951).

Shakespeare, it is suggested, is the prophet without honour in his own country. The 'wide popularity of his works' in Poland, for example, is to be contrasted with 'the restricted sphere of his influence in England, where few read him apart from the stale students of the bourgeois class'. This is because the 'Wall Street morons' have established their 'pernicious control' over the intellectual life of the country, flooding it with 'cheap American trash based on gangsterism and eroticism' (*Warsaw Radio*, 25 April

1951). The American 'perverters of Shakespeare' had even made of *The Taming of the Shrew* 'a trite musical comedy called *Kiss Me, Kate*'. The 'British forgers' were making malicious changes in Shakespeare's text, because his vital works were unacceptable to British reaction: a contrast to Russia, which could produce some of 'the world's finest examples of Shakespeare criticism' (*Moscow Radio*, 23 April 1951).

Shakespeare is given an ideological role as the man who 'saw the evils of the advent of capitalism' (*Budapest Radio*, 23 April 1951) (and was, incidentally, among the favourite writers of Karl Marx, who quotes the 'Gold' speech from *Timon* in *Capital*). The London *Daily Worker* critic, dealing with the Histories on 6 June 1952 summarised the Communist view of Shakespeare thus: 'The overriding quality that distinguishes Shakespeare . . . is the author's shrewd appreciation . . . that no government can maintain itself without discord—either internal or external—if its laws are at odds with economic reality.'

SHEFSTVO, patronage exercised by a *shef* or 'chief' is the Soviet equivalent of 'empire building' in Western business and service jargon. It can be used in a complimentary sense, as in reference to the *shefstvo* exercised over the Navy's political health by the Komsomol. It is more usually used in slangy references to State and Party officials who assume 'private positions of authority' (*Tiflis Radio*, 16 September 1952), putting their own nominees in subordinate posts and expecting personal loyalty from them against rivals for power. *Shefstvo* is prevalent throughout the Soviet system, and the publicised fortunes of their respective clients are often a useful guide to relations among the Soviet leaders: the fall of Beria, for example, was prefaced by purges in his native state of Georgia.

SHTURMOVSHITINA is a word originating in the German *sturm*, or attack, and refers to the practice in industrial undertakings of trying to make up a leeway in production by an eleventh-hour spurt. It may accordingly be called the 'last-minute spurt habit'. By slowing down the rhythm of production, it produces a shunting reaction throughout industry. In Czech industry the December 1950 target was exceeded by 8.7 per cent., but the January 1950 target had not been reached. The coalfields were notable offenders.

Rude Pravo devoted a leading article to the subject on 17 January 1951.

SKYSCRAPERS are not so called in the USSR. They are known as 'tall buildings'. The skyscraper was originally developed in Chicago and New York as an answer to the heavy burden of land charges in a highly competitive economy: there seems no good reason, if emulation and pride in bigness for its own sake are not held to apply, why a Communist state should encourage such a form of architecture. The *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 2nd Edition (1952), vol. 9: 'Tall Buildings', attempts an answer, which appears to be aesthetic and utilitarian advantages. High buildings release space for transport and parks, and they are beautiful in themselves. Yet this is not the whole answer. The Encyclopaedia refers to the problems involved in building the framework and laying the foundations in 'difficult geological conditions'. The business reasons which encouraged skyscrapers in the USA were supported by favourable geological conditions. The evident intention to build them in the USSR where neither economics nor geology suggest them appears to be a mystery not to be resolved in Marxist terms. A possible answer is the need for gigantic, steel-framed buildings, as being the least vulnerable to atomic attack. Whatever the reason, a serious attempt is being made to popularise them. Academician Vvedensky told a radio audience (*Moscow Radio*, 19 July 1952) that, instead of America's 'vast formless buildings', pressing upon one another chaotically, depriving the streets of light and air and turning them into grim ravines, those in the USSR were 'beautiful architectural creations reflecting the beauty and greatness of our epoch'.

SLEEP THERAPY. Pavlov's theory that sleep is a 'braking process' on the mass of brain cells (which may be incomplete; hence the existence of dreams) carried with it the corollary that this braking process was of great benefit to the nervous system. 'Hence sleep has great healing propensities', said Dr. N. I. Katsapkin to the Political-Scientific Society in Moscow on 27 February 1951 (*Moscow Radio*). 'Modern medicine is based on this discovery. Sleep treatment is being successfully applied by Soviet medical science.' This codification of the scientific effects of Nature's Sweet Restorer was also discussed by Professor Fedor Andreyev, a pupil

of Pavlov and a Stalin prizewinner, during a debate among Soviet physiologists. (*Moscow Radio*, 3 July 1950.) He described his method of treating internal diseases by inducing prolonged sleep. This had been used since 1943 in 650 cases of bronchial asthma, ulcers, high blood pressure and other ailments, and was now being used by 'dozens of health establishments' in the USSR. (For the theory behind this cure, see *PSYCHOTHERAPY*.) Professor Andreyev admitted that this method was in use outside the USSR, but stated that 'narcotics' were in use elsewhere, which suggests that hypnosis may be the Soviet practice for inducing sleep.

SOCIALISM. Whereas for the Social Democrat Socialism is a political philosophy and technique complete in itself, to the Communist it is no more than an essential stage on the road to Communism. It is the stage at which, though capitalist 'exploitation' has ceased and counter-revolution has been made impossible through imposing dictatorship of the proletariat, the full programme of Communism cannot be realised. Production is not high enough to give 'to each according to his needs', and so goods have to be distributed according to work done. The so-called 'material base of Communism' represents the final stage at which so many goods and services will be produced that they will be shared out according to individual needs (although it hardly needs saying that the individual will not necessarily define his own needs). Socialism is the period of effort during which this period of plenty is to be prepared. It calls for vast inequalities in wages to make the utmost use of any out-of-the-ordinary skills; it increases the powers of the manager over his workers; it lessens mobility of labour and it sacrifices consumer goods to capital accumulation. Thus, however necessary to hasten the progress of Communism, it has nothing in common with Socialism as understood by non-Soviet socialists.

The 'six conditions of Bolshevik management of economy' in the period of Socialism (i.e. until Communism is proclaimed as having arrived) were stated by Stalin at the Conference of Business Executives, 23 June 1931 (*Works*, vol. 13) to be: (1) To recruit labour power in an organised way by concluding contracts with the collective farms, and to mechanise labour. (2) To put an end to the fluctuation of labour; to do away with wage equalisation; to organise wages properly and to improve the living conditions of the workers. (3) To put an end to lack of personal responsibility;

to improve the organisation of labour and to secure the proper distribution of forces in enterprises. (4) To see to it that the working class of the USSR has its own industrial and technical intelligentsia. (5) To change the attitude towards the engineers and technicians of the old school, to show them greater attention and solicitude, and to display more boldness in enlisting their co-operation. (6) To introduce and reinforce business accounting; to increase the accumulation of capital within industry itself.

The first Soviet Constitution, in a definition now overtaken by events, stated that under Socialism there will be 'neither division into classes nor state authority'. The Soviet system is officially stated to be still in its socialist, and not yet in its communist period.

SOCIALIST REALISM in art and literature is the 'creative method' obligatory for Soviet artists and writers and has been in use since the first All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934. It is 'socialist' in that the work of the writer is 'organically bound up with the tasks of educating the working people in the spirit of socialism'; and its 'realism' consists in a 'just and historically concrete reflection of reality in its revolutionary development' (*Pravda*, 25 May 1954). Reality is thus not what the author's unaided inspiration thinks it sees, which is a purely 'bourgeois' and 'degenerate' idea; nor is it a matter of depicting the external appearances of things, which is Naturalism; nor again does it consist of detachment from the class war, which is Objectivism. There is a conflict; artists are involved in it; and they like everyone else must be guided by 'what comprises the living foundation of the Soviet system—the policy of the Communist Party'. Its definition of the nature of reality is binding; and it regards itself as competent, too, to advise the writer on the forms he should adopt—poets at present lack 'impassioned patriotic lyricism' and readers await works of 'broad epic scope' like *War and Peace*—and the type of character he should choose to write about: there are few works about the 'glorious collective farm peasantry' and a need for 'a more vivid artistic embodiment of the figure of the Communist' (*Pravda*, 25 May 1954). The author must expose and satirise vice and incompetence; but his bad characters, careerists and bureaucrats in particular, must not be shown as typical of Soviet society but as 'the natural counteraction of a healthy organism and a malignant

growth' (*Literary Gazette*, 27 May 1954). It is, for example, 'politically harmful and profoundly vicious' to suggest that Soviet leaders, 'invested in our most democratic of countries with the confidence of the working people', can be corrupted by power (*Literary Gazette*, 27 May 1954).

SOUL. The soul is still referred to figuratively; but no more, since it does not exist in Soviet theory. 'Consciousness is a nervous activity in a given part of the brain.' (Dr. V. M. Tatianov, lecture on the 15th anniversary of Pavlov's death, *Moscow Radio*, 27 February 1951.)

SOVKHOZ (see COLLECTIVE FARMS).

SPORT is bound up with the international prestige of the USSR. The 8th plenary session of the Komsomol (Young Communists) Central Committee decided in April 1952 to raise the standard of athletic skill among the young people of the Soviet Union, thus making it possible for Soviet sportsmen 'in the nearest future' to gain world supremacy in the most important branches of sport. (*Tass*, 11 April 1952.) A report at this same session referred to the need for organising mass physical culture and sports activities among students and young industrial and agricultural workers. The general tendency is to encourage physical fitness courses among the population as a whole. In the Communist states of East Europe it has been pointed out that military training is based on sports training, and it is thus important that youth should join sports associations and gain 'Ready for Work and Defence' badges before completing their military service. (*Bucharest Radio*, 19 April 1952.) The GMA (Ready for Work and Defence of the Fatherland Sports Association) has 320,000 members and candidates in Roumania. It serves 'the Communist and patriotic education of workers' and stimulates 'discipline and competitive instincts' (*Agerpress*, Bucharest agency, 20 April 1951).

Soviet technique is also claimed to be superior. In football, for example, 'while teams from bourgeois countries concentrate mainly on external effect and individual play calculated to show off tricks of virtuosity', the Soviet team (this referred to a Soviet team then touring France) showed 'a collective, friendly and purposeful style of play. Every move, every pass of the Soviet players

was accurately calculated and part of a general and collective plan.' Bourgeois teams 'followed a fixed and schematic pattern, playing mainly previously-learned combinations'. Soviet (and Czech and Bulgarian) teams 'show high initiative and play a many-sided game', and have a moral superiority over their bourgeois opponents, to whose 'crude tricks' they reply 'with a still greater mobilisation of their creative forces' (*Tass*, 19 May 1951).

STAKHANOVITE or 'storm worker' is an outstanding worker who regularly exceeds his production norm, usually by employing more rational methods of work. The word comes from the well-known Donbas miner, Stakhanov, who in the early Five Year Plans, produced unusual quantities of coal. The main aim of the movement is to encourage the rank and file worker to raise his output by stimulating competition. Stakhanovites are encouraged by an unusually high level of wages the more they produce; they are paid, so to speak, by a law of increasing returns. The system has its limitations in that it introduces a 'star' system into a co-operative and collectivist economy; and there have been many satirical comments and cartoons in the Soviet press attacking the dislocation of entire workshops which has resulted from the search for individual records. To some extent, therefore, Stakhanovism has taken a back seat, and new methods have been adopted to produce the same result—'socialist emulation' (a good example to fellow-workers) and 'socialist competition' (often arranged between two factories, to see which can reach its target first or exceed it by the larger percentage) are two examples. Others are:

BIKOV Movement: working with machines running at a faster rate than usual;

GAZDA Movement: saving as much material and fuel as possible;

HENNEKE Movement: a form of East German Stakhanovism after the Second World War, named after a miner Henneke;

LOY System: a resolve to produce more today than yesterday;

TEN MINUTE System: a resolve to arrive at work ten minutes early, and spend that time in getting one's tools ready.

STALINISM. During his lifetime, Stalin was the fount and daystar of Soviet life and communist ideology, 'the creator of new life on earth', than whom no one had ever possessed 'such varied, such

rich, such beautiful, such omnipresent genius'; 'his forecasts are infallible'; 'his plans always come true'; 'his wisdom, the irreproachable correctness of his advice to masters of whatever trade there may be, are astonishing' (*Moscow Radio*, 1 May 1950). 'The outline of the spiritual figure of Stalin' (*Teachers' Gazette*, No. 21, 1947) showed him, in election comments of 1951, as 'the incarnation of all our best hopes', 'the joy of life', 'the beloved leader and teacher'. He was 'the great coryphaeus of science', and one newspaper used his name seventy-one times on a single front page (*Izvestia*, 26 December 1950), with such adjectives as 'light of life', 'supreme father' and 'the man to whom all Azerbaijani women are grateful'.

Apart from his personal praise, Stalin's name was linked with two policy initiatives: 'Socialism in one Country' (i.e. consolidation of the Revolution at home, rather than linking its fate with world revolution) and the Nationalities Policy (whereby the government of nationality groups in the USSR was 'national in form, socialist in content'). Since his death his deified reputation has been deflated. The 'cult of personality' and hero-worshipping in the party and history is deplored, and collectivity is demanded in party leadership, Stalin even being somewhat ironically quoted in its favour. (*Pravda*, 10 June 1953.)

It is not yet apparent how much, if anything, of Stalinism will be allowed to survive as an ideology distinguishable from Leninism. In the 50th anniversary theses of the Communist Party (July 1953), Stalin was quoted only once, and then to praise Lenin as his teacher. The Party was said to have taken the initiative towards the nationalities, 'guided by the Lenin-Stalin national policy' and 'Socialism in one country', though the phrase was not mentioned, re-emerged as 'the Leninist thesis that our country possesses in sufficient quantities everything needed for the complete construction of socialist society'.

'Stalin' (*Stalinskii*) appears as an adjective in the *Standard Russian Dictionary* (ed. Obnorsky). The 1953 edition defines it as 'referring to the life and activity of J. V. Stalin'; the 1952 edition, published when he was still alive, gave as definition 'referring to the period of the construction of Socialism and Communism under the direction of the great leader of the peoples, J. V. Stalin'; with as examples, 'great Stalin period', 'Stalin harvest (abundant)', 'Stalin's care for the human being'.

STATE. The State, in the view of Marx and Engels, used its police rights to preserve their property rights for capitalists. It also refrained from interference in economic life, thus guaranteeing the free market economy by which the capitalist was able to put into his own pocket the surplus value produced by the proletariat. Where no such exploitation or protection of special interests took place, it followed that the State, too, would cease to be necessary. It would, in Engels' words, 'wither away'.

This celebrated phrase was described by Stalin as 'the classical formula of the theory of development of the Socialist state' (speech to 18th Party Congress, 10 March 1939). It occurs in the following passage from the *Anti-Dühring*: 'When there shall be no social classes which it is necessary to hold in subjection—when there shall be neither the dominance of one class over another class nor a struggle for existence based on the contemporary anarchy of production, and when the clashes and violence caused thereby shall have been done away with—then there will no longer be anyone to crush and to hold in restraint and then the need for the state authority which now performs that function will vanish. The first measure in which the state will come forward as the true representative of all society—the turning of the means of production into social property—will be its last independent action *qua* state. Little by little it will become unnecessary for state authority to intervene in social relationships and such intermeddling will automatically cease. The government of persons comes to an end; and the management of things and the direction of production processes takes its place. The state is not "abolished"—it withers away.'

Further thought, especially as the possibilities for successful revolution approached, suggested that the State could not disappear immediately, nor could its repressive features be dispensed with. The capitalists would set up the old bourgeois state again if there were no force to prevent them. Accordingly 'a temporary caretaker state' had to be set up. Lenin explains (*State and Revolution*) that 'the particular power of suppression of the proletariat by the capitalist class must be replaced by a particular power of suppression of the capitalist class by the proletariat (the dictatorship of the proletariat)'. Lenin further elaborated a scheme whereby 'every individual of the population' would become a sort of spare-time civil servant and so obviate the need for a powerful

State bureaucracy: 'the great majority of the functions of "the old State" have become enormously simplified and reduced, in practice, to very simple operations such as registration, filing and checking. Hence they will be quite within the reach of every literate person, and it will be possible to perform them for the usual "working man's wage".'

Under Lenin's successor, however, the State did not wither away, nor were the functions of the Soviet bureaucracy performed by this idyllic and amateur method. Stalin both justified the retention of power by the State and claimed, as distinct from early Marxists, that the attainment of communism required direct initiative on the part of the State. Engels' formula, he said, applied where socialism was victorious in all or most countries but 'in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, when the socialist revolution has been victorious only in one country, and capitalism reigns in all other countries, the land of the victorious revolution should not weaken, but in every way strengthen its State, State organs, intelligence organs and army, if that land does not want to be crushed by the capitalist encirclement' (*Linguistics*, 1950).

Stalin used the example of collectivisation of the countryside to show how the State could pass over from passive defence of the revolution against external and internal enemies to becoming what a Soviet commentator called 'the principal instrument for the building of communism' (*Pravda*, 11 September 1952, on the 35th anniversary of *State and Revolution*). 'Only with the presence of a strong and powerful state, whose directing and guiding force is the Communist Party, can communism be built and its achievements be defended from assaults from without.' The State is, in other words, a useful instrument in the hands of the Communist Party and 'the Party governs the State' (*Moscow Radio*, 25 May 1950). It is, so to speak, the secular arm of the party leaders, with the one important difference that the chief figures in the party also occupy the main government offices. The party is supreme, since it lays down the ideological framework and even the physical targets and time-table to which the State administration must work. Thus the second post-war Five Year Plan was submitted for the approval of the 19th Party Congress (October 1952) before being handed over to the State administration to be implemented. Marshal Voroshilov appeared at Stalin's bier as nominal head of the Soviet State (March 1953), although he had merely been

'recommended' for the office and had not been confirmed by the Supreme Soviet, or Parliament.

SUN. Communist materialism does not permit the belief that the physical universe was ever created. 'Where did it all come from in the first place? To this science can give only one answer. There never was a first place.' (*Daily Worker*, 8 August 1952). Soviet astronomers have made the complementary and comforting discovery that our own galaxy at least will never come to an end. *Moscow Radio* said on 31 August 1950 that 'several bourgeois scientists, seeking to justify the religious tales of the inevitability of the end of the world, have tried to prove that every star, including the sun, must inevitably flare up . . . only certain types of stars are liable to undergo this process. The sun does not belong to this type'.

SUPERSTRUCTURE (see BASE).

TITOISM. Soviet writers have not thought fit to elevate Tito's heresy to the rank of an 'ism'. After first being accused of Bukharinism and Trotskyism, Tito was subsequently regarded as being no Communist at all but as a 'henchman' of 'imperialism'. He and his colleagues were from time to time referred to abusively as Titoites, or the 'Tito Fascist Clique' (*Cominform Journal*, 27 June 1952) but a moratorium was declared on abuse of Tito in November 1954.

TOLKACH (from *tolkat*, to push or jostle), a 'fixer'; the man who knows a man; the man who can get it for you wholesale; who has *blat* (q.v.).

TROTSKYISM has three meanings needing to be distinguished:

(1) That used by Leon Trotsky (1877-1940) and his followers to describe their political theory, in particular their belief that Stalin has distorted Communism by turning a proletarian revolution into a bureaucratic tyranny. This thesis is outlined in Trotsky's own book *The Revolution Betrayed* (1938); and it forms the basis of action of the shadowy Fourth International founded in 1936. Trotskyism has little practical political significance, though it possesses the allegiance of organised political parties in Ceylon, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia.

(2) As one phase of the Soviet revolution, in which the struggle for supremacy between Trotsky and Stalin was exemplified and given less blatantly personal form by the conflict between two conceptions of the future of the revolution—Stalin's view of its consolidation in the USSR, Trotsky's view of its spread abroad as a condition of its survival in the USSR.

(3) Its current meaning in Soviet apologetics. In this sense, the mainspring of Trotskyism is the spirit of rebellion itself rather than any specific doctrinal heresy. A Trotskyist does not necessarily believe what Trotsky did; but he behaves like Trotsky in declining to accept as self-evident the judgment of the leaders on all matters. The Communist Party is 'monolithic': that is to say, it speaks with a single voice and acts together, allowing no room for the groups, cliques, tendencies and rebel movements proliferating in most political parties. By the system of 'democratic centralism' the Central Committee decides a line of action after what is in theory an open and free debate throughout the Party. Once that decision is taken, the question is closed and the loyal communist acts upon it as though it had always been his personal opinion.

The Party is so built that this political unity is matched and guaranteed by an organisational unity, and it is thus difficult for a minority view to be kept alive among any coherent group of communists. 'Democratic centralism', invented by Lenin as a device to preserve the party from the usual fate of revolutionaries, frustration through bickerings and logic-chopping in public, was developed by Stalin as a technique for securing an effective personal control over the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and for the elimination of the many rival personalities and tendencies. In this process the most formidable opponent Stalin encountered was Trotsky, the War Minister, Commander of the Red Army, organiser of victory and in the popular view second only to Lenin among the leaders of the Revolution. The triumph of Stalin may well have proved to represent the victory of reason over rashness, as it is often represented; but this is justification after the event. It was achieved by the patient work of Stalin as Secretary-General of the Party (from 1919), 'centralising' the Party's work in his own hands so as to leave no opportunity for manoeuvre to his opponent. After the death of Lenin in January 1924, Stalin joined with Zinoviev and Kamenev in the Central Committee to oust Trotsky, and having done this by 1925 he joined with Kalinin

and Rykov against his next most dangerous rival and recent ally Zinoviev. The year in which he achieved power for himself (1927) was the one in which Trotsky was exiled from the USSR.

Trotskyism, therefore, is any movement which threatens to dispute supreme power in any Communist Party with its existing (and Stalinist) possessors. It is therefore not merely a term of abuse, but is a precise and pointed criticism when applied to Communists such as Tito, Xoxe, Kostov and Rajk. Ideologically the word means little or nothing in this context; from the viewpoint of Party organisation it means almost everything. This was pointed out with extreme frankness by the Czechoslovak President Klement Gottwald, when explaining the reason for the downfall of his rival Rudolf Slansky, at a meeting of the Prague Central Committee on 6 December 1951. 'While Slansky held the office of Secretary-General', said Gottwald, 'his incorrect organisation and cadre policy, as well as his mistaken working methods, resulted in a weakening of the Party's efficiency and unity, and the danger arose that a second leading centre might be established.' This means simply that Slansky had chosen people loyal to himself ('cadre policy') to fill key posts ('incorrect organisation') and had not kept his colleagues of the Central Committee fully informed about his aims, methods and ambitions ('mistaken working methods'). Thus he became a 'second leading centre'. He was therefore demoted. (Slansky had been appointed in September 1951 to an economic post in the Prime Minister's office, presumably so that scandal might be avoided, the ramifications of his 'conspiracy' uncovered and an eye kept on him personally. But he appears to have had no intention of abandoning his projects.) 'He carried over his bad working methods to his new sphere of activity', said Gottwald; 'he kept the group of his immediate camp followers together, tried to find room for them in his new office and to turn the latter into a sort of separate centre inside the Premier's office, behind the Premier's back.' The moral was that 'the efficiency and appeal of the Party can be paralysed by undermining its organisational-political unity'. The cure was to consolidate this double-barrelled unity and 'close the Party's ranks more firmly around the Central Committee'.

The procedure alleged against Slansky is thus that as Secretary-General of the Party he used his vast influence to create a 'second leading centre' of his own supporters, a second pole of political

force, to counterbalance and eventually supersede the existing Central Committee, thus giving him supreme power in the Party. This, however, is exactly the same process as that adopted by Stalin, the Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party, to secure the same end between 1924 and 1927. The technique by which Stalin attained his authority is one which he had no intention of seeing employed against himself; and of course no one was so well equipped as himself to discover its early symptoms. Slansky, in copying Stalin, is guilty of Trotskyism; and thus, if the charge is to be taken seriously, we are left with the engaging paradox that Stalin was himself the first Trotskyist.

In a broader sense, and at a much less exalted level, Trotskyism is used as a term of abuse, usually with some preceding adjective. There is, for example, the ANARCHO-TROTSKYITE. Thus Bacilek, the Czechoslovak Minister of State Control, called for stronger 'State discipline' in an article in *Tvorba*, quoted by Bratislava Radio on 14 January 1952. Leading State and economic officials, he said, appeared to think they could disregard instructions issued by their superiors. 'We cannot afford to ignore such anarcho-Trotskyite tendencies.' In this context, the Trotskyism consists in setting personal judgment above one's orders; the anarchism in hindering the function of the State machine. HITLERO-TROTSKYITES appeared in France in May 1947. They were the Renault workers who struck unofficially when the Communists were still in the Government. When the Communists took over leadership of the strike and left the Government this term of abuse was forgotten.

TSARISM. Although they have no time for Freudianism, the Soviet leaders have something of a Father Figure in the Tsarist Regime; and the more they have come to depend on Russian patriotism as a source of strength (during 'the Great Fatherland War' of 1941-45, for example) the more divided their emotions have become. It is hated because it persecuted the revolutionaries; it is almost respected because it was Russian. An example of this growing complexity is found in a comparison of the treatment of the Russo-Japanese War in the first and second editions of the *Soviet Encyclopaedia*. The first edition spoke of the Tsarist Government's 'increasingly aggressive policy in Manchuria and Korea' before that war (1904) and the background was sketched in with Marxist simplicity. Nicholas II and his mother held shares in a

timber concession on the Yalu River; and being, like their government, under the influence of reactionary landowners and militarists, they sent troops into Korea under the pretext of protecting it. 'This could only lead to an armed conflict with Japanese imperialism.' Such an explanation makes the Tsar weak, stupid and venal and implies that the Japanese were no worse than the Russians.

The second edition did not appear until after the Second World War, by which time the simplicity of such an explanation might prove embarrassing. A Communist republic existed in North Korea, and so did the possibilities of extending it to the South. Possible reaction from Japan would have to be borne in mind. In addition, however, the role of Tsardom had come to require modification; and it was no longer the Tsar Nicholas who provoked a natural reaction. Japan, 'in attacking Russia without declaring war, committed an act of naked aggression'.

The subject was treated at greater length in a 500-page Survey of the *Diplomatic History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1895-1907* (B. A. Romanov, Leningrad, 1947). This explains the war as one between rival imperialisms, but superimposes a somewhat geopolitical explanation. Russia is shown as trying to defend the mainland from Japanese penetration, which was the first stage towards the Japanese conquest of Korea and Manchuria. Romanov sees Japan, helped by Britain and the United States, securing a 'firm foothold on the Asian mainland—in anticipation of an opportune moment for renewed attack'. Tsarist Russia, though imperialist, is thus shown to have had some right on her side. The implication appears to be that had she, and not Japan, won, her victory would have prevented the later Japanese advances into Korea (1908) and Manchuria in the 1930s.

(However, if Soviet claims are to be taken at their face value, the consequences of the defeat of the Tsars were not irreparable. In the Far Eastern war in 1945, 'the Soviet Union accomplished literally in days what the Western powers had attempted for four years in their fighting against Japan'. V. N. Nikiforov, *The National Liberation War of the Chinese People against Japanese Imperialism, 1937-45*. Pravda, 1950.)

In explaining the expansion of Russia under the Tsars, the Soviet regime uses arguments intended to combine both Marxist analysis and simple patriotism. Tsarist Russia was admittedly backward,

but her culture was higher than that of the neighbouring countries she absorbed, and they were too weak to stand alone, and so must have fallen victims to states with a lower culture. Azerbaijan and Georgia are often quoted as having been in danger of attack from backward Persia. The only solution of their dilemma was to unite with Russia, which accordingly played a progressive role in their development. The masses of these absorbed countries struggled against the Tsars and the landlords, relying on 'the intellectual and political support of the advanced section of Russian society'. Apart from its value in reconciling Marxism and national history such an analysis may throw some light on the emotions that have so far given rise to Russian expansion. The neighbour is absorbed to prevent him being absorbed by a less worthy rival; and this process brings the country new neighbours, who in turn are in danger of absorption by new but even less worthy rivals.

The Russians have lately discovered an even more ingenious proof that Tsarism was not so backward as it had been thought. On the modern Stalinist theory that some wars are 'progressive' (e.g. one replacing capitalism by socialism, or feudalism by capitalism), the more backward pre-1914 Russia was, the more justified Germany would have been in fighting her. 'If Russian Tsarism was the last bulwark of the all-European reactionaries, then it must surely be apparent that war—for example, between bourgeois Germany and Tsarist Russia—is not an imperialist war, not a war of plunder, not an anti-national war, but practically a war of liberation.' (Professor F. D. Kretov, *Moscow Radio*, 25 March 1952.) Engels, in his estimation of the European situation made around 1890, clearly implied in advance that this backwardness of the Tsars, particularly their ambitions to secure control of the Straits from Turkey, was one of the leading factors making for war. Stalin has subsequently corrected this view, in effect, defending the Tsars against Engels, by suggesting that the imperialist rivalry between England and Germany, and the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, were at least factors as important as the ambitions of the Tsars. 'Engels exaggerated the role of Russian Tsarism', says Kretov. What follows from this seems to be that Tsarism, though bad by modern standards, was no worse than its rivals, a conclusion consoling to Russian pride; and that a Russian ambition towards the Straits need not be regarded as the most decisive factor leading towards

responsibility for war, a conclusion which might on occasion be consoling to any leaders of Russia.

UNIVERSE. The Universe is held to have no limits in time or in space and to possess an infinite variety of forms adopted by matter in the process of its development. It is in a state of continuous motion and development. This definition was given by the President of the Armenian Academy of Science, V. A. Ambartsumyan, in the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd edn., 1952, vol. 9, The Universe). It was he whose experiments furnished 'undeniable proof' of this continuous development by showing that some stars are several milliard years old, some 'young' stars are only several million years old and the process of stellar formation 'is still going on' (Professor B. V. Kukarkin, *Moscow Radio*, 2 March 1952). Alma Ata observatory claims to have taken photographs showing this process of star formation. 'Nebulous blotches' are believed to be 'stars surrounded by misty substances' and 'a certain gaseous state of matter'.

The official Soviet cosmogony, as approved in the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1951, takes the view that the planets were formed by the condensation of matter in a state of dust or gas. This theory is associated with the name of Academician O. Y. Schmidt, who has been working on it since 1943, assisted by a group of astronomers, mathematicians and geophysicists. Schmidt draws attention to giant nebulae of dispersed or diffused matter existing in inter-stellar space, and particularly numerous in the galaxy of which our sun is a part. Such particles of cold inter-stellar dust and gas, surrounding the sun in a vast flattened-out cloud, merged to form the earth and the other planets. (See EARTH.)

The new theory is held to explain why the orbits of the planets are situated in a single plane, why they rotate on their own axes and why their forms are nearly circular. It is also held to explain why the four planets near the sun are relatively small in size and made up of heavy rock-like substances while those further away are larger and of lighter substance. The sun's rays had not penetrated to the remoter parts of the original cloud; the temperature had been low, and so the outer planets had coalesced from large ice-bound particles, large but light. Although 'several shortcomings and defects' exist in the new theory, 'our own Soviet country is the centre of the science of the origin of the heavenly

bodies and of the development of our eternally existing and changing universe' (Kukarkin).

This statement of Soviet theory is coupled with attacks on the 'pseudo-scientific' hypotheses of bourgeois and capitalist scientists, who are accused of 'fear of large generalisations, narrow schematisation of natural phenomena and lack of faith in the possible knowledge of the world'. Some even explained the origin of heavenly bodies by 'the ridiculous act of creation by God', which 'shows just how far they are from true science'. 'Clerical circles' saw proof of this 'Church fable' in Jeans's improbable idea that the solar system was the result of the fortuitous collision of the sun with a passing star. The Soviet astronomer Pariysky had disproved Jeans's theory (Kukarkin). 'The reactionary British physicists Milne and Halton' had developed 'a ridiculous theory of the transformation of some sort of a giant "primeval atom" of light energy into the matter of the solar system' (Kukarkin). Jordan and Fred Hoyle teach 'nonsensical' theories. (*Krasniy Flot*, 1 June 1952.)

The Schmidt theory has the great advantage from the point of view of Marxist materialism that it does not attribute the emergence of the solar system to either chance or to some factor which would be exclusive, and could not be expected to be duplicated in the rest of the universe. Unique accident or divine creation must by the nature of the case be excluded. However, the reference to 'shortcomings and defects' suggests that not all Soviet cosmogonists are happy with the theory as it stands. In April 1951, in a popular talk over *Moscow Radio*, Dr. K. L. Bayev spoke with equal respect of two theories. Unfortunately for the 'building up' one, he saw strong evidence that the planets have 'unbreakable connections' with the sun and have at some time separated themselves from it. The main evidence for this is that they all rotate around it in the same direction and almost in the same plane and that the sun revolves round its axis in the same direction as they do. An explanation of this would be that the sun, having used up all its chemical sources of energy—lithium, boron and boron—began to grow smaller and move more quickly on its axis. Its speed, combined with centrifugal force, formed a long protrusion on its surface, and this flew off to form the planets.

Nevertheless, Bayev was attracted to the Schmidt theory on philosophical grounds. It called for no 'rare or unusual circumstances. On the contrary, the emergence of planetary systems is possible

in a similar way not only round our sun but round any other star when collision with a cloud of cosmic material takes place.' Cosmogony is clearly a subject where once more in European history the astronomer must reassure himself that his observations are not getting too far away from the basic assumptions of the secular rulers.

VIGILANCE. An intensive campaign for vigilance (*bdityelnost*) was begun after the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 and received a fillip from the story, wholly discredited after Stalin's death, that a group of doctors had plotted to kill Soviet military leaders. 'It must be admitted', said *Pravda* (31 January 1953) 'that revolutionary vigilance has not been raised to the necessary height everywhere amongst us. A particular testimony to this is the fact that a group of American-British spies and terrorists operated with impunity for a long period in our country, disguised as doctors.' Examples of lack of vigilance (all of them pilloried by articles, cartoons and even photographs taken in offending offices) were loss of confidential papers, careless talk, leaving documents where they were accessible to visitors and showing gullibility (see *ROTOZEYSTVO*) in dealings with strangers. 'To be vigilant means to be able to keep strictly to yourself information known to you about your work, and not to gossip and boast about being well-informed. One can still often meet young people who in the street, on a tramcar or in the train heatedly discuss the work of their enterprise or establishment, new inventions, new scientific works and many other things for which our enemies are hunting. It is your direct duty to restrain people who are too garrulous and to warn your comrades against carelessness and gullibility.' (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 1 February 1953.)

VKP (*Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya*) is the usual abbreviation for the All-Union Communist Party. Until the name of Bolshevik was dropped in October 1952, it used to be written as VKP(b). The customary abbreviations used in communist literature written in English are AUCP (All-Union Communist Party) or CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

WAGE FUND is the total amount of money which a State enterprise or co-operative is permitted under the overall plan to

spend on wages. This total is linked with the output target called for from the concern during the same period. The Roumanian Cabinet decision No. 1424 of 29 December 1950, introducing 'control of utilisation of wage funds' to Roumania, laid down that their use must 'correspond to fulfilment of plan tasks'. Banks could issue the full amount of the fund only when these tasks had been fully achieved; the money must be increased or decreased proportionately to any over- or under-production. The earnings of the worker would thus be reduced whenever his concern did not reach the target, although other causes than his own slackness—for example, bad management—might be to blame.

The Czechoslovak Government set up a State Wages Commission in April 1951, introducing wages totals as a preparatory step to setting up wage funds. Premier Zapotocky, in a speech on 15 April 1951, said wages had been rising more quickly than output. Unfortunately there were still 'backward workers' who retained their old prejudices, born of the times when they had to cheat their capitalist employers if they wanted to make more money. Such people were 'wage profiteers'. That the wage funds were aimed to produce higher individual output by relating wages to work done was shown by Zapotocky's phrase: 'It is impossible to satisfy the longing of all people for a better life on the basis of the old productivity of labour. That is why the old standard of labour productivity must be raised and higher exploits be obtained.' The Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party were told on 18 April 1951 that wage totals would avoid 'a harmful equalisation of wages for workers with different qualifications. They would be an incentive to increase productivity, because the worker could only increase his earnings by stepping up his effort.'

WAR can be most usefully considered under three headings:
(1) The Soviet attitude to war; (2) Soviet theories of waging war;
(3) Soviet views on the likelihood of war.

(1) *The Soviet attitude to war*

Although the Soviet Union is at great pains to present itself as a lover of peace, its aims 'have nothing in common with bourgeois pacifism, that is, a struggle against war "in general"' (Soviet *Diplomatic Dictionary*, 1951, 'Foreign Policy'). 'Lenin recognised two kinds of war, imperialist wars (and therefore unjust) and

wars of liberation (and therefore just). Lenin indicated that the presence of a socialist state in capitalist surroundings must cause not only disagreement but direct attempts by the bourgeoisie of other countries to defeat the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In this case the war from our side would be legitimate and just.'

This definition does not exclude the possibility of preventive war on the part of the Soviet Union, though Soviet resort to war is bound up with Stalinist thinking about the factors which make for victory in war (see 2).

Lenin's two kinds of war are different from those accepted by Marx and Engels, who were content with dividing them into aggressive and defensive wars. On this older definition, the Soviet Union could become involved in wars which had the appearance of aggression in the outside world (the war with Poland in 1920 and with Finland in 1939, for example), and so a new definition was called for which 'excludes the possibility of any misrepresentations calculated to bring grist to the mill' of anti-communists. Hence Lenin and Stalin, who 'never stuck to the letter of the teaching of Marx and Engels', 'developed and enriched Marxism in regard to questions of war, peace and revolution' (F. D. Kretov, 'The Theory and Tactics of the Bolshevik Party on Questions of War, Peace and Revolution', *Moscow Radio*, 25 March 1952).

The new definition, combined with the Soviet definition of Aggression (*q.v.*), seeks to make it impossible for the Soviet Union to be accused of a warlike policy, whatever actions it may take. Kretov quotes Lenin for a definition of the 'real nature' of a war: it is a quotation, truncated at the end, which everyone outside the Soviet Union would attribute to Clausewitz: 'War is a continuation of policy.' But whereas Clausewitz meant that a nation tries by war to achieve the objectives it had failed to secure by peaceful methods, Lenin meant that a war could only be defined in terms of the peacetime aims of the nations taking part. 'If the policy has been an imperialist one . . . a war emerging from this policy will be an imperialist one.' If the policy has been a peaceful one, presumably the war will be a peaceful war. As the Soviet Union will never accuse itself of imperialism, its opponents must be conducting an unjust war, and it cannot accept any conflict of loyalties in the minds of its supporters abroad, who may be torn between communism and national feeling.

As an example of this reasoning, the attack by the North Koreans on South Korea was not regarded as aggression but as civil war (after failure of the original line that it was South Korean aggression). The aggressors, therefore, are the United Nations who 'interfered' in a domestic affair; it is they who are waging 'an aggressive, base and dirty war'. Once civil war has been proclaimed, as in Korea, or 'National Liberation', as in Malaya and Indochina, anyone who resists the 'proletarian camp' is an imperialist, while every non-Communist who takes up arms to defend his interests is in the situation of the well-known creature in the French zoo: 'Cet animal est méchant. Quand on l'attaque il se défend.'

Warfare as such is thus a problem of expediency, not of morals, for the Soviet leaders. Wars can be 'progressive'; they have 'contributed to the development of mankind' in the past (Kretov). The Soviet Union has even in the past been prepared to initiate such wars. Kretov quotes Lenin as saying that when the Revolution had been successful, peace should be proposed to all countries; the conditions would not be accepted and 'then we will prepare and carry out a revolutionary war'. And (again Lenin) 'he who wants a stable and democratic peace must favour civil war against Governments and the bourgeoisie'.

The Bolshevik view of war has 'nothing in common with simple sabotage of war; for example, the refusal to join up and take arms. On the contrary, it is necessary to join the army. Lenin said: "An oppressed class which does not strive to learn how to use weapons and to gain possession of them deserves to be treated like slaves." ' An imperialist war must be turned into a civil war; illegal revolutionary organisations are to be set up in the army as a preliminary to armed revolt against the Government. 'To fight for the turning of an imperialist war into a civil war means that one is not content platonically to wish the defeat of one's Government but that one actively strives for such a defeat.' The loyal Communist, that is to say, may seek a party victory by working for a national defeat. This is consistent, in that the Bolshevik Party itself achieved power in this fashion. It helps to explain why Communist parties do not oppose conscription in principle, even in non-Communist countries, but encourage their members to learn the use of arms in case the opportunity arises for what the *Soviet Encyclopaedia* calls a 'progressive' war of proletariat against bourgeoisie.

Apart from this, 'Bolsheviks support just wars', which include defence from attack or from 'attempts to enslave' a nation, 'to liberate a nation from the slavery of capitalism or to liberate colonies and dependent countries from imperialist oppression', and 'we fully admit the legality, progressiveness and inevitability of civil wars'—in non-Communist countries, naturally (Kretov). The Soviet Union being 'the true Motherland of the world proletariat', it follows that 'the most just, the most legal and holy of wars is one whose purpose is to defend the country in which socialism has triumphed from attack from without and attempts to re-establish capitalist slavery within. The defence of the Soviet Union and of the people's democracies is the holy duty . . . of the workers of the whole world' (Kretov).

(2) *Soviet theories of waging war*

'Stalinist military theory', as its Soviet advocates describe it, tends to play down specifically military factors, such as surprise and brilliant generalship, as determining military victory or defeat; and to emphasise instead economic and social factors, such as material production and morale. Stalin differentiated between Military Art, or the art of war, and Military Science, or what might perhaps be called the codification of the art of total war, in which steel output and propaganda may be more important than—and even replace—actual battles. Hence Stalin was contemptuous of such devices for warfare as the *Blitzkrieg*; hence his insistence on the speediest possible increase in Soviet industrial power, not necessarily for the maximum immediate output of weapons for the 'Military Art' but to strengthen permanently the all-pervading 'Military Science' of Communism. (See MILITARY SCIENCE.)

(3) *Soviet views on the likelihood of war*

In communist theory, modern war has a single cause—imperialism. 'A handful of millionaires and multi-millionaires are preparing a third world war to swell their profits still more.' (*Moscow Radio*, 1 May 1951.) 'So long as imperialism exists, so long as landowners and capitalists are in power, imperialist wars will be inevitable and democratic peace impossible' (Kretov).

In that case, the question arises: will the imperialists fight each other, or will they combine and turn on the Soviet Union? In the early days of the Revolution, an eventual clash between communism and capitalism was regarded as inevitable. In 1927 Stalin

quoted Lenin as having said that 'our work of construction will depend a great deal on whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist world, a war which is inevitable, but which may be delayed either until the proletarian revolution starts in Europe, or until the colonial revolution is fully mature, or finally, until the capitalists fight each other for the sharing of the colonies' (15th Bolshevik Party Congress).

It is now no longer taken for granted that such a conflict is inevitable. (Stalin's reply to journalists, April 1952.) It is the function of the Peace Movement, not to subvert capitalist governments and replace them with socialist ones (although this is not excluded if conditions should be favourable anywhere), but to prevent capitalist governments from making war on the Soviet Union. 'Either the people will bridle the warmongers and prevent a new war or the imperialists will be able to delude the people and carry out their plans.' (Academician Alexandrov, a party philosopher, in his book, *Socialism is Peace and International Friendship*, Moscow 1952.) He allowed himself a qualified optimism: 'Even the reactionary Governments of certain imperialist countries are beginning to understand that the people are determined to preserve peace and will unleash all the strength of their wrath against the warmongers.'

Stalin does not commit himself to any prophecy as how successful the Peace Movement will be. It may prevent a particular war and preserve peace for the time being. 'Of course this is good—very good indeed.' But it will not end war as such. Two occasions for war between the 'imperialists' will remain: France and Britain against the United States, a revived Germany and Japan against their trade rivals. This, says Stalin, is what happened between the two wars, and it will happen again, because in his opinion American control of the capitalist world is not strong enough. Thus 'the inevitability of wars between the capitalist countries remains', and 'in order to eliminate the inevitability of wars, imperialism must be destroyed'. Official theory therefore, as laid down by Stalin in the *Bolshevik* article of October 1952, is that the inherent strength of the Soviet Union and her allies, aided by the Peace Movement, may be sufficient to deter her enemies from making war on her. This does not mean that there will be no localised war-like incidents between the two camps, since 'in a certain combination of circumstances the struggle for peace might develop in one

place or another into a struggle for socialism', presumably as in Korea. If war between the two camps can be delayed long enough, the USSR's opponents will obligingly make war on each other, as they did in 1939, and relieve it of the effort and risk of destroying their system for itself.

WARMONGER. This word is the usual translation of a Russian expression involving a quite different and more vivid image—*podzhigatyeli voyny*: 'war incendiary'. This has many overtones in a vast rural country like Russia, where arson has long been a favoured means of settling personal grudges, where predominantly wooden towns have hitherto been so at the mercy of fire, and where the landscape and national temperament have tended to encourage the distraction of pyromania. (See, for example, Gorky's essays on this subject; and note the aesthetic feeling in the Russian phrase for a burning haystack—*krasniy petukh*: 'the red cockerel'.) Warmonger, with its suggestion of a trader selling campaigns across—or from under—the counter in self-contained parcels, neatly wrapped, is a pale shadow of the meaning. Nearer, but still less colourful, is the expression popular in the 1930s for arms manufacturers: Merchants of Death.

WOMEN. The role of women and their rights in society is a theme on which Soviet theory and practice do not march in step. In principle, equality for women should be one of the distinguishing marks of socialism. 'The position of women', said Lenin, as quoted by the *Cominform Journal* on 9 March 1951, 'shows particularly graphically the difference between bourgeois and socialist democracy'. The paper went on to develop Lenin's quotation for our own times: 'The sham bourgeois democracy which, in effect, bars women from participation in political and public life, the "theories" of women's social "inferiority", the exclusion of women from elementary civil and human rights, unequal payment for labour, intimidation and befuddling of their minds by the Church, by threats and persecution of their democratic organisation—such is the picture of the position of women in the capitalist countries.'

Yet since Anna Pauker fell in Roumania in June 1952 no woman has occupied a leading role in a Communist State. In the USSR, against the several women Cabinet Ministers of Britain, America and other countries, can be set only the late Mme. Alexandra

Kollontai, a member of the Party Central Committee in the 1920s and once Ambassador to Norway. She was a phenomenon not repeated, and under Stalin and his successors the higher reaches of policy making and execution became exclusively male preserves, except for one out of more than fifty Ministries—the Ministry of Health, held in 1954 by M. D. Kovrigina. Women have access to most trades and professions, but do not occupy leading and responsible positions on anything like a comparable scale with men. It is, for example, a considerable achievement for a woman to become chairman of a collective farm. (The magazine *Sovietskiy Soyuz*, March 1952, considered one such woman, Valentina Shkurova, worth a full page illustration; another woman chairman appears in the film *Kuban Kossacks*.)

Much of the comparison with non-Communist countries is not perhaps to be taken at its face value; the real contrast is not between East and West, but with Communist theory and the vestiges of the old subjection of women in various parts of Russia. Thus the time-honoured view, so prevalent in the orient, that women must work and men must sleep, was attacked by the *Bakinski Rabochi* of Baku (quoted by the *Continental Daily Mail*, 9 May 1952): 'the men must fulfil the basic, more complex and labour-consuming tasks. In the future, those males who avoid heavy farm work and those who protect them (their womenfolk) will be brought to trial.'

If women are to work less hard in Azerbaijan, they are expected to assume tasks in Eastern Europe which have been hitherto regarded as suitable only for men. The East German *Tribüne* revealed on 15 May 1952 that since the previous October women had been working underground in the Wilhelm Pieck mines at Mansfeld, doing 'so-called non-arduous tasks' and working in canvas shoes. In Bulgaria, a former textile worker Stoilka Valdimirova left the mill for the mine and was awarded the title of 'master-miner'. She told the Sofia newspaper *Izgreve* (7 April 1951) that 'I am sure that many more girls will follow my example. By working every day in the mines we shall prove that the women in Bulgaria have the same rights as men.' The wheel of industrialisation has indeed come full cycle since the days in which Karl Marx and other students of the British blue books of the 1840s could regard women's work in the mines as humiliating to them and to society.

Hard work can be done elsewhere than in the mines. A Hungarian girl of 15 'who builds Socialism' is preparing to become a bricklayer. 'She gets up at 4.30 a.m. and is taken by bus to her working place. There she gets her breakfast at 6—a cup of coffee and bread with marmalade—and works until 12 when she has lunch.' (This consists of goulash and an apple.) 'Afternoon work lasts until 5 p.m. At 5.30 they are taken home by bus.' (Assuming she needs half an hour to wash and dress in the morning, the bus journey takes an hour, which would mean that she returns home at 6.30. That is to say that, travel included, she does a 13½ hour day at 15 years of age.) There are compensations. 'On Sundays she has a wonderful time: she either attends a cultural performance or goes for a motor-bicycle ride with young freedom fighters.' (*Kis Ujsag*, Budapest, of 28 March 1951, which reports these details, adds that the girl 'also reads a lot'.)

In Czechoslovakia women are drafted into industry, and for their benefit the Liberated Household was founded to do the laundry work they found difficult to do for themselves. However, washing was sometimes kept for as much as six weeks. The women were told (*Prague Radio*, 8 April 1951) that the Liberated Household 'had its own labour difficulties'. They were encouraged to persevere by being told the view that a woman's place was in the home was now outmoded. The only person who turned up her nose at the working woman was 'the bourgeois woman, incapable of earning enough to buy a loaf of bread, and living as a parasite'. Sometimes the woman is tempted out of the home by being persuaded that there is nothing but drudgery there, nothing but 'wearing themselves out at home day after day in non-productive work' (*Magyar Nemzet*, Budapest).

The corollary holds true. Women are not held in contempt if, though staying at home, their work there can be truly termed productive. Communism has taken over Fascism and Nazism's offer of Medals for Mothers, if they are philoprogenitive enough. In Hungary, for example, a mother who wishes to qualify for the First Class medal of the Order of Motherhood must have had fourteen or more children. In the USSR, the grant of the title of Mother-Heroine was made in July 1954 to 190 mothers who had given birth to and reared ten or more children. (*Tass*, 4 July 1954.)

WORKERS. The Communist picture of the 'workers' is of a basic mass of toiling millions, the 'working masses', disorganised, often not members of any trade unions and generally indifferent to political agitation or ignorant that anything can be done about their misfortunes. From them emerges the 'working class', which is broadly speaking the union-organised and politically-conscious section of the workers. The 'vanguard of the working class' is the Communist Party, entitled to leadership by its 'scientific' analysis of social conditions, past, present, and future. It carries to 'the broad masses of the working people' the light of Marxism-Leninism, 'the ideology of the working class' (*Cominform Journal*, 4 May 1951). These 'broad masses' may include, as an honorary gesture, the so-called 'working peasants'—those who do not own land of their own and can be induced to support the town workers; but who, aiming to become landowners, can never be whole-hearted proletarians.

The hierarchies are well expressed by V. Cervenkov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister: 'the foundation of our State is the alliance between workers and the working peasants, under the guidance of the working class, led by the Communist Party.' (Speech to Party agitators, 7 April 1951.)

YEDINONACHALYE ('undivided authority'), a word used in the past to describe government under a single head, such as a monarchy, is now applied to the powers wielded by commanding officers of the Soviet Armed Forces. These are sometimes known as *komandiry-yedinonachalniki*, or sole-powered commanders. Nominally such undivided authority was re-established during the Second World War by the abolition of political commissars. (7 November 1942.) Political officers remained, however, in both Army and Navy, and after the war there seems to have been a tendency for them to try and recover the Party's authority in the Services. During 1951, however, there was a clear tendency to stress the unique nature of the military commander's authority. The Deputy Chief of the Political Administration of the Army discussed it (*Propagandist i Agitator*, Forces political journal, No. 15, 1951). Major-General V. Moskovski, editor of *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*), the Army newspaper, wrote (15 June 1951): 'The commander is responsible before the state for the fighting preparedness of his unit, the military and political training of his subordinates.

That is why the party and the government tirelessly heighten the role of the sole-powered commander as the authoritative leader and organiser of the education and training of his subordinates. Where the execution of an order is concerned no restriction or criticism of the acts of a commander are permissible. To raise and in every way protect the authority of the sole-powered commander is the most important task of the political organs and party organisations. It is necessary that political training, all party-political work should be directed towards the consolidation of undivided authority, the raising of the authority of the commander and the consolidation of discipline on the basis of severe exactation.' Far from keeping a watch on the military commander, the political representatives are thus expected to use their prestige to support his. He is to be regarded as responsible for their work as well as his own, and the authority of Lenin and Stalin is quoted; both these 'leaders of genius' had proved that 'the most expedient system of administration in the Soviet Army is completely undivided authority, i.e. such a system of administration which puts on the commander the responsibility for all sides of the military and political life of the units and formations. The sole-powered commander takes the full responsibility for military and political training, the education and military discipline of the personnel.' (Col. S. Goncharov, 'V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin on Undivided Authority in the Soviet Army', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 24 October 1951.) The 'selection of the network of party education' in a unit—that is, the choice of political officers—'must take place with the permission of the commander of the formation or unit and according to his directions' (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 15 August 1951.) In sum, 'the sole-powered commander has unlimited authority over the troops entrusted to him' (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 16 December 1951).

The two most immediately likely reasons for the spread of the principle of *yedynonachalye* are that military commanders are now completely reliable politically or that military preparedness must have absolute priority in Armed Forces training. The principle is not, however, confined to them. *Pravda* of 10 January 1952 stated that further progress on the railways demanded 'the consolidation of discipline and undivided authority'. A similar tendency is noticeable, though the word may not be used, in references to the responsibility of the schoolteacher for his scholars and the manager for his factory. In the schools, for example, the young Communist

organisations are forbidden to call children away from their studies 'for the execution of public tasks of whatever nature' (*Pravda*, 11 December 1951).

ZERNOGRAD. See AGROGOROD.

ZHDANOVSCHINA or 'Zhdanoverly' refers to the policies associated with the name of A. A. Zhdanov (d. 1948), a prominent member of the Politburo. In his speech at the founding of the Cominform (1947) he presented the world as being divided into two irreconcilable camps. At home, in the years 1946-48, he led a campaign for Socialist Realism (*q.v.*) in music and literature, and personally attacked many authors and composers for 'formalism' and 'cosmopolitanism'. *Zhdanovschina* came to stand therefore for cultural isolationism and ideological purity at home and ideological pugnacity abroad. Zhdanov died, ostensibly of angina, on 2 August 1948, and so long as Stalin lived, this anniversary was observed with speeches on the radio networks. (In 1953 the Moscow Radio remained silent, but the usual praise for him came from Kiev, Prague and Tirana.) At the 19th Party Congress (October 1952) Mr. Molotov asked delegates to stand in memory of Zhdanov and another dead leader Shcherbakov; three months later a group of doctors (rehabilitated in April 1953) were accused of murdering these two men. They were both praised in an outline history of the Party's relations with the Armed Forces since the Revolution (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 16 April 1954); Bulganin and Khrushchev alone were named with them as Party leaders who had been 'dispatched by the party for war posts' between 1941 and 1945. About the same time the Party and literary press began to criticise a number of authors for their reversion in their recent work to 'naturalism', 'a petit-bourgeois outlook' and 'sentimentality'. Suggestions that *Zhdanovschina* might be reappearing in the arts were apparently contained in a cartoon in *Krokodil* during June 1954, showing an author whose desk was set on top of a weather vane, and who refused to work when there was no wind blowing. Somewhat earlier (in *Ogonyok* during March 1954) the fabulist Malishevsky had made his first appearance for about a couple of years and had written the story of the hare who received a safe conduct pass from a wolf. Despite this, the wolf caught him. The hare produced his pass and the wolf demanded to see the signature.

'It is yours', said the hare.

'What of that?' asked the wolf. 'Let me see what is written above it.'

'You wrote that as well.'

Having read it, the wolf said he could never have put his signature to such a promise; and he tore up first the paper and then the hare.

'Others say', adds the author, 'that he tore up the hare first; and some say that he did not even bother to tear up the paper.'



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